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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines state-society relations in the long 1970s, a pivotal period for Hong 
Kong. Using under-exploited archival evidence, it overcomes the limitations in the existing 
literature written mainly by political scientists and sociologists, which is primarily 
theoretically driven and relies on published sources. It explores how a reformist colonial 
administration investigated changing political culture of the Chinese society, and how 
political activism and shifting public opinions impacted on policy making. It analyses five 
case studies: the Chinese as the official language movement, the anti-corruption campaign, 
the campaign against telephone rate increases, the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary 
School disputes and immigration from mainland China. It shows how the colonial 
administration possessed organizational capacity to monitor the movement of opinion 
direction in the society closely through covert opinion polling exercises, Town Talk and 
MOOD. These constructed ‘public opinions’ were circulated and discussed among high 
ranked civil servants, including the Governor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
They affected policy formulation. Hong Kong people had extremely limited democratic 
rights but the public was involved in the policy making process. The thesis also highlights 
how ‘public opinion’ was a construction. Political cultures in Hong Kong varied in 
accordance with class and age, and changed in significant ways, with Chinese communities 
demonstrating increased readiness to engage in political movements and discourses.  
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Preface 
 
 
 
My pursuit of history can be traced back to 1999. Everything started eighteen years ago when 
I was nine. I went to a book store and purchased my first history book. This book changed the 
rest of my life. I still remember my first time reading history. The heroes, the wars and the 
revolutions. I was like a time traveller experiencing all these historical events. Reading 
between the lines, the feeling was indescribable. The unexplainable contentedness, sorrow 
and pain: ‘as if a hand had come out and taken yours’. Since then, I have aspired to become a 
historian. 
 
Along the way, I have been extremely fortunate to meet numerous history mentors, who have 
inspired and enlightened me, and encouraged me to take the way I have taken. 
 
When I was in elementary school, there was Hilda Yam. While other teachers taught rigidly 
according to the Chinese education curriculum, she was different. I always enjoyed her 
classes. She told us about the two World Wars and how Germany rose to power. She taught 
us Lu Xun and poems of Song and Tang dynasties.  
 
When I was in secondary school, there was Rosaline Kwong. She was my history teacher. I 
was a typical adolescent who was dissatisfied with everything in the world. I still remember 
the time when she taught the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Noticing I was upset, disappointed 
and puzzled, she spent an hour talking to me after the lesson. She was the first person to tell 
me that history did not always have the answers we looked for.  
 
When I was in Eastbourne, I was taught by two history teachers, Jonathan Miller and Richard 
Bunce. They had very different personalities. Miller was the serious one. He always guided 
students patiently and systematically. The Stuart history confused me. From the English Civil 
War in 1642 to Charles I’s regicide and the establishment of Cromwell’s Protectorate: Why 
did everything return to the way it was in 1649? Maybe this is the powerlessness of history: 
things changed but things still stayed the way they were. Bunce was the complete opposite of 
Miller. He loved teasing me because I always looked way too serious. The memories of me 
chasing after him in the dining hall because I had a question on the American Civil War is 
still in the back of my mind. (The more I chased, the more he ran!) I will always remember 
his American history class, Lincoln’s House Divided Speech and how he made us memorize 
all the states in the United States. 
 
When I was in Durham, I was supervised by Alex Barber. His intelligence and quick 
wittedness always reminded me of my own inadequacies as a historian. And his seminars 
were always interesting. I still love seventeenth century British history: a vibrant field which 
indeed ‘turned the history upside down’. And I can never forget my first time handling an 
original manuscript.  
 
Going to York to study my PhD degree is probably one of the best decisions I have made in 
my life. Special thanks must go to David Clayton, who has been a perfect mentor in the past  
three and a half years. David is definitely the best supervisor a PhD student could possibly 
ask for: always patient, supportive and enthusiastic. He taught me the art of being a historian. 
He reminded me of the importance of history in this time of turbulence. When I was in doubt, 
	 VIII	
he was always there to back me up, offering insightful advice and support. I can never forget 
the three-hour marathon-like meeting we had in the Brotherton Library before submitting my  
spin-off article to China Information. Without his encouragement, none of this would have 
been possible. It has been a great pleasure and honour being your student, David. Thank you 
for having so much trust in me. I will always be deeply indebted to you for your tremendous 
support; academic and pastoral. I would also like to thank Jon Howlett, Oleg Besnech and 
Stevi Jackson for their invaluable guidance. I gained so much from every Thesis Advisory 
Panel meeting, which has been truly thought-provoking. Special thanks too to Ma Ngok, who 
hosted me during the Global Scholarship Programme for Research Excellence in Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. Big thanks also goes to academics who were willing to sacrifice 
their valuable time and offer me advice, including John Carroll, Agnes Ku, Lam Wai-man, 
Lui Tai-lok, Michael Ng, Ray Yep and John Wong.  
 
In the past eighteen years, my parents have never questioned the path I have taken and 
offered unconditional support. I can always imagine the difficulty of explaining to others why 
your daughter was a history PhD student in a commercial world like Hong Kong. Thank you 
for everything. I would also like to thank the following friends for their academic and 
emotional support: Alvin Au, Grace Cao, Jessica Chan, Matthew Chin, Yiyun Ding, Sally 
Ho, Charlie Hung, Llewellyn James, April Kwan, Kenneth Lam, Vivian Ng, Rachael 
Treharne and Florence Tsui.  
 
After eighteen years, this long journey has reached an important milestone. I will never forget 
the obligations of being a historian. And I will always be the same Florence, who believes 
that being a historian can make a tiny difference to this world. Thank you for gradually 
turning the dream of this nine-year old girl into reality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Florence Mok                 January, 2019    
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                                                            Introduction 
 
In today’s Hong Kong, there is a growing sense of nostalgia for the late colonial period, 
particularly among the young generation and anti-China activists.1 They view Beijing’s 
interference in politics, education and media as an encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy, 
as guaranteed under the British rule. Yau Wai-ching, the former Legislative Councillor who 
faced disqualification due to her political agenda, described the colonial regime as ‘relatively 
enlightened’ and argued that China was undermining a ‘well-developed political and 
constitutional framework’ ‘step by step’.2 Andy Chan Ho-tin, the convenor of the Hong Kong 
National Party described the last two decades post-handover as ‘a period of regression rather 
than progress’: ‘The situation is so dire that we dare say Hong Kong never experienced such 
horrid colonialism until 1997’.3 The blue flag of colonial Hong Kong, inscribing the Union 
Jack with the coat of arms of the colony, was repeatedly waved by radical localists in anti-
China demonstrations, advocating the Special Administrative Region’s secession from 
mainland China. The picture of colonialism painted by these young activists has raised an 
important question: Do the Hong Kong public have an accurate historical understanding of 
state-society relations in British Hong Kong?  
 
These recent statements about British colonialism are an expression of serious discontent 
towards China’s political intervention in Hong Kong. They are subjective statements used to 
support activists’ political stances. To mitigate against the misuse of history, it is essential to 
																																																						
1 Gary Cheung, ‘Beijing Finds Hong Kongers’ Nostalgia for Colonial Era Hard to Fathom’, South China 
Morning Post, 1 October 2012.  
2 Yau Wai-ching, ‘Democracy’s Demise in Hong Kong’, New York Times, 16 September 2018.  
3 Jeff Lam and Alvin Lum, ‘Hong Kong Separatist Party Leader Andy Chan Ho-tin Calls China ‘‘A Threat to 
All Free Peoples in the World’’ in Fiery Foreign Correspondents’ Club Speech’, South China Morning Post, 14 
August 2018.		
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have a thorough understanding of the relationship between the colonial state and the Chinese 
communities in Hong Kong under British rule. This thesis responds to this agenda by 
undertaking the first comprehensive archive-based study to explore the relationship between 
political culture and policy making in the long 1970s. The overarching research question is: 
How did state-society relations evolve in the period before the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
of 1984? The thesis tackles this question by asking two inter-related questions: What 
strategies were employed by popular social movements, and do they reveal a shift in mass 
political culture?4 In this thesis, political culture is defined as political attitudes and political 
orientations. It mainly examines the attitudes of Hong Kong Chinese towards the colonial 
government, their ideas about rights and entitlement, and sense of political advocacy. In 
particular, it investigates what form of political actions were considered acceptable by 
contemporaries. How did the bureaucratic perceptions of ‘public opinions’ influence the 
colonial government’s ruling strategies? 
 
By focusing on these questions, this thesis hopes to contribute to a new understanding of the 
role played by social movements in policy changes and shifting political culture in Hong 
Kong. Using under-exploited archival records in the Public Record Office in Hong Kong and 
the National Archives in Kew, it offers a new perspective of state-society relations in British 
Hong Kong, which is lacking in the existing work of political scientists and sociologists. Like 
																																																						
4 According to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, level of political participations and attitudes towards politics 
varies in different political cultures. There are three types of political cultures which could be categorized as 1) 
parochial 2) subject and 3) participant. 1) The parochial political culture can be used to describe societies where 
there are no or minimal specialized political roles and expectations of changes initiated by the political system. 
People often do not have knowledge and interest in politics. They may be aware of the presence of a central 
political regime but their feelings towards the political structure are often uncertain or negative. 2) The subject 
political culture refers to societies in which people are aware of politics and political phenomenon. Yet, their 
orientations to engage in politics (‘input objects’) ‘approach zero’. Due to their heavy subjection to decisions 
made by the central government, they are hence, ‘subjects’. 3) The participant political culture is one in which 
members of the society ‘tend to be explicitly oriented’ to both the political and administrative structure and 
process. In other words, they engage in politics actively and are able to exert their influence on the government. 
See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton, 1963), pp. 17-18.  
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revisionist social science and historical literature, the thesis rejects the concept of Hong Kong 
as a ‘laissez-faire’ state. It brings together the disjointed revisionist research on the colonial 
state and Chinese communities in Hong Kong. It contributes to the emergent scholarship on 
the comparative study of late colonialism. To many, Hong Kong was a peculiar case: ‘both a 
political anachronism and a financial anomaly’.5 On the one hand, the colony was a highly 
developed centre of finance and industry; on the other hand, the colonial administrative 
system seemed conservative: a representative electoral system was absent and there was no 
prospect for democracy or independence. The changing state-society relations in Hong Kong 
can be used to identify similarities and differences in experiences of decolonization in the 
British Empire, setting up a transnational comparative framework for further studies.  
 
This thesis consists of six chapters, which include: 
1) Constructing ‘Public Opinions’ through Town Talk and MOOD  
2) The Chinese as the Official Language Movement 
3) The Anti-Corruption Movement 
4) The Campaign against Telephone Rate Increases 
5) The Campaign to Reopen the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School  
6) The Changing Immigration Discourse and Policy 
The first chapter explains how the colonial state solicited public opinions and how they 
influenced ruling strategies. The other five chapters are case studies, which are major events 
of political participation which stimulated heated public discussions in the long 1970s. 
 
Based on five case studies, Chapters 2-6 above, this thesis argues that activists employed 
																																																						
5 Susan Strange, Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline (New 
York, 1971), p. 112.  
	 4	
collaborative strategies to mobilize the public in the 1970s. Activists often resorted to 
informal means, such as petitions, signature campaigns and setting up ad hoc organizations, 
to pull resources, rally support from external parties and pressurize the colonial government 
to introduce changes. Direct confrontation was rare. Activists deployed ideological and 
instrumental reasoning. The thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies.  
 
This thesis also explores how the reformist state monitored political activism and shifting 
popular sentiments. It uses archival sources to detail for the first time sophisticated covert 
polling, Town Talk and MOOD. Through this monitoring, City District Officers gathered and 
provided intelligence on political activism and opinions of people of different social classes 
and age groups to high ranked colonial bureaucrats. This thesis demonstrates how constructed 
‘public opinions’ and intelligence on political activism fed into the policy making process, 
alongside other factors such as London’s interests and relationship with China. 
 
Finally, this thesis reveals to what extent Hong Kong society was homogenous, sharing a 
uniform set of political attitudes and orientations. It investigates how, affected by reforms 
implemented by the increasingly responsive colonial state, mass media and education, the 
general political culture shifted: did people express their concerns more willingly without 
hiding their identities and increasingly accept the need for political activities? It also assesses 
to what extent political culture differed in accordance with social class and age. It tests five 
positions on social differentiation. First, emphasizing their social statuses, the upper middle 
classes disapproved of illegal and informal political engagement. Second, the middle class 
was inclined to be politically indifferent, and tended to be pro status-quo. Third, despite their 
capacity for political mobilizations, the working class was primarily driven by 
instrumentalism, hence, reluctant to engage in political activism unless their stakes were 
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affected. Four, the adult members of the society valued political stability and were reserved 
towards political activism, in particular those of direct confrontation. Influenced by 
traditional Chinese values, the middle aged and elderly groups did not support informal 
popular political engagement. Five, the young generation was divided. While many refused to 
engage in social movements, many at the higher education viewed expressing grievances 
through informal political participation as their rights.  
 
1970s: A Period of Transformation 
 
The 1970s was a pivotal but under-explored period of Hong Kong history. Politically, the 
colonial government’s ruling strategies changed drastically. The British had clearly learnt the 
vulnerability of Hong Kong in the Star Ferry riots in 1966 and the leftist riots in 1967.6 
Before the 1970s, the Urban Council was the only political institution with democratically 
elected members. The Council’s franchise was still very much restricted after its 
inconsiderable expansion in 1965. The absence of an effective communication channel, ‘a 
gap’ between the colonial government and the people, was first identified by the Commission 
of Inquiry after protests against increases in ferry fare turned into civil unrest in 1966. Senior 
civil servants soon acknowledged that the existing law and order was ‘unsustainable’ and 
																																																						
6 The Star Ferry riots took place in April 1966. Before the Cross-Habour Tunnel was built in 1972, the Star 
Ferry was an important transport used by people to travel between Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. In 1965, 
the colonial government announced that the Star Ferry Company had applied for a fare increase of between 50% 
and 100%. The Transport Advisory Committee approved the increase in March 1966. A protest initiated by So 
Sau-chung and Lo Kei took place in early April 1966 but was suppressed by the colonial government. 
Subsequently, the peaceful demonstrations turned into a violent riot, in which vehicles were burnt and shops 
were looted. A person died in the riots with many injured. More than 1,800 people were arrested. In 1967, 
demonstrations broke out in May due to labour disputes in shipping, taxi, textile, cement and artificial flower 
companies. Pro-Beijing trade unions were involved. The demonstrations soon developed into violent riots 
between pro-Beijing leftists and the Hong Kong government. Bombs were placed in various locations. The 
turmoil did not subside until October. 51 people were killed and 832 people were injured. More than 4,900 
people were arrested. See Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (eds.), May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 
1967 (Hong Kong, 2009).  
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sought ‘new forms of legitimation’.7 The 1967 riots represented another ‘legitimacy question’ 
to the colonial state when an industrial dispute rapidly developed into a colony-wide 
disturbance .8 As David Trench recognized, 
 
Hong Kong socially, politically and economically is pre-eminently a community that 
depends on confidence... A loss of confidence could only too easily be generated by 
the successful exploitation of social and administrative problems by the Communists 
or an erosion of our export markets by overseas interest.9 
 
As the introduction of a democratic electoral system was unfeasible, the City District Officer 
Scheme was implemented to restore confidence, enhance legitimacy and improve 
communications in 1968. It was multi-functional. The City District Office was ‘a 
communication agent, a community organizer and a trouble-shooter for the people’.10 On the 
one hand, it facilitated communications between the government and the Hong Kong Chinese 
and explained policies to the public; on the other hand, it addressed people’s grievances and 
fed ‘public opinions’ to the policy makers in the bureaucracy. In 1971, the Secretariat for 
Chinese Affairs was renamed as the Home Affairs Department, which signified ‘the end of 
the colonial phase and the beginning of, albeit still technically colonial, ‘‘home’’ rule’.11  
 
																																																						
7 Ian Scott, ‘Bridging the Gap: Hong Kong Senior Civil Servants and the 1966 Riots’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 45:1 (2016), pp. 132-3, 138 and 144. 
8 Lawrence Cheuk-yin Wong, ‘The 1967 Riots: A Legitimacy Crisis?’, in Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (eds), 
May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967 (Hong Kong, 2009), p. 46.  
9 FCO 40/292, David Trench to Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 23 April 1970; also quoted in Ray Yep and Tai-lok Lui, ‘Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and 
the Dynamics of Social Reforms’, China Information, 24:3 (2010), p. 252. 
10 Ambrose Y. King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots 
Level’, in Ambrose Y. King and Rance P. K. Lee (eds), Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong, 1981), p. 138. 
11 Stephen Ortmann, Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong: Containing Contention (London, New 
York, 2010), p. 40. 
	 7	
State-society relations underwent further changes during the reign of Murray MacLehose, 
who understood that instilling a sense of belonging among the Hong Kong Chinese was the 
key to the enhancement of the colonial government’s legitimacy : 
 
Like any other government this one must govern by consent and must do so without 
the aid of the electoral system. If that consent is to be retained, not only must 
legitimate demands be satisfied, but the population must be convinced that such 
satisfaction is genuinely the object of government. The need is not for administrative 
action producing physical results; there is also a need to secure the active confidence 
of the population. We cannot aim at national loyalty, but civic pride might be a useful 
substitute.12  
 
Under MacLehose, the colonial government became increasingly responsive to popular 
demands. A series of legislative and institutional changes were introduced, including the 
legalization of Chinese as the official language of Hong Kong, the enactment of the ‘Touch 
Base’ policy and the formation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), 
all of which will be discussed using newly available archival evidence.  
 
Socially, a number of long-term reforms were implemented. The Ten-Year Housing 
Programme provided accommodation for approximately 1.8 million people. Free primary 
education was introduced. Social welfare services, public assistance, transport, labour 
legislation as well as the medical and health system were also expanded.13 The long 1970s 
																																																						
12 FCO 40/329, Murray MacLehose to Sir Leslie Monson, Wilford, Morgan and Laird, 16 October 1971; also 
quoted in Yep and Lui, ‘Revising the Golden Era’, p. 253. 
13 John Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2007), p. 161; Chi-kwan Mark, ‘Crisis or 
Opportunity’, in Priscilla Roberts and Odd Arne Westad (eds), China, Hong Kong and the Long 1970s: Global 
Perspective (Basingstoke, 2017), p. 264;  
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also witnessed a surge in political mobilizations. There seemed to be a shift in political 
culture, particularly among the post-war baby boomers, who started to develop a sense of 
belonging to Hong Kong.14 They were not afraid to express their discontent and engage in 
social movements. The emergence of these young activists and the increased responsiveness 
of the colonial state led to a ‘new political and social climate’, which encouraged discussions 
of current affairs in public domain.15 Besides, both legal and illegal immigration from China 
continued to be an important issue, placing pressure on the colony’s housing and welfare 
system, and creating tensions between locals and mainland Chinese. It is possible that a Hong 
Kong identity was constructed in opposition to a mainland Chinese identity.  
 
Economically, with a modern banking system, strong international trade networks and an 
abundant supply of relatively cheap labour, Hong Kong experienced economic take-off in the 
1970s. There was rapid growth in the financial sector. Hong Kong’s Gross Domestic Product 
had increased by 117 per cent during the period from 1968 to 1973.16 The index of real wages 
increased from 100 in 1964 to 184 in 1982.17 The middle class in Hong Kong subsequently 
rose materially and culturally. Throughout this period, Hong Kong served as the most 
important gateway for Communist China to trade with the outside world and generate foreign 
exchange.18 Economic discrepancies between Hong Kong and China became more visible. 
Relations between Hong Kong Chinese and their relatives in mainland experienced changes 
due to the shifting economic statuses. For instance, it was conventional for Hong Kong 
Chinese to send remittances to their relatives in China as the latter were relatively poor and 
																																																						
14 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London, 2004), pp. 180-8; Steve Tsang, Government and 
Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1995), p. 248; Carroll, A Concise History, p. 167-
76; Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W. K. Chiu, ‘Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, in Tak-wing 
Ngo (ed.), Hong Kong’s History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule (Hong Kong, 2002), p. 105. 
15 Ibid., p. 106.  
16 Carroll, A Concise History, p. 168. 
17 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1975), p. 34. 
18 Priscilla Roberts, ‘Introduction’, in Roberts and Westad (eds), China, Hong Kong and the Long 1970s, p. 17. 
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needed foreign currencies. 
 
The 1970s was also a significant period for the future constitutional settlement of Hong Kong 
due to the changing developments in Britain and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Facing relative economic decline, accelerated decolonization and a Communist government 
unlikely to agree to the continuation of British administration beyond 1997, colonial 
bureaucrats were aware that the British rule in Hong Kong was challenging. Geographically, 
the colony was militarily indefensible. The attitudes of the PRC also suggested that the 
colony’s sovereignty was simply non-negotiable. As MacLehose had pointed out, it was 
therefore vital for the British to ‘work out policies in Hong Kong concisely designed to 
prolong confidence and so gain all possible time for conditions to emerge in China in which a 
favourable negotiation would be possible’.19 It was foreseeable that ‘a maximum degree of 
economic progress and tranquillity in the colony, and international respect for it’ would be 
the strongest bargaining chips for Britain in the future Sino-British negotiations, which was 
anticipated to take place in the mid-1980s.20 Nevertheless, the tension between Britain and 
Hong Kong increased in this period. Public confidence towards the British government fell 
due to the devaluation of Sterling in 1967. More restrictive quotas were imposed on textile 
exports from Hong Kong to Britain, as Hong Kong’s tariff free access to British markets was 
untenable once Britain had become a member of the European Economic Community.  
 
To prepare for future negotiations with China, the colonial government had to alter its ruling 
strategies and relationship with its people. The 1970s was also a period of changes for China: 
the admission to the United Nations, the Cultural Revolution, the failed coup of Lin Biao, the 
																																																						
19 FCO 40/329, MacLehose to Monson, Wilford, Morgan and Laird, 16 October 1971; also quoted in Yep and 
Lui, ‘Revising the Golden Era’, p. 253. 
20 FCO 40/704, ‘Planning Paper on Hong Kong’, (date not specified) 1976 p. 11; also quoted in Yep and Lui, 
‘Revising the Golden Era’, p. 256. 
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death of Mao Zedong, and the rise and fall of the Gang of Four. These changes in context did 
not only affect how the colonial government dealt with Hong Kong-China and Britain-China 
relations, it also influenced views of ordinary Hong Kong Chinese towards their motherland 
and the Chinese Communist Party. As the 1967 riots had demonstrated, situation in China 
directly affected Hong Kong’s development. Chinese nationalism and social discontent in the 
colony could be easily exploited by communists and turned into political turmoil. In the early 
1970s, there was a rise in patriotic and anti-colonial movements in Hong Kong, such as the 
Chinese as the official language campaign and the Diaoyu Islands movement. Political 
instability in China also led to an influx of Chinese immigrants from the mainland to Hong 
Kong, imposing tremendous strains on the colony’s resources. Under these circumstances, 
the colonial state constantly faced a tricky task: how to adjust administrative strategies and 
implement reforms which could enhance its credibility and legitimacy without adversely 
affecting Sino-British relations. 
 
The 1970s was an era of instability and uncertainty. It was also the precursors for political 
and social changes in the 1980s and beyond. An exploration of the relationship between 
political culture and policy making in the 1970s is necessary to understand reforms and 
responses initiated by the colonial state and changing Anglo-Chinese relations, leading to the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. Although scholars have recently refuted the notion of 
a ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’ and pointed out that considerable social 
conflicts had broken out in the post-war period, there remains a paucity of detailed archive-
based studies on how social movements were organized and how the public and the state 
responded to political activism.21  
																																																						
21 The concept of ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’ was coined by Lau Siu-kai in Society and 
Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1982). Revisionists, such as Tak-wing Ngo, Ma Ngok and Lam Wai-man, 
had refuted this erroneous view of state-society relations in the 2000s. The development of the historiography 
will be analysed in the following section.  
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The rest of the thesis addresses the dynamics between political culture and policy making in a 
pivotal period in Hong Kong using standard historical methods. The next section of the 
introduction analyses the historiography of Hong Kong and explains more precisely how the 
research questions of this thesis emerged. The second section explains the approach and 
methodology used in this thesis. The last explains the selection of case studies and outlines 
the structure of this thesis. 
 
The Historiography of Hong Kong 
A Minimally-Integrated Social-Political System 
 
The first wave of the history of Hong Kong was typically written from the perspective of the 
colonial state, focusing in particular on political changes introduced by the successive 
colonial governments over time. Geoffrey Robley Sayer, for example, examined changes 
implemented by different Governors, drawing on his own geographical knowledge and 
personal experience of living in Hong Kong as a cadet officer and the Director of Education. 
Eleven out of fourteen chapters of his book were dedicated to detail each Governor’s 
backgrounds, personalities, thoughts and policies, from Sir Hercules Robinson in 1862 to Sir 
Henry May in 1919.22 An almost identical approach was adopted by Winifred Wood.23 
‘Society’, was rarely mentioned in these accounts. Sayer merely indicated that there was ‘a 
steady development in the relations of the government with Chinese community’.24 As 
Christopher Munn has pointed out, historians like Sayer treated ‘the colony almost entirely as 
																																																						
22 G. R. Sayer, Hong Kong 1862-1919 (Hong Kong, 1975). 
23 W. A. Wood, A Brief History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1940).  
24 Sayer, Hong Kong 1862-1919, pp. 127-8. The only records Sayer had about the Chinese society were formal 
political developments that incorporated Chinese elites into the administration, initiated by the colonial state. 
For example, Chinese ‘Peace Officers’ were selected, to be replaced by the ‘Registrar-General’ in 1857 and the 
first Chinese unofficial member was appointed in Legislative Council by Governor Hennessy in 1881 etc.  
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a European enterprises and of pushing the Chinese on the island quite out of the picture’.25 A 
deeper understanding of state-society relations in Hong Kong was missing.  
 
A similar approach was adopted by George Endacott, who mainly examined economic and 
social conditions under different Governors, constitutional changes and the development of 
representative government in Hong Kong. Still writing from a Western colonial perspective, 
Endacott de-emphasized the role played by the Chinese society in the construction of Hong 
Kong. He argued that the colony was a ‘barren rock’ before the arrival of the British: ‘history 
of Hong Kong really begins with the coming of the British in 1841, which arose out of the 
trade between the merchants of Western Europe and China’. Hong Kong only consisted of a 
few small villages and was ‘sparsely populated’ up until the nineteenth century.26 Endacott’s 
work also highlighted that Hong Kong was a special colony due to the adoption of a non-
interventionist philosophy of rule:  
 
The colony of Hong Kong was long regarded as different from other colonies, as a 
phenomenon unique even in the many-sided story of British overseas expansion. The 
dispatches to and from the Colonial Office abound with references to its special 
character and there was some doubt if it could be regarded as a colony at all.27 
 
 The colonial state in Hong Kong was portrayed as ‘a minimum of government’ in the style 
of ‘Benthamite laissez-faire’, with Chinese communities having a limited impact on policy 
formation and the state having a weak relationship with social groups.28  
																																																						
25 Christopher Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841-1880 (Richmond, 
Surrey, 2001), p. 6. 
26 G. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1964), pp. 3-4. 
27 Endacott, ‘Preface’, in Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong 
Kong, 1964), v.  
28 Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, p. 121. 
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This historical tradition arose for a number of reasons. Firstly, the British officials had been 
promoting the rhetoric of Hong Kong as a unique colony with limited state interventions for 
years. For example, Lord Stanley once said ‘methods of proceeding unknown in other British 
colonies, must be followed in Hong Kong’ and Governor Sir Hercules Robinson similarly 
asserted that ‘Hong Kong is totally unlike any other British dependency and its position is in 
many respects so grotesquely anomalous’.29 Secondly, official documents at district level 
were extremely limited during their time of writing. After the end of the Second World War, 
the Urban Council had no elected members. High politics was the focus of research. Little 
attention was given to the Chinese society, leading to an extremely imbalanced and 
fragmentary understanding of state-society relations in Hong Kong. 
 
In the 1970s, intrigued by the absence of political mobilizations in post-industrialized Hong 
Kong, social scientists started addressing the political culture of the Chinese communities, 
using ahistorical methods. In Western models, rapid urbanization was often linked to 
increased political instability and political participation. For instance, Harold Laski held that 
‘organized democracy is the product of urban life; it is therefore natural that it should have 
made its first effective appearance in the intense political activity of the Greek city-states’.30  
Max Weber believed that urbanization had a profound effect on culture and was closely 
related to the rise of the notion of ‘citizenship’.31 Karl Deutsch believed that social 
movements often happened in places which had experienced modernization. Taking many 
developing countries in Asia as examples, the increased number of ‘city dwellers, markets 
farmers, users of money, wages earners, radio listeners and literates’ post-modernization 
																																																						
29 CO 129/2, Letter from Lord Stanley to Sir Henry Pottinger, 3 June 1848; Hong Kong Annual Report 1859; 
they were quoted in Endacott, ‘Preface’ in Government and People, v.  
30 H. Laski, ‘Democracy’, in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 5 (New York, 1937), p. 78. 
31 M. Weber, General Economic History (Glencoe, 1950), pp. 315-8. 
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added ‘pressures for transformation of political practices and institution’.32 Samuel 
Huntington concluded that political violence and instability was more likely to happen in less 
developed countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as ‘rapid social change and the rapid 
mobilization of new groups into politics’ were often accompanied by ‘slow development of 
political institutions’.33 Most existing theories suggested that urbanization and modernization 
would inevitably lead to changes in culture and lifestyles, and hence increase social 
inequalities and the likelihood of the outbreak of social conflicts and political disturbances. 
 
Newly industrialized Hong Kong challenged this anticipated pattern. Compared to other 
modernizing societies, the political situation in the British colony was stable. There was no 
sustained civic advocacy for constitutional reforms. The level of political participation of 
Hong Kong Chinese in formal politics remained extremely low. Norman Miners, for 
example, observed that ‘not only have violent outbursts been rare, but the urban workers 
showed and still show little inclination to protest or organize in legally permitted ways to 
improve their lot’.34 Ambrose King similarly noted that the British colony was ‘an urban 
polity relatively free from riots and political cleavages’.35 His study of Kwun Tong, a 
working class residential area, suggested that ‘the majority’s orientations towards the 
(political) system, the input object and the self as an active role are extremely low’. Half of 
his interviewees were entirely ‘apolitical’: they had no knowledge of and concern in politics 
at all.36 J. S. Hoadley noticed the presence of a ‘discrepancy between potential and actual 
Chinese political participation’. In 1966, eligible voters in the Urban Council election 
																																																						
32 K. W. Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development’, The American Political Science Review, 
55:3 (1961), pp. 493, 498. 
33 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1969), pp. 4-5. 
34 Miners, The Government and Politics, p. 32. 
35 Ambrose Y. King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots 
Level’, Asian Survey, 15:5 (1975), p. 424.  
36 Ambrose Y. King, ‘The Political Culture of Kwun Tong: A Chinese Community in Hong Kong’, Asian 
Journal of Social Science, 5:1 (1977), pp. 134 and 136. ‘Input Object’ refers to organizations or individuals that 
channel demands from the society to the polity, such as political parties and politicians.  
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numbered between 250,000 and 300,000. Nonetheless, the voter registration rate remained 
extremely low throughout the 1970s. Only 12 to 15 per cent of the eligible population 
registered to vote in the Urban Council elections by 1971. In the 1977 election, only 37,778 
of them registered. The voter turnover rate was decreasing: 39 per cent in 1967, 24 per cent in 
1969 and 26.7 per cent in 1971.37 In this light, a number of sociologists and political 
scientists started examining Hong Kong’s political culture to explain this ‘unusual’ pattern of 
development.  
  
According to these scholars, the colony’s political stability was attributable to a general lack 
of interest in political participation. In the words of Ronald Inglehart, ‘different societies are 
characterized to very different degrees by specific syndrome of political culture attitudes’. 
These cultural differences are often ‘enduring’ and have ‘major political consequences’, 
affecting people’s political attitudes and orientations.38 The political culture in Hong Kong 
could be best described by the term ‘political apathy’.39 Theoretically, the apathetic attitudes 
were formed due to a number of reasons. Firstly, political upheavals led to the formation of a 
‘refugee mentality’ among the Hong Kong Chinese in the post-war period. Many believed 
they were only sojourners and considered Hong Kong to be ‘a lifeboat’ in the sea of China. 
Coming to the colony to seek security and stability, many avoided getting involved in politics 
and conflicts, and were primarily driven by instrumentalism.40 Secondly, Confucian values 
also constituted political conservatism among Hong Kong Chinese. According to the 
schooling in Confucian classics, the ideal relationship between government and people was 
																																																						
37 J. S. Hoadley, ‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends’, Asian Survey, 13:6 (Jun., 
1973), pp. 605, 601 and 612. 
38 R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, 1990), p. 15. 
39 According to Miners, Hong Kong Chinese were ‘completely apathetic to the business of government and 
showed no desire to participate in any form of political activity’, in The Government and Politics, p. 32; 
Similarly, King argued that the low voter turnover rate in colonial Hong Kong was ‘an exhibition of political 
apathy’, in ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics’, p. 427. 
40 Ibid., p. 34; J. S. Hoadley, ‘Hong Kong is the Lifeboat: Notes on Political Culture and Socialization’, Journal 
of Oriental Studies, 8 (1970), pp. 210-1. 
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‘analogous to that which should exist between parents and children, or between a shepherd 
and his flock’.41 Under this ethos, ordinary people were not involved in policy formation. The 
harmony of the society was stressed and social conflicts were condemned. According to the 
sociologists, these values created ‘a deep-rooted anti-political attitude among the people’.42 
Confucian theories also neglected the formation and structure of the ruling institutions. 
Instead, they stressed the importance of the moral character of administrators.43 Paternalistic 
rulers were expected and deferred to. 
 
Thirdly, despite the absence of democracy, the colonial state had gained public recognition 
through its practice of administrative co-option. By recruiting Chinese elites into the 
administrative system, the colonial government gained legitimacy by becoming what 
Endacott called a ‘government by discussion’, in which extensive public consultation would 
take place before implementation of any important government decisions; or in King’s words, 
a ‘synarchy’, which was ‘a joint administration shared by both the British rulers and non-
British, predominantly Chinese leaders’.44 Chinese figures of wealth were appointed either by 
the Queen or the Governor into the Executive and Legislative Councils as unofficial 
members. Their opinions were always consulted on important decisions related to Chinese 
customs.45 The practice of co-option could be found outside the public administrative 
domain. According to Miners, consulting the pressure groups was ‘the traditional way in 
which British administrators conduct(ed) their businesses’.46 Before any government policies 
were announced, pressure groups were first to be contacted privately. On the one hand, their 
																																																						
41 Hoadley, ‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese’, p. 613. 
42 Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong, 1988), p. 70; Hoadley, 
‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese’, pp. 612-3; Miners, The Government and Politics, p. 35. 
43 King, ‘The Political Culture of Kwun Tong’, p. 137. 
44 Endacott, Government and People, p. 229; King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics’, p. 425.  
45 Endacott, Government and People, p. 231. 
46 Table 8 in ibid., p. 186. 
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representatives could express their views towards these government proposals and explain 
any difficulties that may involve in implementing the policies; on the other hand, the colonial 
state could avoid undesirable consequences and public responses towards the policies. 
Through working with pressure groups, ‘the interests of the people were virtually represented 
on these committees’.47 The legitimacy of the colonial government was therefore enhanced, 
minimizing the possibility of public resistance. The Urban Council was also set up after the 
Second World War to increase public participation. The first Urban Council unofficial 
member’s election took place in 1952 and the number of unofficial members increased from 
two in 1952 to fifteen in 1983.48 Councillors were typically members of the elite; and the 
franchise was extremely limited. The limited franchise for the Urban Council, the practice of 
administrative co-option and the pressure groups system favoured the men of wealth and 
sectional interests. This system was subject to reform during the period of study in this thesis.  
 
The City District Officer Scheme, introduced under the supervision of the Secretary for 
Home Affairs in 1968, represented the colonial government’s attempt to incorporate 
grassroots opinions into the administrative system. By the end of 1969, there were ten City 
District Officers. Their duties ranged from ‘commenting on the district’s development 
planning’ and ‘organizing festival celebrations’ to ‘handling individual and family cases’ and 
‘answering public enquiries’. City District Officers met with ordinary residents and local 
leaders, and reported back to the Secretariat for Home Affairs and relevant departments.49 
This ‘administrative absorption of politics’ provided channels for ordinary Hong Kong 
Chinese to express their opinions in policy formation despite the absence of a democratic 
political system. As a result, the communication gap between the public and the government 
																																																						
47 Ibid., pp. 188-9. 
48 Miners, The Government and Politics, p. 156.  
49 King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics’, pp. 431-4. 
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had been narrowed. During a period of rising affluence, most Hong Kong Chinese were 
satisfied with the status-quo. They did not demand constitutional reforms.50 
 
Lastly, the low level of political participation could be attributed to the non-democratic 
design of Hong Kong’s political structure. The Urban Council, the only administrative body 
which had elected members before 1985, was in essence an advisory body without executive 
power. The Council was only ‘given general power to provide facilities for recreation, 
culture, and sports; to sponsor and promote theatrical and musical performances; and to 
conduct literary, artistic and sporting competitions and displays’. It could not perform other 
functions without the Governor’s permission and had little financial autonomy before 1973. 
Not only did it have ‘no jurisdiction over their (Councillors’) salaries or conditions of 
service’, its annual financial report had to be sent to the Colonial Secretariat. Many eligible 
Hong Kong Chinese did not waste their time and energy to engage in formal politics. It is 
also worth noting that its electoral franchise was only opened to people who were qualified 
by income, education, or professions. Not until 1983 did the franchise expand to include all 
residents aged over twenty-one and had lived in Hong Kong for at least seven years.51 All 
these factors were given by sociologists to generalize Hong Kong’s political culture 
theoretically, supporting the false notion that there were limited interactions between the 
Chinese communities and the colonial state.  
 
In the 1980s, sociologist Lau Siu-kai described a laissez-faire state and a politically apathetic 
Chinese society. According to Lau, social conflicts were rare in the colony. Under typical 
circumstances, it was strenuous to mobilize Hong Kong Chinese to engage in ‘a sustained, 
																																																						
50 Hoadley, ‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese’, p. 613; Miners, The Government and Politics, pp. 
34-5.  
51 The functions and powers of the Urban Council can be found in ibid., pp. 155-63. 
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high-cost political movement’. Although social conflicts and violence occurred in 1956, 1966 
and 1967, their scale was relatively small or moderate. Lau believed this phenomenon could 
be explained by the ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’. In Hong Kong, there were 
limited links between the ‘autonomous bureaucratic polity’ and the ‘atomistic Chinese 
society’. The colonial state dominated the political sector and was largely free from 
interference by social and economic forces. It did not pursue any kind of activism to intrude 
unnecessarily into the Chinese communities. It also lacked ‘organizational penetration’ into 
the Chinese society. The only linkages between it and the Chinese society were some Chinese 
elites, intermediate organizations and state-sponsored schemes such as the City District 
Officer Scheme, the mechanisms of which were weak.52 The underlying social ethos was 
‘utilitarianistic familism’. Even in a hyper urban-industrial setting, familial interests remained 
the primary consideration among most Hong Kong Chinese, placed above communal 
interests. This resulted in the absence of public spirit and low public morality, and 
subsequently low level of political participation in Hong Kong.53 The term ‘political 
aloofness’ was used by Lau to describe this phenomenon.54 Within these familial groups, 
economic interdependence and mutual assistance were emphasized. In other words, the 
Chinese households in the colony relied on familial networks and were capable of self-
regulating. Many only expected the colonial government to provide stability and did not 
require the state to intervene and deliver equity.55 Due to limited contacts, politics only took 
place at the boundary between the state and society, and was often ‘not highly 
institutionalized in formal or legal sense’.56 
 
																																																						
52 Lau, Society and Politics, pp. 2, 14-20, 122 and 157. 
53 Ibid., pp. 68-85; Lau Siu-kai, ‘Chinese Familism in an Urban-Industrial Setting: The Case of Hong Kong’, 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 43:4 (1981), pp. 978-86. 
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This portrayal was erroneous. Firstly, ‘political stability’ does not necessarily equate to the 
complete absence of political activism. Throughout the history of Hong Kong, the colony 
witnessed a number of political and social mobilizations, indicating a considerable degree of 
political participation among the Chinese population. In the pre-Pacific War period, various 
political and social conflicts took place, ranging from popular insurrection during the Sino-
British Wars to Anti-Japanese boycott and riots in 1908.57 Informal popular political 
participation was prevalent post-1946. In spite of its insignificant scale, the Star Ferry riots in 
1966 signified the emergence of anti-colonial sentiments among some Hong Kong Chinese. 
The 1956 and 1967 riots were due to the on-going Chinese Civil War, inspired by the 
Kuomintang and the PRC. Adhering to the strict definition of political participation, these 
sociologists neglected these activities: only formal and lawful political activities, such as 
participating in Urban Council elections and being members of mainstream political clubs, 
were considered to be political participation. However, a broader definition of political 
activism was not widely accepted amongst historians. Even when studying a mature 
democracy, such as post-1945 Britain with large mass political parties, it is essential ‘to 
expand the concept of politics into that of political culture’: ‘familiar components of ‘‘the 
political’’–party, elections, government, policy– are vital, but should not be privileged’.58 
Popular politics involved writing open letters to the authorities, organizing a boycott, signing 
a petition, joining a protest, engaging in discussions via newspapers. In the 1970s, there was a 
surge in such mass political participation in Hong Kong, as will be detailed in this thesis.  
 
Secondly, it is equally important to note that at times, ‘political culture might not be very 
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political, measured in conventional terms’.59 Social movements rarely addressed a monolithic 
agenda. As Matthew Hilton has noted, ‘individual material advantage is only one 
consideration of being a consumer and that for much of our recent history movements of 
consumers have appeared, which draw collectively on these wider motivations’.60 For 
instance, protests against increased prices of telephone rentals in Hong Kong in 1975, which 
will be examined in Chapter 4, should be viewed as a sort of ‘politics of consumerism’. As by 
making complaints against the increased utility price, activists were also protesting against 
the lack of government regulation over the utility sector. Such activism was not apolitical. 
Little attention was paid to these informal social movements and consumer activism by the 
first generation of sociologists. Hoadley did mention the language movement but only 
considered how it influenced formal political engagement in Urban Council elections.61  
Despite his acknowledgement of the changing political structure and increased political 
activism among the young generation in post-1966 riots Hong Kong, King failed to examine 
these unorthodox political activities initiated by the new force.62 To fully understand the 
political culture in Hong Kong, this thesis expands the traditional definition of political 
participation. It investigates the public discourse and a number of social movements that took 
place in the 1970s.  
  
These studies were ahistorical. Contemporary context was neglected due to the over-reliance 
of these sociologists on social science theories and data generated by interviews. For 
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example, Lau acknowledged that state-society relations in his work were conceptualized in 
‘an ideal typical way’ in order to ‘bring out the crucial features in the phenomena’. His 
adoption of a ‘basically theoretical approach’ inevitably had led to the omission of ‘many 
historical and empirical details’.63 The representativeness of the collected data is also 
questionable due to the limited sampling size. It is certain that the political attitudes of the 
1065 residents and 402 local leaders King sampled in Kwun Tong and the opinions of the 
university students Hoadley collected did not represent the entire Chinese population in the 
British colony. Some of Lau’s data was as well based on a small-scale project conducted by a 
group of final year sociology students. These statistics lacked representativeness. King’s 
selection of Kwun Tong as a case study is also problematic. Kwun Tong was strategically 
chosen by the colonial government to be developed as a main industrial district in 1954. 
Public housing was subsequently built, and the demography of the district mainly comprised 
low-income residents, industrial workers and apprentices, whose education level was likely to 
be low. As King himself had recognized, demographic variables, in particular education, 
income and occupation, were crucial factors that determined political attitudes and 
orientations. These poor methodological constructions resulted in partial and inaccurate 
knowledge of Hong Kong’s political culture.  
 
In addition, the ways these sociologists set up their questions and interpreted their data were 
problematic. Firstly, the level of political participation at Councils and mainstream political 
bodies does not necessarily reflect the level of political participation of the Chinese society. 
Political engagement could be expressed in forms of unlawful and informal political 
activities. Secondly, the adoption of a simple dichotomy between Chinese and non-Chinese 
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Urban Councillors caused inherited deficiencies in Hoadley’s data.64 One should not assume 
that similar political orientations were shared among all Chinese Councillors; and the 
political agenda of these Chinese officials was not necessarily different from, or even 
antagonistic to that of the non-Chinese Councillors. Alternative factors influenced the level of 
participation were not investigated. For example, what propositions were put forward may 
have affected the reactions of these Councillors. It is a gross over-simplification to argue that 
the relative low level of political engagement indicates ‘political apathy’ and a complete 
absence of ‘Chinese liberalism’. Inactivity in the Council could stand for different meanings, 
depending on context. Given that the appointed Councillors still outnumbered the elected 
Chinese members in this period, silence could be interpreted as powerlessness, neutrality or 
even disagreement. Lastly, the low level of formal political participation among ordinary 
Hong Kong Chinese could be attributed to the general belief that the Urban Council only 
possessed limited power and could not effectively influence the policy making process.65 In 
essence, the Chinese officials and population were not politically indifferent or ignoring 
politics completely; instead, it was rationality that led them to engage less. The term ‘political 
apathy’ therefore can never rightly describe the phenomenon of low level of formal political 
participation. 
 
Lau’s methods must be challenged. The fact that more than half of Lau’s respondents stated 
that they ‘would not approve behaviour of those people, who, in safeguarding their family 
interests, engage in social conflict with others, thus resulting in social unrest’, already 
suggested that many still believed that the provision of public good was important despite 
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their familial concerns.66 Many of the questions set by Lau were also suggestive, focusing on 
personal and financial needs. The findings may have been different if these questions, 
instead, focused on public needs, such as education and housing. His claim that ‘social 
classes as structural forces in shaping interpersonal relationships and political actions are 
relatively insignificant in Hong Kong’ deserves further investigation.67 Respondents holding 
diverse views about class does not necessarily indicate that Hong Kong Chinese lacked social 
class consciousness and social class did not affect their political orientations. By dismissing 
the importance of class, the complexity created by the existence of familial members from 
multiple classes was left unexplored. Lau’s approach overlooked ‘class differences within the 
Chinese community’, misinterpreting the Hong Kong Chinese as a homogenous and 
amorphous social entity.68  
 
Similarly, many of King’s data can be interpreted differently. In his case study of Kwun 
Tong, King concluded that the percentage of people that could be labelled as ‘attentive 
public’ in Hong Kong was ‘considerably low’ as about 50 per cent of his respondents never 
followed accounts of public and government affairs.69 Nonetheless, instead of being 
politically apathetic, a number of alternative factors could explain this finding. Long working 
hours, language barriers and poor dissemination of news could account for this. King’s claim 
that the 18.6 per cent of interviewees who provided ‘no answer’ when being asked about their 
feeling of freedom in talking politics with anyone were either being ‘ignorant’ or ‘having no 
orientation toward the input object or toward the self as political actor’ is equally problematic 
and subjective.70 They may still have political discursive exchange with people. By 
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impulsively arguing that the 63.4 per cent of his respondents who were ‘undecided’ whether 
improving the district’s living condition was the responsibility of the government or that of 
the ordinary citizens, were ‘either ignorant of or of no orientation’ towards policy making 
process, King may have misinterpreted the responses.71 Most people would have answered 
‘undecided’ given the absence of a clear definition for the phrase ‘improving the district’s 
living condition’. The respondents could be dutiful citizens who looked after the environment 
and cleanliness of the district; however, they could be powerless if improving the living 
condition meant better urban planning and an increase in the provision of public housing.  
 
Lastly, the influence of Confucianism alone was insufficient to explain the low level of 
formal political participation in Hong Kong. As David Faure has argued, the impact of these 
‘traditional values’ on Hong Kong’s political culture had been overstated: ‘Confucianism no 
more dictates the evolution of the economy or the evolution of politics in Hong Kong or 
anywhere else in East Asia than Christianity may be said to be the driving force of such in 
Europe and America’.72 Other contextual factors were underestimated. Colonialism before 
the 1970s, for instance, had a strong impact on the colony’s political culture. As a historical 
actor himself, Faure recalled that colonialism ‘kept Hong Kong people away from 
discussions of first principles’ and subsequently led to ‘a sense of resignation’. This colonial 
mentality set ‘the limits’ of political participation. Although the colonial government became 
increasingly open in the 1970s, many Hong Kong Chinese still observed these ‘limits’, which 
they believed should not be pushed.73 The failure to take historical context into consideration 
constitutes the major weaknesses of this literature written by the first wave of sociologists to 
investigate political culture during the 1970s and early 1980s.  
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Revisionism 
 
In spite of the limitations, the concept of a ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’ 
continued to dominate the scholarship prior to the 1990s. External observers and expatriates 
purported the idea of a ‘highly insulated state’, which adopted an indirect role, combining 
economic laissez-faire and political non-intervention.74 The claim of political stability and the 
ethos of political passivity were also rarely contested. In his book in 1989, Ian Scott, for 
instance asserted that the public of Hong Kong was largely ‘politically unaware’ before Sino-
British negotiations took place in 1982. After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was agreed 
in 1984, it was argued that Hong Kong people remained apathetic.75 Scott however offered a 
new understanding of state-society relations in regard to class, which was previously omitted 
by sociologists. It represents the first revisionist understanding of Hong Kong’s political 
culture, with a stress on the impact of crisis management by the state. Scott pointed out that 
the colonial government’s approach in handling the changing economic and social structure 
played an important role in Hong Kong’s general political stability. Although political 
turmoil often emerged when economic and social structures evolved, ‘discontent at social or 
economic conditions is seldom sufficient by itself to make people riot’.76 Political crises only 
occurred when the colonial state lacked capability to absorb the discontent by incorporating 
dissidents into the administrative system. In other words, political stability could still be 
maintained through political institutionalizations. In Hong Kong, rapid industrialization in the 
post-war period gave rise to a working class, which was an unstable political force. Hong 
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Kong’s political, economic and social system had created ‘a grey industrial world’, in which 
working hours were intolerably long, working condition was inhumane and opportunities for 
upward social mobility were limited.77 As the 1956 and 1967 riots had demonstrated, the 
workers were unable to express their dissatisfaction with the closed political system. 
According to Scott, the 1966 riots took place mainly because of the economic and social 
conditions of the colony, which were closely related to Hong Kong’s political and class 
structure.78 Despite Scott’s assertion that both the newly-emerged working class and middle 
class were the ‘unstable political forces’ in the colony, he did not discuss the characteristics 
of political attitudes specified to these groups. Furthermore, the role played by students and 
intellectuals, who did not fit into these occupational categories, was not interrogated. They 
were important political actors from the 1960s. The relationship between social classes and 
political culture remained underexplored. 
 
By not relating values to class and institutional position, ideational approaches ignore 
the coercive forces and interests which maintain and enforce conformity to 
established norms…Altered technologies, economic opportunities, or new patterns of 
association and organization (were also ignored).79 
 
The idea that class dynamic had a deterministic effect on political culture was a dominant 
intellectual discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, as the above quote alludes to. As the previous 
section illustrated, the prevailing view amongst commentators on Hong Kong affairs was that 
class did not explain how state and society were evolving in Hong Kong. This view was 
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subject to more profound revisionism in the 1990s. Lau’s assertion about class attracted 
criticism from Tai-lok Lui and Thomas Wong, who argued that the society of Hong Kong 
should not be treated as ‘some amorphous entity’.80 Their research divided the Chinese 
communities into seven different classes, based upon occupations.81 Findings from surveys 
suggested that class-consciousness did exist among Hong Kong Chinese.82 People of the 
lower classes tended to share similarities with Lau’s model: placing heavy reliance on 
familial networks when seeking jobs and solving financial difficulties. However, contrary to 
Lau’s claim, the social members of higher classes were inclined to look for solutions in the 
market, for example borrowing money from a bank and hiring domestic workers.83 Quoting 
the words of Lui and Wong, ‘instead of having a uniform, across-the-board accommodative 
mechanism, familistic-network in character, depoliticizing in effect, there are in fact different 
class based mechanisms at work’.84 Lui and Wong agreed with Scott that the relatively low 
social mobility of manual workers also contributed ‘a source for social instability’, which 
could be noted from the disturbances in 1956, 1966 and 1967.85 Nonetheless, they pointed out 
that in other times, they were relatively moderate and non-militant. This was primarily due to 
their endorsement of traditional Chinese values, which resulted in their political conservatism 
and passivity.86 Their belief that plenty of opportunities were available in the colony also 
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overrode their pessimism about personal advancement and ‘spared the danger of personal 
strain and discontent’.87  
 
Benjamin Leung pointed out that the scale and frequency of industrial actions taken by the 
working class were determined by ‘the strength of labour organizations and the development 
of major political events locally and in mainland China’. In the early post-war period, trade 
unions were affiliated either to the PRC or Taiwan. Workers were therefore only mobilized 
by politics of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.88 The level of industrial 
actions was relatively high during the period from 1946 to 1949 as the Chinese Engineers’ 
Institute was able to create cohesions among labour, making effective mobilization of 
workers possible.89 The leadership of the Chinese Engineers’ Institute was replaced by 
politically-orientated trade unions which were established in the late 1940s. However, during 
the period from 1950 to 1959, the level of industrial strikes remained low as trade unions 
focused on providing welfare benefits to workers and recruiting more members, especially 
from the expanding textile and plastic good industries, to join their unions. Lacking the 
financial and ideological support from big trade unions, industrial strikes in the 1950s were 
minimal. 90  The level of labour movement only increased in 1967, when rising cost of living 
coincided with the outbreak of Cultural Revolution in China.91  After 1967, the working class 
was stabilized due to China’s improved relation with the West and adoption of the peaceful 
co-existence policy.92 These studies did bring ‘social structure’ back to ‘the discussion of 
politics and political stability’.93 Nonetheless, this revisionism was based upon data collected 
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from surveys and interviews. The relationship between class-consciousness and political 
orientations was not subject to analysis using archival sources of trade unions and 
government agencies. Activism was also narrowly defined as engagement in industrial or 
working class politics. 
 
Many questions were left unanswered: What were the attitudes of other social classes towards 
politics? Were they susceptible to political mobilizations in circumstances when demands 
could not be met through markets and familial networks? How did factors, such as age, 
influence the political culture of these groups? How did engagement with the colonial state 
affect social movements? These were some of the questions addressed by revisionist social 
scientists. 
 
Since the 1990s, revisionists have contested the notion of a ‘minimally-integrated social-
political system’ and convincingly argued that it misrepresented the state-society relations in 
Hong Kong. There were two strands in this literature: one analysing colonial statecraft and 
the other examining political culture in the Chinese society. Scholars working on the colonial 
state argued that the existing literature had grossly simplified the complex nature of British 
colonialism in Hong Kong.94 In reality, the colonial state was far from ‘a politically neutral 
state’, which ‘disengaged itself from societal affairs’. Its reach in the Chinese society was ‘far 
more penetrating’ and the state-society relations were ‘far more complicated’.95 Varied ruling 
strategies were adopted in different circumstances. The synoptic view that emerged was that 
state-society relations in Hong Kong were ‘complex and contingent upon particular 
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situations’.96 Sometimes, the ruling elites acted benevolently. Sometimes, they merely 
rewarded their followers. Sometimes, they were repressive. Through the deliberate creation 
of ‘social cleavages’ and the collaborations with various social groups, ranging from elites 
and businessmen to marginalized workers and activists, the colonial state could ‘exercise 
leverage and manoeuvre events into the desired directions’.97 Law Wing Sang labelled this 
network of relations as ‘Collaborative Colonialism’.98 
 
In order to weaken the influence of the Yuen Long faction, the anti-development camp in 
Heung Yee Kuk, a new constitution was passed by the colonial state in 1955, which almost 
doubled the size of the Tsuen Wan faction.99 The constitution, however was revised under the 
pursuit of the Yuen Long camp in 1957, leading to intensified tensions between the two 
groups. Far from non-interference, the colonial government on the one hand, sent the District 
Commissioner to secretly approach the Tsuen Wan camp and discuss the formation of the 
Council for Rural Administration, marginalizing the Yuen Long faction; on the other hand, 
declared the Kuk illegal when it failed to register under the Societies Ordinance. During the 
chaos, the state introduced the Heung Yee Kuk Bill in late 1957 without discussions, 
restoring the 1955 constitution. The pro-development faction dominated the Kuk, which 
smoothened the implementation of development plans in the New Territories.100 The 
exclusion of rural rivals demonstrated the colonial state could be manipulative and 
oppressive.101  
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In the early post-war era, the colonial government intervened to protect the vulnerable ‘infant 
industries’ in Hong Kong. For instance, the colonial administration interfered the cotton 
market during the raw materials shortage. It also restricted the importation of cheap Japanese 
textiles to the colony under the Sterling Area’s exchange controls.102 During the period from 
the 1960s to the 1970s, the state even provided some subsidies, especially with respect to the 
cost of essential commodities, housing and food. The rents of small businesses that were 
cleared from the resettlement areas and relocated in multi-storey buildings were subsidized 
by the Housing Authority. To keep the cost of labour low, HK$149 was provided as public 
housing subsidies to manufacturing workers, which was equivalent to approximately 70 per 
cent of their monthly wage. In 1973, the state subsidies to a working class household reached 
about 50.2 per cent of its average wage. In private housing market, the state also 
implemented rent control, restricting the increase of rent to 21 per cent or less in two years’ 
time.103 The Vegetable Marketing Organization monopolized vegetables wholesale market 
and there was a ‘Rice Control Scheme’.104 The state aimed to keep prices low. It also sought 
to protect local agriculture and food production. The colonial state restricted the volume of 
import of food from China to only 43 per cent between 1954 to 1963, and 50 per cent 
between 1964 to 1980.105  
 
Like other British colonies, there were ‘severe controls on freedom of expression’ in Hong 
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Kong.106 The newspapers in the colony were ‘continuously and systematically monitored and 
pervasively censored through the collaborative efforts of executive actions, legislative 
provisions and judicial decisions’.107 Before 1951, only the Governor could exercise 
censorship power during the state of emergency. The colonial government’s power of 
censorship was substantially strengthened in 1951 after the introduction of the Control of 
Publications Ordinances, which allowed the state to suspend newspapers in peace time 
provided that they may disturb public order and provoke strong popular sentiments.108  
Similar rules were applied to films due to the worries that they could become ‘an ideological 
weapon’ in the context of Cold War.109 Since 1950, the colonial state ‘severely’ regulated the 
film industry and tightened censorship regulations. Films which exacerbated political 
rivalries and provoked feelings of racial or national hostility were subject to censorship as 
they were ‘dangerous to the security of the colony’.110 The freedom to protest in public and 
form organizations was also curtailed by statutory controls throughout the post-war period, 
indicating that the colonial government was aware that it had to keep an eye on social 
unrests.111 In addition, the colonial state intervened in education by tailoring a depoliticized 
school curriculum.112 The colonial state used the curriculum to shape the ‘abstract’ Chinese 
identity of the young generation. Taking the subject Chinese history as an example, to 
prevent the spread of communist and nationalist ideologies in Hong Kong, the colonial 
government only used the work of classically trained and conservative scholars in the 
syllabus. Contemporary political issues were not touched upon. A ‘depoliticized, sanitized 
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version of Chineseness, quarantined from the modern world’ was promoted.113 Consequently, 
students related Chineseness to ‘neither contemporary China nor the local Hong Kong 
landscape’.114 As Ma Ngok has argued, ‘the mutual non-intervention between polity and 
society was overstated’.115 The impact of these constructed ‘public opinions’ had on policy 
making is under-investigated.  
 
The strongest revisionist challenge came from efforts by historians and social scientists to 
reconstruct social movements, with particular stress given to the disturbances of 1966 and 
1967. These were viewed as ‘a watershed in Hong Kong’s political history’.116 Before the 
mid-1960s, Hong Kong’s political discourse was largely influenced by Communist China and 
Kuomintang Taiwan.  There was little concern over local politics. Nevertheless, the sojourner 
mentality ended when Hong Kong Chinese gradually turned into a settled population due to 
the tightening of border control between Hong Kong and China in the 1950s. The strong 
contrast between ‘the lawless horror in the near-totalitarian political system’ of China and the 
stability and capitalist system offered by the colonial government also favoured the formation 
of a new political culture in Hong Kong.117 After the outbreak of the Star Ferry riots in 1966, 
political culture shifted among the young generation, who were locally born and had no 
experience with the Chinese Communist regime. The disturbance led them to ‘reflect their 
life and their role in the local society, and voice their views in a significant way for the first 
time’.118 The ‘firm and carefully calibrated responses’ to suppress the rioters also helped the 
colonial state to ‘win over public support’, leading many Chinese in Hong Kong began to 
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identify the colonial government as ‘their government’.119 Steve Tsang argued that the 
emergence of this ‘distinctly local political culture’ indicated that the ‘apathy’ described by 
Lau was ‘not all pervasive’: ordinary Hong Kong Chinese did engage in political activities, 
especially those focused on the improvement of their living conditions. Tak-lok Lui and 
Stephen Chiu similarly observed ‘a change of popular mind’, especially among the young 
generation, in the mid-1960s. The riots in 1966 and 1967 signified the beginning of a new 
era, in which politics was localized and no longer dominated by affairs of China and Taiwan. 
Identity politics faded away and political demands were now ‘spontaneous, issue-driven and 
non-ideological’. This ‘new political and social climate’ encouraged discussions about 
political affairs in public discourse.120 The emergence of political consciousness and 
increased social movements showed that Hong Kong Chinese, especially the young 
generation, were far from politically apathetic.  
 
Scholars have also investigated state-led reforms of the 1970s, the focus of this thesis. John 
Carroll argued that reformism enhanced the government’s credibility and fostered a sense of 
belonging among the locals.121 This occurred during a period of rapid economic 
development, which enabled Hong Kong people to travel abroad and compare their homeland 
with other cities. Increased economic affluence led to the rise of a local popular culture, such 
as local television programmes, movies and music. As Benedict Anderson pointed out, mass 
media helped the creation of an ‘imagined community’: although people in a community may 
not necessarily know each other in real life, they usually had similar interests or identify 
themselves as part of the place due to their access to mass media, which subsequently created 
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a common public discourse.122 In Hong Kong, mass media shaped ‘collective memories’ and 
refigured ‘popular imagination membership in the Chinese nation-state’, facilitating the 
formation of a distinctive local identity. In many local movies and programmes, ‘the cultural 
differences between Hong Kongers and mainland Chinese’ were emphasized.123 As a result, 
the notion that ‘Hong Kong was politically and culturally separated from China’ was 
reinforced.124 Influenced by the local popular culture, many Hong Kong Chinese ‘became 
proud of Hong Kong’s hybrid status: its blend of Chinese and Western culture and its 
emphasis on both traditional Chinese values such as family and education and on modern 
Western values, such as economic freedom and the rule of law’. Increased economic and 
cultural interchanges between Hong Kong and China further ‘showed Hong Kong people 
how different Hong Kong was from the mainland’. Many Hong Kong Chinese now 
considered themselves to be ‘a special, even different kind of Chinese’ and started believing 
that ‘they could be culturally Chinese without accepting the PRC regime’. As John Carroll 
has observed, the emergence of this local consciousness led many activists in Hong Kong to 
start making more demands to the colonial government in the 1970s.125 The Cultural 
Revolution in China, the anti-Vietnam war movement and student unrests worldwide also 
constituted to this ‘change of mood’, especially in higher education institutions after the mid-
1960s. Decolonization in Hong Kong was further speeded up after the Suez Crisis in 1956. 
The British economy was weakened, making the maintenance of a costly Colonial Office to 
closely supervise the administration of the colony impossible.126 All these factors facilitated a 
change in Hong Kong’s political culture in the 1970s.  
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Published in 2004, Lam Wai-man’s research is the most accomplished work of revisionism. 
Lam’s work consisted of thirteen case studies, which examined thirteen different social 
movements that took place in Hong Kong during the period from 1949 to 1979. Unlike 
surveys, this historical multiple-case interpretative approach took political and social context 
into consideration. Lam expanded the formerly narrow definition of political participation to 
include unlawful and informal activities, such as protests, signature campaigns, petitions and 
discursive discussions. Through examining the scale, intensity and publicity of these 
campaigns, Lam pointed out that political mobilizations were never absent in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong Chinese were far from politically indifferent. Lau’s claim that the Chinese 
society lacked the ‘will and ability’ to challenge the colonial state therefore was 
unjustified.127 She also revised the claims made by Lui and Chiu about the pragmatism of 
protests.128 Lam pointed out that these political mobilizations conveyed different ideologies, 
ranging from nationalism and anti-colonialism to the concept of universal human rights and 
gender equality. Although the culture of de-politicization continued to exist due to people’s 
previous experience as refugees and the influence of the Cold War, it did not stop political 
activism. The cultural indifference to politics made cooperation between political parties 
difficult and led to divisions within activists, and hence, constricted the movements in terms 
of their scale and level of radicalness. The tensions between political activism and the culture 
of de-politicization gave rise to the middle ground: ‘gradualism and reformism within a 
framework of stability and prosperity’, which in turn benefited the colonial government. 
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Activists adopted ‘a reformist attitude towards social changes’: they ‘rarely called into 
question its (the colonial state’s) legitimacy and right to rule’.129   
 
Like much of the revisionism to date, Lam relied on published sources, newspapers to 
construct new statistical series of protests, and government published reports and student 
newsletters to present case evidence. She did not use the standard historical source, state 
records. State records potentially show how the colonial government perceived these social 
movements and whether this public opinion had channelled to the policy making process. 
They also allow investigations into alternative factors, most notably the impact of imperial 
dynamic, the role played by state agencies in London. As Ray Yep has rightly reminded us, 
‘the exchange between the colonial administration of Hong Kong and the British sovereignty 
before 1997, and the interaction between the national government and its subordinate units in 
China since 1949’ can and will always ‘serve as a good basis for evaluating the interaction 
between the HKSAR and the Central People’s Government after 1997’.130 This thesis also 
critiques Lam’s measure of activism. The frequency of an event and the number of editorials 
appeared on newspapers did not reflect public opinions, for or against the movement.  
 
By confining her sources to two newspapers, Ming Pao and Wah Kiu Yat Po, diverse 
opinions and attitudes in other newspapers were neglected. If discursive debates were, as 
Lam argued, ‘in themselves political acts and represent(ed) a particular important and 
relevant mode of (political) participation’, discursive discussions in other newspapers must 
be examined.131 A newspaper’s viewpoint does not always represent that of its readers. 
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However, even if Ming Pao and Wah Kiu Yat Po did represent the views of their readers, 
their circulation figures suggested that they only constituted a small amount of total 
readership, as shown in Table 1 below.132 Ming Pao and Wah Kiu Yat Po only accounted for 
12.25 per cent and 6.97 per cent of all Chinese newspapers sold each day in Hong Kong. Lam 
may be concerned that other less ‘neutral’ newspapers may have presented biased views to 
readers. However, this ‘disinformation’ itself is also a sort of information, which can give us 
a glimpse of the prevailing and oppositional mood. This thesis addresses these deficiencies 
by examining strategies and rhetoric employed by the activists, the public receptions of these 
campaigns.  
 
Table 1: Estimated Circulation Figures of Main Newspapers by December 1971 
Names of Chinese Daily 
Newspapers 
Estimated Daily Circulation Figure 
Wah Kiu Yat Po 68,300 
Sing Tao Man Pao 60,000 
Kung Sheung Daily News 60,000 
Hong Kong Times 40,000 
Tin Tin Yat Po 40,000 
Express /Fai Po 116,000 
Ming Pao 120,000 
Sing Tao Yat Pao 230,000 
Hong Kong Daily News 55,000 
Wen Wei Pao 10,000 
Ta Kung Pao 10,000 
Ching Po 75,000 
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 75,000 
Ting Fung Yat Po 10,000 
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Afternoon News 10,000 
Total 979,300 
 
Source: HKRS 70-7-76-2, Public Relations Department, Government Information Services, 
‘Estimated Circulation Figures of Main Newspapers by December 1971’, December 1971. 
 
 
Approach and Methodology  
 
The significance of this research lies in the richness of the unexplored primary sources. Most 
existing research was carried out by political scientists, sociologists, linguists and 
anthropologists. This thesis is timely and important. It is the first to use the comprehensive 
archival sources to explore political culture and public policy making in this crucial period of 
Hong Kong. Departing from the existing methodologies and focus, it provides a longer 
perspective using historical discipline, aiming at bridging the gap between the past and 
present. This thesis questions: How did unorthodox mass political activities interact with the 
bureaucracy and alter existing political establishments and order? How did political attitudes 
of Hong Kong Chinese of different social classes and age groups shift over time? 
 
An inductive method was employed in the thesis. Evidence was obtained from archives in 
both Hong Kong and London. The state records in the Hong Kong Public Record Office and 
the National Archives in Kew include secret internal correspondence between senior officials 
in Hong Kong and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, intelligence gathered 
by the Commissions of Inquiry and the Home Affairs Department, observations made and 
public opinion polls conducted by City District Officers, speeches delivered by department 
heads and politicians, minutes of meetings of different departments and Councils, published 
government reports, and Chinese press reviews conducted by the state. The combined use of 
state records from both ‘central’ and ‘district’ government bodies provides new perspectives 
on state building and social mobilization. 
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These state records did not only capture officials’ mindsets. They also include open letters 
and petitions written by activists and organizations. Many of these documents were 
confidential and only released to the public domain recently. These under-exploited records 
provide a novel understanding of how social movements were organized and how the state 
responded to political activism. They capture social change and can be used to examine the 
development of associational life, a manifestation of ‘political activism’. The way officials 
and activists described social movements in private correspondences and petitions illustrates 
participants’ political orientations and how activists and organizations were mobilized. Secret 
intelligence gathered by different committees and departments offers information about 
activists’ motivations and their political attitudes. City District Officers’ surveys and 
observations record how ordinary Hong Kong Chinese viewed political activism, which can 
be used to analyse political culture of different groups in the colony. State published reports 
and speeches delivered by senior civil servants reveal rhetoric employed by the colonial 
government to justify its stance and encounter political activism, which can be compared to 
official lines adopted in private internal records. Minutes of departmental meetings and 
correspondence between the Governor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office evaluate 
contemporary mood and explain reasons behind administrative, legislative and institutional 
changes.  
 
Apart from the colonial state’s perspective, unofficial records, such as newspapers, pamphlets 
and student newsletters, have also been collected and consulted. This research is not confined 
to a few Chinese newspapers. Both Chinese and English newspapers have been used as 
sources. Newspaper rhetoric has been studied for certain key moments in time, notably when 
social movements took place and political and social changes were debated in both public 
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and private domains. The mass media played a significant role in constructing the collective 
sense of Hong Kong community. It is also important to note that they were consumer 
products and used by elites to appeal for popular support. Some of the campaigns, such as the 
China Mail anti-corruption campaign, were centred on the media. Newspapers constitute a 
valuable source, indicating changing popular sentiments in the Hong Kong society.  
 
This thesis argues that collaborative strategies were primarily employed by activists in social 
movements to mobilize the masses. Activists set up ad hoc groups to pull resources of 
different political and social groups together to exert pressure on the colonial government, 
These groups included the All Hong Kong Working Party to Promote Chinese as Official 
Language in the Chinese as the official language movement in 1970, the Christian Industrial 
Committee coalition in the campaign against the telephone rate increase in 1975 and the All 
Hong Kong Committee to Strive to Reopen the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee School in the 
Golden Jubilee incident in 1978. Rather than confronting the colonial state directly, these 
coalitions and activists expressed their grievances and solicited public support through 
informal channels. Petitions, signature campaigns, surveys, public opinion polls and open 
letters were methods commonly used to exert pressure on the colonial state. For ordinary 
Hong Kong Chinese, discursive debates on newspapers and anonymous petitions were 
important channels to raise concerns and influence politics. Rallying support from external 
parties, such as MPs, officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, international 
organizations and the press was also prevalent due to the possession of limited resources. 
Direct confrontations, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, were not absent in colonial Hong 
Kong. Nonetheless, these measures often required more resources and were not endorsed by 
the public. They were therefore less popular and used only by the young generation in the 
1970s.  
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This thesis differentiates between ideological and instrumental motivations. Pragmatic 
concerns, such as the ‘livelihood’ of the public, people’s ‘confidence’ and the colony’s ‘order 
and stability’ were almost coined in all social movements by the political actors. This rhetoric 
was indeed effective, especially after the leftist-inspired riots in 1967. As both the Chinese 
society and the colonial government understood that disturbances could break out if public 
confidence was lacking and grievances were not handled properly. Ideologies, such as 
cultural nationalism, anti-colonialism, racial equality and social justice were commonly 
found in students’ slogans and petitions. Nonetheless, they were less appealing to other age 
groups and social classes. This rhetoric was employed by activists to peacefully ‘coerce’ the 
colonial state to give concessions. As the protest against the telephone rate increase has 
demonstrated, terrorism was extremely rare but not non-existent in Hong Kong. Radicals 
threatened the initiation of widespread riots and the use of violence when the colonial state 
neglected public opinions. They however, only represented a small number of marginal 
groups. In other words, radical and violent rhetoric was seldom adopted.  
 
This thesis also argues that political activism and shifting popular sentiments played an 
important role in administrative, legislative and institutional changes in Hong Kong in the 
1970s. The reformist colonial state had developed an increasingly scientific and sophisticated 
polling exercise, Town Talk before 1975 and MOOD after 1975, to assess and understand 
changing public opinions in the Chinese society. Case studies in this thesis suggest that 
emerging social movements successfully pressurized the colonial government to act in 
response to shifting popular sentiments. The procedure normally started with the supply of 
intelligence on social movements and public opinions by local organizations, such as the City 
District Officers and the Home Affairs Department, to senior officials. Preliminary advice 
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was given by these civil servants who observed the community closely. If the event attracted 
considerable attention from the public, a Special Committee or a Commission of Inquiry was 
set up to investigate the issue. After which, the public was invited to take part in consultation. 
This was usually followed by the publication of reports explaining the Committee’s findings 
to the society. Lastly, the colonial state determined whether a new administrative approach 
was to be adopted based on these special reports. During this policy making process, 
nonetheless, a number of factors may outweigh popular sentiments in the colony as a decisive 
factor to determine whether legislative and institutional changes should be implemented. As 
Chapter 3 demonstrates, popular demands were not granted if London’s interests were 
jeopardized. The anti-corruption campaigns did lead to the formation of the ICAC in 1974, 
but the extradition of Peter Godber from Britain to Hong Kong was unfeasible due to 
London’s resistance to amending the Fugitive Offenders Act. The Home Office was 
concerned that the retrospective change would lay both the British and colonial governments 
open to criticism and affect other dependent territories in the British Empire. The colonial 
state’s decision was also influenced by practicality. In Chapter 4, despite public opposition to 
any increase of telephone rate, the Legislative Council enabled the Hong Kong Telephone 
Company to increase telephone rental by 30 per cent in February 1975. The decision was 
made before the Commission of Inquiry completed its investigation since it was the only 
solution to prevent the company from going into bankruptcy. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
diplomatic concerns also delayed the implementation of the new immigration policy in 1980. 
For fear it might endanger the relations with the PRC, London was reluctant to end the Touch 
Base policy despite the Governor’s constant pursuit.  
 
Lastly, this thesis argues that political culture in Hong Kong differed in accordance with 
social classes and age groups. One must acknowledge that people belong to the same social 
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class or age group do not always share similar political attitudes. Difference could be 
attributed to a number of factors which have not been examined in this thesis, such as 
personal experience, level of education and gender due to the absence of relevant archival 
records. Although the heterogeneity within each social class and age group should not be 
understated, the state records provide an overall sketch of varied political culture in Hong 
Kong. The upper class was in general reluctant to engage in political activism. They despised 
informal means of political participation as they believed that these activities were 
undignified and undermined political stability. The middle class on the whole was indifferent 
to informal political engagement. Many were pro-establishment and politically conservative, 
advocating caution in the changing state-society relations. The working class and the 
grassroots level were mainly driven by instrumentalism, leading them to keep themselves 
distant from political activism. They were unaware of the implications of an increasingly 
responsive reformist colonial state, and were not interested in how Hong Kong was governed 
as long as their livelihoods were unaffected. Their capacity for political mobilizations 
however, should not be neglected. As Chapter 4 shows, they formed groups effectively and 
participated in political lobbies when their social and economic interests were jeopardized.  
The adult members in the society mostly believed that political activism should be checked as 
it might go out of hand, threatening the order and stability of the colony. They held a reserved 
attitude towards student activism, which adopted the strategies of direct confrontation. The 
middle aged and elderly groups were influenced by traditional Chinese values. They largely 
disapproved of popular informal political engagement. The young generation was largely 
divided. Some students were reluctant to take part in social movements. Yet, those at the 
higher education tended to consider informal political participation to be an appropriate way 
to express themselves. Relative radical strategies, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, were 
adopted to pursue their ends. In general, the young generation held a less favourable view of 
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the colonial state than their seniors.  
 
The general political culture in Hong Kong had shifted in the long 1970s. In the early 1970s, 
the political culture was relatively conservative. People avoided direct involvement in social 
movements. Even in discursive debates on newspapers, many chose not to disclose their 
identities. Students were often considered radical despite the absence of direct confrontation. 
By the mid-1970s, influenced by reforms implemented by the colonial state, mass media and 
increased education, people became increasingly eager to raise their concerns and express 
their discontent with the colonial government. Moderate informal political channels, such as 
sending petitions and organizing signature campaigns were gradually accepted. In the 
aftermath of the 1967 riots, political activism which directly confronted the colonial regime, 
such as demonstrations and sit-ins, nonetheless was still not widely acknowledged, indicating 
some degree of political conservatism. The frequent coining of rhetoric, such as ‘stability and 
order’, ‘trouble-makers’ and repeated associations of radicals with the leftists suggested that 
the traumatic experience in 1967 was still haunting many Hong Kong Chinese.  
 
Despite their merits, the partiality and limitations of the sources must be acknowledged. The 
author’s understanding of state-society relations in Hong Kong was primarily derived from 
state records which are available in the public domain. Nevertheless, some of these records 
are fragmentary. Documents involving politicians and individuals that are still alive are not 
released. Files containing sensitive content which may influence the present relationship 
between Britain and China are still being retained. Some incriminating archival records had 
either been destroyed on the eve of decolonization or are being kept in the Migrated Archives 
to prevent disclosure. The unavailability of some of these sources constitutes an imperfect 
analysis of state-society relations in the 1970s. The use of oral history is also ruled out in this 
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thesis as priority is given to the examination of under-exploited state records, which are more 
accessible. Developing a sophisticated methodology to source historical actors and conduct 
oral interviews is also beyond the scope of this PhD.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis  
 
Chapter 1 demonstrates that the reformist colonial government invested considerable 
resources and manpower polling a representative sample of people. Since 1968, the 
bureaucracy had started collecting and analysing public opinions regularly through Town 
Talk, a secretive mechanism which was only known to senior officials. This later evolved 
into MOOD, a more systematic and scientific opinion poll in 1975. This chapter shows how 
methodologies and sampling methods of Town Talk and MOOD were refined by the colonial 
regime in the 1970s to enhance the representativeness of its constructed ‘public opinion’. It 
also reveals how this data was distributed to policy makers, which demonstrates that the 
masses did participate in policy formulation but were made structurally invisible by the 
state.133 The thesis then uses five case studies as empirical examples to deconstruct state-
society relations in colonial Hong Kong in the 1970s: how intelligence collected through 
Town Talk and MOOD fed back into the policy making process, and how political activism 
and public discourse influenced the colonial state’s ruling strategies.  
 
The selection of these case studies were based on five criteria. First, they have to be 
significant and controversial issues which can be used to reveal the main tensions in state-
																																																						
133 The term structurally invisible is in italics because the MOOD unit technically was not wholly invisible. 
High ranked officers were aware of its presence. However, far from being a tangible department with its own 
separate and visible structure, MOOD was embedded in the CDO programme. Its operation relied on staff of the 
ten City District Offices. Although high ranked officers were fully aware of MOOD which was embedded in the 
CDO programme, its presence was concealed from the public. Hence, it was structurally invisible.  
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society relations in Hong Kong in the 1970s. All the cases increased political activism and/or 
involved intensive discursive exchanges at all levels of society. Second, these case studies do 
not only include positive responses from the government, but also negative responses. 
Examination therefore can be made to identify the pattern: under what circumstances was it 
more likely for social movement and public opinion to exert pressure on the colonial 
government and successfully influence its policies. Third, these events and issues covered 
most of the 1970s and so allow assessment of the shifting political culture and ruling 
strategies. Fourth, these campaigns are either inadequately covered by the existing 
scholarship, or at least have some aspects which are under-investigated. And finally, there are 
abundant state records about these case studies are available in both archives in London and 
Hong Kong. Popular reactions towards these events and government’s responses can 
therefore be assessed using data derived from underexploited archival sources complemented 
by published sources.  
 
These case studies are arranged in chronological order as event that took place first often had 
knock-on effects on those happened afterwards. For example, language requirements were 
lowered after the language movement in 1970, allowing more Chinese speaking people to 
serve in the colonial bureaucracy, including the ICAC which formed in 1974. The proposed 
increase in telephone rate in 1975 and the Golden Jubilee incident in 1978 quickly became 
heated issues as it was believed corrupt practices were involved, which many Hong Kong 
Chinese considered unacceptable after the formation of the ICAC in 1974. Reading the case 
studies chronologically also enables direct comparison of state-society relations in different 
stages: the early, the mid and the late 1970s.  
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In each case study, the changing public discourse and the organization of political activism 
are analysed. Through which, political culture of different social and age groups can be 
understood. The colonial state’s responses to shifting popular sentiments and social 
movements are then investigated so that the relationship between public opinion and 
administrative, legislative and institutional changes can be comprehended.  
 
Chapter 2 details the Chinese as the official language movement in 1970 which has not been 
covered by existing literature using archival sources. The campaign was significant. The 
legalization of Chinese as the official language of Hong Kong removed the communication 
barrier between the colonial regime and the Chinese society. The stake of the Hong Kong 
Chinese in politics was also drastically enhanced as more Hong Kong Chinese could now 
serve in the colonial government. The movement was substantial. It was endorsed by people 
of different groups and contained a broad spectrum of public opinions, ranging from cultural 
nationalism to instrumentalism.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between a number of anti-corruption campaigns and the 
formation of the ICAC, the most important institutional change in British Hong Kong in the 
1970s. The ICAC was largely successful in restoring public confidence in the colonial 
government. It also played an important role in changing Hong Kong’s political culture. 
People started to identify themselves when reporting cases of corruption. Their fear towards 
officialdom also had been greatly reduced. Corruption had been a serious problem in the 
colony since the post-war period. Institutional reforms however were unfeasible before the 
1970s due to strong resistance from London. The shifting popular sentiments and political 
activism in the colony in 1973 attracted considerable attention from international media and 
MPs. This created an impetus for the colonial government to renegotiate institutional changes 
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to eradicate corruption in Hong Kong.  
 
Chapter 4 examines how telephone rates were regulated in Hong Kong and how this 
influenced consumer movements, and vice versa. In late 1974, it was rumoured that the 
monopolized Hong Kong Telephone Company would increase telephone rates by 70 per cent. 
It soon sparked off colony-wide protests of unprecedented scale, in which activists adopted 
both collaborative and confrontational strategies. The movement was significant since there 
was an anti-colonial agenda behind the protests against rising prices. Poor regulation was 
condemned and the state’s intervention was demanded. It also indicates changing political 
culture. Hong Kong Chinese, including those at the grassroots level, demonstrated 
considerable skills to mobilize support when their interests were at stake.  
 
Chapter 5 documents the Golden Jubilee incident in 1978, which reveals young activists’ 
remarkable capacity for organization, effective communication with post-secondary students 
and MPs in London. The colonial state encountered political activism of teachers and 
students by setting up a Committee of Inquiry. The shifting opinions monitored by the 
colonial government however suggested that political culture in Hong Kong was divided: the 
grassroots groups, middle aged and elderly households largely disapproved of confrontational 
political activism initiated by the educated young generation.  
 
Chapter 6 explores the changing immigration policy in Hong Kong in the 1970s. It was set as 
the last case study due to its different nature. First, it covers the entire 1970s rather than a 
short period of time. Second, rather than political activism, discursive debates were explored. 
It explains how public opinions and other factors, such as international publicity and the 
Sino-British relations, affected the immigration policy of British Hong Kong in the long 
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1970s. The scale of illegal immigration from China strained the colony’s limited housing 
stock and its under-developed welfare and education system since the 1960s. The shifting 
international and popular discourses regrading immigration influenced how the colonial 
government managed this ‘problem’ through implementing a ‘new’ immigration policy. The 
exclusionist immigration policy of the colonial state facilitated increased discriminations 
towards and stereotypes of mainland Chinese. Mainland Chinese illegal immigrants were 
often being referred as inferior due to perceived cultural differences, lack of language 
proficiency and skills, and absence of working ethics. The heightened hostility towards 
Chinese immigrants influenced how Hong Kong Chinese identified with the colony and led 
many of them to engage in intensive discursive debates, demanding reforms and prioritization 
of their access to economic resources and social services. The shifting popular sentiments, 
along with the constraints in land and resources imposed tremendous pressure on the colonial 
government, driving which to affirm necessity of new immigration controls to London in 
1974 and 1980 respectively.  
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I. Constructing ‘Public Opinions’ through Town Talk and MOOD 
 
 
According to Lau’s concept of ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’, the links 
between the ‘autonomous bureaucratic polity’ and the ‘atomistic Chinese society’ were 
extremely limited. The colonial state had no ‘organizational penetration’ into the Chinese 
communities and Chinese households were politically apathetic, reliant on familial networks 
and self-regulating. As a result, ‘boundary maintenance’ was sustained. Politics only took 
place at the boundary between the colonial government and the Chinese communities. These 
political interactions were largely ‘not highly institutionalized in formal or legal sense’. In 
other words, political institutions which allowed non-bureaucratic outsiders to exercise 
political power were absent.1  
 
As the introduction has demonstrated, Lau’s position was ahistorical, theoretical and using 
mainly a non-representative set of interview data, failing to examine the relationship between 
the colonial state and Chinese communities in Hong Kong ‘in a particular structural-historical 
context’.2 Although revisionists had refuted this erroneous view of state-society relations, 
political communications are under-explored. The City District Officer Scheme, which was 
introduced in 1968 to bridge the communication gap between the colonial state and the 
Chinese communities, has not been subject of close historical examination. For example, the 
work of Steve Tsang, John Carroll and Ian Scott only provided a short institutional history of 
the scheme, focusing on the background in which it was established and its key functions.3 
King’s ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots 
Level’ contained the most detailed account about the scheme. Nonetheless, the article was 
																																																						
1 Lau, Society and Politics, pp. 13-21, 121 and 157-9.  
2 Ibid., pp. 21 and 157. 
3 Tsang, A Modern History, p. 190; Carroll, A Concise History, p. 159; Scott, Political Change, pp. 107-10. 
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published in 1975. Relying on published sources and few oral interviews, his understanding 
of the scheme was impressionistic.4 This existing literature neglects to discuss how the 
colonial state constructed and monitored ‘public opinions’ using Town Talk and Movement of 
Opinion Direction (MOOD), a state-funded public opinion polling, not officially included in 
the scheme. The Town Talk and MOOD files have only recently been released to the public 
domain, enabling historians to investigate the mechanism used by the colonial state to solicit 
public opinions at local level. 
 
Using archival evidence, this chapter addresses how the reformist colonial state in Hong 
Kong monitored and solicited changing popular sentiments through covert polling exercises. 
It examines Town Talk and MOOD, two bureaucratic instruments, introduced by the colonial 
state after the leftist riots to monitor shifting public opinions under the coordination of the 
Home Affairs Department and the City District Offices. Town Talk reports were first 
produced in 1968. In 1975, advanced methodologies were adopted to collect public opinions 
at district level. Town Talk was then given a new name: MOOD. This chapter details the 
changing methodologies the bureaucrats adopted to enhance the credibility of this data 
throughout the 1970s. It also explains how these constructed ‘public opinions’ were 
channelled back to the policy making process. By demonstrating that these constructed 
opinions influenced the state’s administrative strategies, this chapter argues that  
the ‘public’ was involved in the policy making process through Town Talk and MOOD. Also, 
unlike Lau’s beliefs, Town Talk and MOOD indicate that political interactions between state 
and the society were formally institutionalized. Although the presence of the polling 
exercises was concealed from the public and therefore people may be taking part in policy 
formulation unconsciously, high ranked officials were fully aware of Town Talk and MOOD, 
																																																						
4 King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics’. 	
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which were embedded in the City District Officer programme. Talk Town and MOOD 
supplied officials with information on strategies and rhetoric employed by activists to 
mobilize the mass in social movements. Containing substantial amounts of valuable data 
about ordinary Hong Kong Chinese in a rich qualitative manner, it also provides analysis of 
the impact of class and age on political culture in Hong Kong. These reports, alongside 
confidential state correspondences and newspapers, will be used in the five case studies in 
this thesis as primary sources, to deconstruct political culture in accordance to social classes 
and age groups. The five case studies also investigate how these constructed ‘public 
opinions’ were channelled into the policy making process and influenced ruling strategies in 
Hong Kong in the 1970s. This chapter provides a foundation for this later analysis.  
 
Post-hoc Official Conceptualization of Public Opinions through Town Talk 
 
Before the 1960s, the colonial government in Hong Kong was jointly administered by 
expatriates and Chinese elites. Bureaucrats often consulted Chinese elites and advisory 
boards before policies’ implementation. They did not consult the public directly. The 
Secretary of Chinese Affairs was the main channel of communication between the colonial 
state and the Chinese communities. Rule of indirect: regular contacts with Chinese traditional 
societies and organizations, such as kaifong associations5, rather than direct from ordinary 
Chinese residents, were used to obtain intelligence on changing popular sentiments.6 Upon 
the collection of opinions, weekly departmental meetings were held in the Secretariat for 
Chinese Affairs. The Secretary of Chinese Affairs then reported verbally at the Government 
House every Friday.7 In the New Territories, District Officers took a similar role. They 
																																																						
5 The term ‘kaifong’ refers to people living in the same neighbourhood.  
6 Lau, Society and Politics, p. 133. 
7 HK 413-1-2, ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, Town Talk, 15 April 1969, p. 1. 
	 55	
served as the link between the colonial state and rural villagers in their areas: on the one 
hand, District Officers informed the government of the local leaders’ opinions; on the other 
hand, they explained government’s development plans and policies to the public.8 The 
Government Information Services was also responsible for monitoring public opinions 
indirectly. While controlling the dissemination of news and shaping public opinions through 
supplying newspapers with a Daily Information Bulletin, the department monitored the press 
closely to evaluate shifting popular sentiments.9 The official conceptualization of public 
opinions generated by these indirect devices were not representative, more a reflection of 
views of Chinese social elites and community leaders. The voices of ordinary Chinese people 
remained unheard.  
 
The Urban Council was the only institution which possessed both executive power and 
democratically elected members. Nonetheless, only two of ten were elected Councillors and 
its franchise remained extremely limited. There were few channels for the public to raise their 
grievances. The colonial state was reluctant to introduce a relatively democratic political 
system as senior civil servants believed that a centralized administration was more efficient. 
They were also concerned that an increasingly democratic local government would lead the 
Chinese government to believe that Hong Kong was moving towards independence.10 This 
contributed to a sense of ‘alienation’, that was felt strongly by many people during the 1960s 
and beyond.11 The Star Ferry riots in 1966 were attributed to social discontent in the colony.12 
A communication gap between the state and the Chinese society was identified by the 
Commission of Inquiry. Opinion polls were not conducted on a regular basis at this point. 
																																																						
8 Tsang, Government and Politics, pp. 39-40. 
9 Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong, p. 165. 
10 Scott, ‘Bridging the Gap’, p. 138. 
11 Tai-lok Lui, 那似曾相識的七十年代 (The Old-so Familiar 1970s), (Hong Kong, 2012), p. 56. 
12 Tsang, A Modern History, p. 189. 
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Public opinions were only gauged on ad hoc basis in response to the riots by the Commission 
of Inquiry, the Secretary of Chinese Affairs and the police force.13 The 1967 riots indicated 
the colonial government’s legitimacy was challenged and reforms were necessary .14 To 
improve political communication between the state and Chinese society, the City District 
Officer Scheme was introduced in 1968, widening channels of political participation without 
democratization or delegation of further executive power to the Urban Council.15 The 
government departed from its previous ruling strategies. The scheme was ‘a multifunctional 
political structure’. Ten City District Offices were set up to provide policy makers with 
intelligence about public opinions, to explain the state’s policies, to answer public enquiries 
and to manage district affairs. This reform sought to incorporate the lower strata of the 
society into the administrative authority. City District Officers observed the people in their 
everyday lives and surveyed them collectively via District Monthly Meetings and Study 
Groups, new devices ‘geared primarily to reach local leaders’; Town Talk, a new confidential 
official publication, was oriented towards ordinary people.16  
 
Since the introduction of the City District Officer Scheme in 1968, City District Officers 
were required to organize the opinions they heard and gathered into weekly written reports, 
the circulation of which were restricted only to department heads and high ranked 
government officials. These confidential reports known as Town Talk captured the weekly 
talk of the town, the qualitative aspect of opinions. Being ‘one of the most important channels 
for soliciting public opinions’, Town Talk aimed to ‘detect any strong current of public 
feeling’ and solicit views of ‘man in the street’ from ‘different walks of life’ in urban areas.17 
																																																						
13 Scott, ‘Bridging the Gap’, pp. 132-7. 
14 Scott, Political Change, p. 124; Wong, ‘The 1967 Riots: A Legitimacy Crisis?’, p. 46. 
15 Scott, ‘Bridging the Gap’, p. 144; Lui, 那似曾相識的七十年代, p. 21. 
16 King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics’, pp. 433-4. 
17 ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, p. 3. 
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It excluded the opinions of the bureaucrats, instead they recorded what they heard in public 
places and on social occasions, both private and public. Public opinions were gathered 
primarily by observing and having casual conversations with ordinary people. 
 
To acquire accurate understanding of shifting public opinions, the colonial state invested a 
substantial amount of time and manpower in the preparation of Town Talk. Town Talk was 
prepared mainly by Liaison Assistants, Liaison Officers and City District Officers. In 1969, 
there were as many as 100 reporting officers spread over the urban areas in Hong Kong. 
These officers were responsible for collecting opinions independently from these ten city 
districts. City District Officers also attended routine staff meetings with field staff in different 
departments, such as the Tenancy Inquiry Bureau and the Resettlement Department, to gather 
the comments they picked up, which were as well included in the report.18 Apart from 
Liaison Officers and City District Officers, Town Talk was prepared by ‘all officers in the 
department’. In other words, senior officers and clerical staff in the Home Affairs Department 
also made contributions. At this early stage, according to the Secretary for Home Affairs, 
Town Talk was only a ‘by product’, which either arose in casual conversations and meetings 
with individuals or was overheard.19 The comments City District Officers solicited were not 
always necessarily sensitive. Sometimes they were ‘almost random’ in the weeks ‘when 
nothing much seems to catch the public interest and imagination’.20 Staff normally did not 
ask for views on any particular topic but only reported what they overheard. However, on 
request, special assessments on public reactions on various matters could be carried out.21  
 
																																																						
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
19 HKRS 413-1-2, D. R. Holmes, ‘The Preparation of Town Talk: A Guidance Note’, 11 October 1969, p. 1. 
20 ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, p. 2. 
21 HKRS 413-1-2, Secretariat for Home Affairs, ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, 27 
November 1969, p. 4. 
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Who did Town Talk observe or interview? To enhance the diversity and representativeness of 
the opinions collected, the importance of not relying on the same people was repeatedly 
emphasized in Town Talk: ‘strangers are a good source and you should acquire the trick of 
striking up acquaintance around the district’. The opinion poll primarily targeted the Chinese 
population. The ‘wealthier non-government, non-Chinese people’ were considered to be 
contacts that were ‘not good’. To avoid natural bias, City District Officers tried not to 
interview excessive people of the same social status. There were also clear definitions of 
different social groups. For example, ‘middle class’ meant households whose monthly 
expenditure was approximately $500.22  
 
To effectively understand the opinions of different social classes, the Home Affairs 
Department continued to expand its contact list. Initially, the Secretary for Home Affairs 
defined ‘public opinion’ as ‘a majority opinion of adults’. In 1969, the contacts which the 
City District Officers had were still very limited. They were mostly ‘more public spirited 
middle class men, older students, housewives, the white collar class and well-to-do-men 
whose English proficiency was limited’. Understanding the constraints, the Home Affairs 
Department increased contacts with grassroots members, such as factory workers, hawkers 
and poorer people. To measure the extent of a comment, the officials had to provide general 
descriptions of the respondents, including social class, occupation or industry and 
geographical area, such as educated middle class and textile worker.23 The continual 
expansion of Town Talk’s contact list to include increased interviewees of different social 
classes and age groups indicates the colonial state’s determination to obtain a representative 
sample of public opinions. Nonetheless, there was also no clear guidance on the number of 
																																																						
22 Ibid., pp. 2 and 4. 
23 Holmes, ‘The Preparation of Town Talk: A Guidance Note’, pp. 1-2. 
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people they should interview or talk to: this was not ‘a statistically justifiable sample of 
expressions of public opinions’.24 As a result, terms such as ‘majority’, i.e. exceeding 50 per 
cent, were used with caution.25 Town Talk was not robust.  
 
Although Town Talk was not statistically representative, its emphasis on qualitative data 
analysis allowed officials to obtain a richer and more in-depth understanding of interviewees’ 
attitudes and feelings. To ensure that data collected was free from official bias, officers were 
instructed to follow certain techniques. Firstly, it was advised that comments ‘should arise 
without prompting’. As to do so would ‘colour what you hear’. When questioning the 
respondents, staff were instructed to frame the questions ‘in a neutral way’. For example, 
instead of asking one ‘don’t you think it is wonderful the government has decided to do away 
with concubines?’, one should frame the question as ‘have you heard of the proposed new 
law? Do you think it is any good? Will it work?’. During the course of contacts, if serious 
misconceptions were encountered, City District Officers were obliged to ‘correct them on the 
spot if possible’. Alternatively, follow-up actions, such as explaining the proposals, passing 
words to relevant departments, should be planned and recorded in the report.26 This was to 
prevent unintended repercussions similar to the 1967 riots which might be stemmed from 
misunderstandings and miscommunications between the colonial state and the Chinese 
society.  
 
After gathering opinions from different respondents, meetings were held to finalize the 
report, which then reached the policy makers. Either the City District Officers held an 
informal meeting during which staff reported on what they heard in the past one week or the 
																																																						
24 Secretariat for Home Affairs, ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, p. 2.; Holmes, ‘The 
Preparation of Town Talk: A Guidance Note’, p. 2. 
25 Ibid., p. 2. 
26 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
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Liaison Officer collected all the comments in the offices. City District Officers then decided 
what to include in Town Talk and were responsible for the summarizing and editing the 
report. It was advised that in particular, topics which people talked about ‘outside personal 
affairs’ or had some connection with the governing of Hong Kong should be included. 
Unexpected views and serious misunderstandings among the public should also be recorded. 
A meeting specifically on Town Talk was subsequently held between the City District 
Officers, City District Commissioners and the Deputy Secretary of Home Affairs to compare 
and cross-check the findings. City District Commissioners and Deputy Secretary of Home 
Affairs then weaved these solicited comments into narratives: ‘coherent if possible but 
incoherent if this is necessary to reflect confusion’. These comments should be followed by a 
‘fairly long or thoughtful reflection’ on the subject. After the report was finalized, it was 
disseminated only to high ranked officials. The Governor would ‘take time to read it’ and 
‘often discuss it with head of departments’, who were also recipients of Town Talk.27 Being 
classified as ‘restricted’, the existence of Town Talk was concealed from the public: ‘we do 
not particularly want it to become publicly known that such a preparation is produced’.28 It 
was the responsibilities of the head of departments to ensure that the report did not ‘get into 
hands of junior officers’.29 Talk Town fed into the policy making process without the public 
knowing.  
 
The relatively unsystematic and unscientific nature of Town Talk attracted criticisms from 
bureaucrats, who questioned the report’s credibility. As early as in 1969, the Home Affairs 
Department recognized that the selection of contacts was ‘often not methodical’ although it 
was also claimed that it was ‘unlikely’ that any subject that was widely talked about would be 
																																																						
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
28 ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, p. 3. 
29 Holmes, ‘The Preparation of Town Talk: A Guidance Note’, p. 4. 
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missed.30 By 1972, there were accusations both within and outside the Home Affairs 
Department arguing that the way opinions were solicited in Town Talk was ‘mostly 
unsystematic’ and comments were largely ‘impressionistic and without statistical support’. 
Some officers still defended its methodologies. For instance, Stephen Y. S. Ho, the City 
District Officer of Central argued that it was intentional that Town Talk was collected ‘in an 
unscientific manner quite different from a statistical research’. The usefulness of the opinion 
poll relied on the fact that it was ‘an album of human expressions manifested through 
personal contact and human relations’. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that after four years 
since the first Town Talk was published, the Home Affairs Department should address its 
limitations. Was it capturing views from different sectors of the community, beyond the reach 
of City District Officers? Why were the views from youth and students ‘comparatively rare’? 
Why were so many insights not incorporated in the reports? Why were they so imprecise, 
with references to the opinions of ‘several housewives’ or ‘a few kaifongs’?31  
 
To improve the quality of Town Talk, the state refined its surveying methodology. To ensure 
that only important matters were included in the reports, the staff focused on ‘hot topics’ of 
the week, as decided by individual City District Officers. The Assistant City District Officers 
acted as the coordinator of Town Talk in different districts. The department also continued to 
expand its contact list and seek more contacts from various sources. As people of different 
social classes had different mentalities and reactions on the same issue. Hoping to enhance 
the representativeness of the opinions they gathered, the Home Affairs Department 
considered a number of recommendations. Rather than merely reporting what they had 
overheard randomly, ‘a more positive method’ was needed and City District Office staff were 
																																																						
30 Secretariat for Home Affairs, ‘The Preparation and Significance of Town Talk’, 27 November 1969, p. 3. 
31 HKRS 489-4-25, ‘Town Talk’, Memo from Stephen Y. S. Ho to C.D.C (HK), 27 January 1972, pp. 1-2. 
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asked to approach different sectors in the community for opinions. Nonetheless, this 
recommendation was rejected as Town Talk should not be collected explicitly. Another 
suggestion that public opinions should be collected by counter staff was also turned down 
due to existing heavy workload.32 With limited resources, the present method of collecting 
Town Talk remained unchanged despite the expansion of contact list. Town Talk remained a 
weekly survey to capture the ‘immediate reaction of the public on controversial issues’.33 The 
failure to introduce significant methodological changes led many bureaucrats continue to 
question the reliability of the report’s findings.  
 
To strengthen the authoritativeness of Town Talk, the Home Affairs Department and the City 
District Officers experimented with new version in February 1975. The new Town Talk 
written report was divided into five sections. The first section was ‘popping points’, which 
consisted of main issues of public concern that high ranked civil servants needed to be 
informed, such as increase in telephone charges, corruption and unemployment. The second 
section outlined popular misconceptions on the state’s policies and actions the Home Affairs 
Department should take to correct them. The third section contained immediate reactions to 
‘hot issues’. The fourth section included rumours which could be formerly found in ‘Small 
Talk’. The last section assessed how public opinions were influenced by television, radio and 
the press. To avoid ambiguity and offer a perspective on social stratification, Town Talk 
indicated the type of persons holding the views reported. Respondents were classified in the 
following groupings in accordance to their age, social class, education level, type of 
residence, gender and occupation. (See Table 2.) Staff also ranked insights using one to four 
stars, ranging from a small minority to the majority. In terms of procedure, the City District 
																																																						
32 Ibid. 
33 HKRS 413-1-2, Note of meeting held on 5 December 74 and 11 December 74 at Wan Chai City District 
Office to discuss ways and means of improving the quality of Town Talk, pp. 1-2. 
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Officers now chaired the District Town Talk meetings and reported to the Deputy Director of 
Home Affairs on every Tuesday afternoon. During each week’s meeting, City District 
Officers also indicated whether the comments they reported were solicited by the staff or 
simply overheard.34  
 
Table 2: Classifications of Social Stratifications Adopted in Town Talk in Early 1975 
Types Classifications 
A. Age  Young  (A1) Middle Aged 
(A2) 
Old (A3)  
B. Social Class Lower Class 
(B1) 
Middle Class 
(B2) 
Upper Class 
(B3) 
 
C. Educational 
Level 
Primary 
Education (C1) 
Secondary 
Education (C2) 
Post-secondary 
Education (C3) 
 
D. Type of 
Residence 
Group A Estate 
(D1) 
Group B Estate 
(D2) 
Squatters (D3) Others (D4) 
E. Gender Male (E1) Female (E2)   
F. Occupation Blue Collar (F1) White Collar 
(F2) 
Professionals 
(F3) 
 
 
Source:  HKRS 413-1-2, ‘Town Talk’, Memo from A. K. Chui to C.D.O.s, 5 February 1975, 
p. 2. 
 
 
From 1968 to 1975, the Town Talk exercise was the main device the colonial state adopted to 
improve political communications and gauge shifting public sentiments in the Chinese 
communities directly. To solicit a representative sample of public opinions, the colonial 
government invested a considerable amount of manpower and time on Town Talk. Prior to 
1970, there were more than 100 staff engaged in the exercise, which was a weekly practice. 
These polling exercises were not conducted explicitly in the public and the reports derived 
from them were highly restrictive. Only high ranked officials who were involved in the 
policy making process had access to them. This created a false impression that the public was 
																																																						
34 HKRS 413-1-2, ‘Town Talk’, Memo from A. K. Chui to C.D.O.s, 5 February 1975, pp. 1-3. 
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not involved in the policy formulation process. Nonetheless, as later chapters will 
demonstrate, these constructed ‘public opinions’ had a direct impact on the colonial state’s 
ruling strategies.  
 
A selective qualitative survey, Town Talk, enabled officials to have an improved 
understanding of shifting popular attitudes and sentiments. High ranked civil servants 
considered this information before introducing administrative, legislative and institutional 
changes in Hong Kong. The fact that the Home Affairs Department continued to introduce 
methodological advancements to the exercise also suggests the report’s value to colonial 
bureaucrats. The next section explains why MOOD replaced Town Talk, and how the colonial 
state improved MOOD in the second half of the 1970s. 
 
From Town Talk to MOOD 
 
The fact that there were no clear guidelines in the late 1960s and early 1970s on who the City 
District Officers should interview resulted in interviewees being consulted spontaneously and 
repeatedly. This put the report’s authoritativeness in question. As Augustine Kam Chui, the 
Deputy Director of the Home Affairs Department, noted: 
 
The major criticism of Town Talk over years has been that it was unsystematic and had no 
statistical basis. This will always be the case but its credibility can be increased very 
considerably if the staff involved each contact a predetermined number of people every 
week to ensure that the coverage is as widely extended as feasible.35 
 
																																																						
35 HKRS 394-27-9, ‘Town Talk, Memo from A. K. Chui to all C.D.O.’, 24 February 1975, p.  2.  
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In this context, MOOD, a successor of Town Talk, was introduced in March 1975. It intended 
to be a ‘more authoritative and therefore influential’ public opinion poll to replace Town 
Talk.36 MOOD was a confidential report generated by the Home Affairs Department, the 
main purpose of which was ‘to draw attention to subjects which are currently or potentially of 
public concern, and to assess public reactions, attitudes and feelings in appropriate 
instances’.37 Nonetheless, MOOD focused on a number of aspects Town Talk did not pay 
attention to. MOOD placed its priority on collecting opinions that were not from analysis of 
the media. It examined the impact of the press on public opinions, public misconceptions and 
voices of ‘the less articulated classes’ who ‘cannot get their views heard and have therefore 
suffered in silence’. Controversial topics and anti-government activities were investigated, as 
well the opinions of civil servants who disagreed with state policies. MOOD was important 
for colonial bureaucrats. It was stated clearly that MOOD was given ‘the first priority over all 
other work’ as it was ‘read by the Governor and his policy advisers every week, and was 
referenced during policy making’.38 Due to the sensitivity of the intelligence gathered, the 
reports similarly only circulated among senior officials.39 Heads of departments were 
reminded to store their MOOD reports ‘securely all the time’.40 Its highly restrictive nature 
also suggests MOOD findings were acknowledged and handled carefully. 
 
As the existing polling exercise was ‘not comparable with that of a professional public 
opinion survey’, which reduced accuracy, the administration sought to improve the 
methodologies of MOOD. Opinion polling was evidently valuable to bureaucrats. The 
																																																						
36 Ibid., p. 1. 
37 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘MOOD: Movement of Opinion Direction’, 13 March 1975, p. 1. 
38 ‘Town Talk, Memo from Chui to all C.D.O.’, pp. 1 and 3. 
39 The circulation rate of MOOD varied throughout the 1970s, ranging from 153 to 167 copies. They were only 
sent to policy makers and high ranked officials, usually the secretaries and heads of each department, such as the 
Chief Secretary, the Secretary of Local Intelligence Committee and the Director of Information Service. For the 
full distribution list, see Table A in Appendix.  
40 ‘MOOD: Movement of Opinion Direction’, p. 2. 
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colonial state made investment to improve this source of intelligence throughout the 1970s. 
Compared to Town Talk, archival evidence suggests that MOOD was a sizable unit with a 
clear chain of accountability. The total staff involved increased from 100 in Town Talk to 
about 280 to 380 in MOOD. (See Table 3.) Records also reveal that the Home Affairs 
Department was systematic in observing and soliciting public opinions. Unlike Town Talk, 
MOOD was no longer a by-product derived from random conversations. A sophisticated and 
systematic polling scheme was developed to solicit public opinions. City District Officers 
were no longer at discretion to choose the subject of investigation. Instead, the topic of each 
exercise was selected by the Deputy Director of the Home Affairs Department. MOOD 
covered issues that were of the interest of both the public and the government. During the 
period from March 1975 to June 1976, the government used MOOD to examine public 
attitudes towards a number of ad hoc issues, including public reactions to the Labour 
Relations Bill, the proposed increase in public transport charges, school fees and electricity 
prices. The colonial government also displayed a clear interest in general political attitudes 
and identities. Each MOOD exercise began with the debriefing given by the Deputy Director 
at the Home Affairs Department Headquarter after the subject was selected. Policy papers 
were provided to ensure MOOD Officers, who were nominated by City District Officers, had 
‘an intelligent and accurate understanding of the subject (topic)’. Similar documents were 
disseminated to the Community Information Unit in the Home Affairs Department, which 
consisted of six experienced liaison civil servants. During each meeting, the City District 
Officers were given a topic and the number of respondents required. On the next day, every 
City District Officer, assisted by his or her MOOD Officer, held a meeting to explain and 
discuss the subject with the district MOOD team. To reach the grassroots level, the MOOD 
staff then created samples using data supplied by Mutual Aid Committees and kaifong 
associations, under the liaison of community leaders. Each monitor had a fifty person contact 
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list, of which every week, one-third of the people were removed from the list and replaced by 
new contacts. In special occasions, the City District Officers could add the contacts back to 
the list and use them more than once.41 On the other hand, the Community Information Unit 
monitored comments made by the mass media which attempted to determine the sentiments 
of groups and areas that were potentially sensitive, such as coolies and hawkers in some 
circumstances. It also conducted random sampling through telephone calls, using the data 
provided by the Census and Statistics Department.42 Unlike Town Talk, the Home Affairs 
 
Table 3: Chain of Command in MOOD’s Operation in 1977 
 
 
 
(It is estimated that total number of staff engaged in MOOD exercises ranged from 280 to 
380.) 
 
 
																																																						
41 ‘Town Talk, Memo from Chui to all C.D.O.’, pp. 1-3. 
42 HKRS 394-27-9, Extract from minutes from Governor’s Committee, 21 March 1975.  
Secretariat of Home Affairs
Deputy Director of Home Affairs
Assistant Director of Home Affairs
Administrative Officer (MOOD Secretary)
10 City District Officers 
10 MOOD Officers
MOOD Team  (Each district's MOOD team consisted of about 10 staff, who were 
either Executive Officers or Community Organizers.)
Liaison Staff (Total number ranged from 150 to 250 per exercise.)
Community Information 
Unit
(6 staff) 
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Department now regulated the sampling size in each opinion polling exercise. Each MOOD 
drew data from approximately 2,500 people.43 MOOD also advised its staff to be indirect and 
pay close attention to their interviewing techniques. This avoided giving the impression of 
surveillance and could ‘take the respondents off their guards’.44 When the reports were 
returned, the City District Officers convened a meeting in which findings were checked, 
discussed, analysed, and compiled in note form. They had to provide details of the 
respondents, including age group, class, educational background, type of residence, gender 
and occupation. A final MOOD meeting, attended by all MOOD Officers, the Deputy 
Director and the Assistant Director, was then held at the Home Affairs Department 
Headquarter. During the meeting, feedback collected from all districts were examined as a 
whole and compared with data obtained by the Community Information Unit.45 An editor 
analysed findings to produce one MOOD report for circulation. In 1975, MOOD was printed 
on every Thursday for circulation on Friday.46 In 1977, to allow sufficient time for thorough 
investigation, MOOD became a bi-weekly report.47  
 
By 1977, there were between 150 to 250 monitors. They were either full-time Executive 
Officers or part-time Community Organizers working outside office hours. The Home Affairs 
Department built up a regularly updated contact list of about 10,000 people.48 This cohort 
was selected by the Home Affairs Department staff as they were known to be ‘responsive and 
																																																						
43 ‘MOOD: Movement of Opinion Direction’, p. 1; The estimated total population of Hong Kong was 4,045,300 
and 4,402,990 in 1971 and 1976 respectively according to the government censuses. 2500 was about 0.0618 per 
cent and 0.0568 per cent of the estimated total population in 1971 and 1976. See Hong Kong Census and 
Statistic Department, Hong Kong Population and Housing Census: 1971 Main Report (Hong Kong, 1972), p. 9 
and Hong Kong Census and Statistic Department, Hong Kong 1981 Census Main Report: Analysis (Hong Kong, 
1982), p. 15. 
44 HKRS 394-27-9, ‘Needle Point, Session on MOOD’, minutes of Home Affairs Department meeting held on 
21 July 1975, 28 July 1975, p. 2. 
45 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘Information Paper for Recipients of MOOD: How MOOD is Produced?’, MOOD, 5 May 
1977, p. 4. 
46 ‘MOOD: Movement of Opinion Direction’, p. 1. 
47 ‘Information Paper for Recipients of MOOD’, p. 4. 
48  Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
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well-informed about life and problems in their respective social sectors’ and ‘ready to offer 
information, views and suggestions on public issues’. This was not a random representative 
sample derived from population census data. The list was regularly revised to ensure constant 
turnover. Less useful old contacts were removed and new contacts were added, increasing the 
total number of respondents progressively. It was claimed to ‘cover a wide cross-section of 
occupation groups, stratified in respect of age (15-24, 25-44, 45 and above) and educational 
background (primary and below, secondary, post-secondary and above)’.49 About 300 to 400 
people were selected from the list for each MOOD issue. Apart from interviewing people on 
the contact list, the Home Affairs Department staff spoke to people in the community. The 
number of these incidental samples varied in different districts. They ranged from 2,000 to 
3,000 in total. In normal circumstances, no respondent was interviewed more than once in 
less than four months. As the Chief Secretary and the Secretary for Administration imposed 
the duties of assessing and predicting public reactions towards proposed and existing policies, 
on request, the Home Affairs Department was now obliged to report opinion trends on 
specific topics to relevant department directly.50 Apart from the normal contacts, a random 
sample of 20,000 households was selected by the Census and Statistic Department and passed 
to the City District Office staff. This was to ensure that regular and reliable new contacts 
spreading across the full spectrum of social strata in different urban areas were added. Home 
visits were made to these households by the officials, who were responsible for establishing 
an informal rapport on public affairs.51 
 
As with Town Talk, MOOD was a research project concerned with collecting qualitative 
information and public sentiments. It adopted an informal interviewing system modelled 
																																																						
49 HKRS 394-27-9, Memo from Christine Chow to Lam Chow-lo, enclosed in MOOD Review Paper, 6 January 
1977, p. 2. 
50 ‘Information Paper for Recipients of MOOD’, pp. 1-2.	
51 Memo from Chow to Lam, pp. 2-3. 
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input on the Osaka Feedback Scheme and the Japanese Monitor System for National Policy.52 
Nonetheless, unlike Town Talk, each report had tailor-made topics and targeted groups. Tests 
and pilot surveys were carried out in advance, such as checking the sample coverage and 
anticipating non-response rate. This was done to determine the method used in soliciting 
views, for example, whether through observations, sending out questionnaires or 
interviews.53 If it was in the format of interviews, ‘informal’ techniques were employed. 
Questions were not standardized. Staff could tailor the wordings and alter orders of the 
questions which they believed were appropriate for the contacts. Such unstructured approach, 
it was judged, succeeded ‘better than set questions in getting to the heart of the respondent’s 
opinion’.54  
 
Nevertheless, by 1977, bureaucrats were questioning the credibility of MOOD. The 
Commissioner of Census and Statistics, for example, pointed out that ‘MOOD method has 
areas where it can be improved’, such as the choice of samples and statisticians’ conduct.55 
As better-informed respondents were still contacted frequently, reports did not ‘truly reflect 
the attitudes and thinking of an average citizen or a man in the street’.56 In no way was 
MOOD a representative sample. Another criticism of MOOD was that it could be biased. 
Officials used MOOD as ‘an axe of their own to grind’.57 City District Officers’ and 
monitors’ personal opinions distorted public attitudes. People also may have acted reservedly, 
knowing the approaching person was a civil servant. 
 
																																																						
52 ‘Information Paper for Recipients of MOOD’, p. 1. There is no additional information on these methods in the 
Hong Kong archives or in the public domain. 
53 Memo from Chow to Lam, p. 5. 
54 Formal and informal interviewing, content extracted from Claus Moser and Graham Kalton, Survey Methods 
in Social Investigation, (London, 1971), in memo from Chow to Lam, annex A.  
55 HKRS 394-27-9, D. S. Whitelegge to A. K. Chui, 6 April 1977. 
56 HKRS 394-27-9, ‘Some Observations on MOOD Methodology’, 7 May 1979, p. 1. 
57 Whitelegge to Chui.  
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To further improve the methodology of MOOD, it was recommended that a departmental 
representative should attend discussions if that report was requested by a particular 
department. As the current MOOD only covered Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, the 
presence of the staff of the New Territories Administration, such as the District Officer of 
Tsuen Wan, was useful. Not only could they learn the contacting techniques, but information 
from New Territories could also be gathered and used for comparisons. On important topics, 
such as Green Papers on constitutional development, the department used ‘more scientific 
methods’ to check public views regularly.58 To enhance the report’s credibility, three-quarters 
of the contacts in each issue of MOOD became incidental casual respondents. The established 
contact lists in different districts were now renewed and the categorical breakdowns, such as 
age and occupation of respondents, were sent to the Census and Statistics Department.59 
These new arrangements were made possibly because City District Officers and monitors still 
approached better-informed, responsive respondents repeatedly, affecting the 
representativeness of MOOD.  These changes also lowered the risks that officials carried out 
fewer interviews than MOOD required them to. 
 
Even by 1979, the Home Affairs Department was reluctant to change the sampling method, 
as it would have involved ‘extra work’, and was thus impractical given ‘limited resources’.60 
MOOD was instead issued on a monthly basis, allowing more time for fieldworks.61 It was 
not until April 1980 that the Home Affairs Department switched to a quota sampling method. 
The selection of contacts in terms of their gender, age and occupation was now in proportion 
to the number and distribution of the overall population in the area. The most updated general 
																																																						
58 HKRS 394-27-9, Home Affairs Department, ‘Note of a Meeting to Discuss Possible Improvement on MOOD 
Methodology held on 11.5.79 at 2.30 p.m.’, 15 May 1979. 
59 HKRS 394-27-9, Home Affairs Department, ‘Note of a Discussion on Improvement on the MOOD 
Methodology held on 17.5.79 at 3.00 p.m.’, 21 May 1979. 
60 ‘Some Observations on MOOD Methodology’, p. 1. 
61 Ibid., p. 3.  
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population breakdown in terms of gender, age and occupation was supplied by the Census 
and Statistics Department every three months. This new method was probably adopted 
because of the changing geographical distributions of Hong Kong’s population. According to 
the government census in 1971, 25 per cent of the total population lived in Hong Kong 
Island, 18 per cent in Kowloon, 37 per cent in New Kowloon and 17 per cent in the New 
Territories. By 1981, the distribution had changed, with a large increase in the New 
Territories: 24 per cent of the total population lived in Hong Kong Island, 16 per cent in 
Kowloon, 33 per cent in New Kowloon and 26 per cent in the New Territories.62 This 
sampling by district reduced the cost and time used in travelling to other districts, and City 
District Officers had better understanding of the areas and neighbourhoods in their own 
districts. The new methodology reduced the sampling size from 2,500 to 993. These 993 
respondents now included people in Tsuen Wan and Kwai Chung.63  
 
Apart from quota sampling method, random sampling method was also adopted in household 
interviews in 1980 on an experimental basis. In every MOOD exercise, household members 
of selected living quarters in one district were randomly interviewed. The selection of the 300 
living quarters was based on a sample frame provided by the Census and Statistics 
Department, using systematic random techniques. All household members aged 15 and above 
in the chosen quarters were interviewed. Besides, the questionnaire approach was adopted. 
Questions were set out including the alternative of answers. The exact same questions were 
now asked and were in the same order. The answers provided by the respondents were 
subsequently coded. Coding sheets were then processed using manual data processing 
method and table formats compiled. This enabled the analysis of responses and reactions on a 
																																																						
62 Hong Kong 1981 Census Main Report, p. 63.  
63 HKRS 471-3-2, ‘MOOD Methodology, MOOD’, 10 April 1980.  
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‘strictly scientific basis’.64 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, the government invested to improve the methodologies, 
hence the reliability of the polling exercise, indicating the value of MOOD to the 
bureaucracy. The Home Affairs Department introduced MOOD to replace Town Talk in 
1975. Compared to Town Talk, MOOD was way more organized and scientific. In terms of 
content, MOOD examined more different aspects than its predecessor. This included 
comments made by the press, how they influenced popular sentiments and the opinions of the 
lower strata of the society. The theme of each report also became more focused. Rather than 
recording everything officials overheard, only topics that were significant for both the public 
and the bureaucrats were selected and investigated. Statistically, respondents were sourced 
from increased different channels, including the Census and Statistics Department. To 
enhance the report’s representativeness, incidental contacts were increased and the sampling 
size was largely expanded. By the end of the 1970s, quota sampling method and random 
sampling method were introduced to ensure that high ranked officials had detailed 
understanding of shifting opinions of different age groups and social classes in each district. 
While statistical techniques had been improved, MOOD preserved Town Talk’s essence, 
drawing on the local intelligence of City District Officers.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the colonial bureaucracy in Hong Kong invested  
resources and manpower, polling a representative sample of public opinions covertly in the 
long 1970s. To close the communication gap with Chinese people, the colonial government 
																																																						
64 HKRS 394-27-9, Alice Lai, ‘Notes on MOOD Methodology’, 12 September 1980, p. 2. 
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regularly collected and closely monitored the shifting public opinions. Throughout the long 
1970s, the state’s opinion poll evolved from the by-product Town Talk to the systematic 
prototype of MOOD in a scientific manner. When Town Talk was first introduced in 1968, it 
primarily recorded what officials overheard and the random conversations they had with 
Chinese residents in different districts. The report was not statistically robust. It was based on 
a small sample that was self-selected using existing contacts between bureaucrats and 
ordinary people: it was capturing those people willing to discuss their sentiments. These 
people were consulted repeatedly. Techniques changed dramatically over time. The contact 
list of the Home Affairs Department was renewed regularly with the addition of new contacts 
of different social classes and age groups. Indirect interviewing techniques were adopted by 
officials in interviews to ensure that opinions they gathered were free from bureaucratic bias. 
To further enhance the representativeness of the exercise, the state refined the methodologies 
of the exercise and introduced MOOD in 1975.  
 
Rather than recording what officials heard in the public, MOOD examined significant issues 
and events that were of interest to both the Chinese communities and the high ranked 
bureaucrats. In particular, it focused on the opinions of the less articulated social classes and 
the impact of press on public opinions. MOOD was more scientific. The contact list was 
widened and incidental contacts were increased to enhance representativeness. The sampling 
size of each exercise, which was not specified in Town Talk, increased to 2,500 in 1975. 
Areas covered also rose from merely ten City Districts to the New Territories. By 1980, the 
quota sampling method and random sampling method were adopted. Compared to devices 
used by the colonial state to monitor public attitudes before 1967, both Town Talk and 
MOOD were more organized and scientific.  
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Town Talk and MOOD were important direct mechanisms by which ordinary Chinese people 
were consulted on government policy. They contrast with older indirect methods, by which 
colonial state worked through social elites who in theory represented their communities. 
These constructed ‘public opinions’ were new, and could be used to deconstruct political 
culture in accordance with social classes and age groups. 
 
Although it remains difficult for historians to determine exactly how this information was 
used and surviving records are partial, piecemeal evidence in archives suggests both Town 
Talk and MOOD were read by high ranked officials and fed into the policy making process. 
These sensitive ‘public opinions’ circulated restrictively within senior policy makers, 
including the Governor and his policy advisers, and were referenced in policy formulation, as 
noted in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, both polling exercises were not included in the 
official programmes of the Home Affair Department and the City District Officer Scheme, 
their existence was concealed from the public. In other words, the public influenced the 
colonial state’s ruling strategies implicitly. The following five chapters, namely the Chinese 
as the official language movement, the anti-corruption campaign, the campaign against the 
telephone rate increase, the Golden Jubilee incident and the changing immigration policy, 
demonstrate how these constructed ‘public opinions’ had influenced the colonial state’s 
ruling strategies in the 1970s. Along with newspapers and other state records, Town Talk and 
MOOD provide valuable information on strategies and rhetoric employed by activists to 
mobilize the masses and achieve their political agenda in each specific context.  
 
 
	 76	
II. The Chinese as the Official Language Movement 
 
 
 
In 1974, the Chinese language was recognized as the official language of Hong Kong under 
the Official Languages Bill. The Official Languages Bill was the result of a prolonged 
struggle led by a large number of organizations, student bodies and individual activists. The 
language movement was the largest social movement during the long 1970s, and is 
investigated for the first time in this thesis using newly available archival sources, 
complemented by published primary sources, notably newspapers and student newsletters.  
 
Demand to make Chinese the official language of Hong Kong can be traced back to the mid-
1960s, the beginning of a new era, when a new political culture and Hong Kong identity 
started to emerge. It was a time when the Chinese population of Hong Kong gradually turned 
into ‘a settled one’ and the sojourner mentality dissipated.1 In particular, the young 
generation, who were locally born and had no experience with the PRC started to reflect on 
their life and their role in Hong Kong, and express their grievances, as in the 1966 Star Ferry 
riots.2 Popular mood further shifted after the 1967 riots. The post-war baby boomers 
rethought their relations with colonialism. 3 This context, along with rapid economic 
development, increased economic and cultural exchange between Hong Kong and China, and 
the colonial government’s effort to build credibility and respond to public demands, 
facilitated the rise of a ‘distinctly local political culture’.4 With the introduction of the City 
District Officer Scheme in 1968, political communications between the bureaucracy and the 
grassroots public improved.5 The public increasingly involved themselves in current affairs 
																																																						
1 Tsang, A Modern History, pp. 180-1. 
2 Tsang, Government and Politics, p. 248. 
3 Lui and Chiu, ‘Social Movements’, p. 105.  
4 Tsang, A Modern History, p. 223; Carroll, A Concise History, p. 167. 
5 Leung, Perspective on Hong Kong Society, p. 163; Tsang, Government and Politics, pp. 216-9. 
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and politics. Due to a wider cultural shift and bureaucratic reform, political discourse became 
‘spontaneous’ and ‘issue-driven’.6 
 
Despite the importance of the language movement and its potentially strong effects on local 
political culture, the campaign has not been covered in depth by existing literature. J. S. 
Hoadley merely used the campaign to demonstrate that the Chinese population mobilized on 
a temporary basis. He argued that the slow increase in the number of voters registered and 
consistently low voter turnover rate in elections from the late 1960s to 1970s indicated that 
the level of political participation of Hong Kong Chinese remained low.7 When looking at the 
aftermath of the 1967 riots, Ian Scott has also mentioned the development of the language 
movement, but did not explain its significance.8  Lam Wai-man devoted eleven pages in her 
chapter, ‘Rediscovering Politics: Hong Kong in the 1960s’, to examine the development of 
the language campaign and how it impacted on Hong Kong’s political culture.9 For Lam, the 
campaign possessed ‘numerous political meanings’: that the Hong Kong society was ‘moving 
away from its past’; that local identity was starting to emerge; that the members of the young 
generation were searching for political allegiance and had become active political actors. 
Lam argued practical demands and ideological concerns were mutually reinforcing and a 
culture of depoliticization persisted.10   
 
The existing literature has not explored the strategies and rhetoric employed by the activists. 
This chapter therefore uses a wide range of sources collected from the Public Record Office 
in Hong Kong and the National Archives in London to answer the following questions: What 
																																																						
6 Lui and Chiu, ‘Social Movements’, p. 105. 
7 Hoadley, ‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese’, pp. 608-12. 
8 Scott, Political Change, pp. 110-3.  
9 Lam, Understanding the Political Culture, pp. 125-36. 
10 Ibid., pp. 134-5.  
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motivated the participants to engage in the movement? Did the movement suggest a general 
shift in political culture? And what role did political activism play in the legalization of 
Chinese as the official language in 1974?  
 
Shifted Public Sentiments in the 1960s 
 
 
 
Since the early 1960s, there had been discussions about the status of Chinese language in 
public discourses. Hong Kong and Kowloon Joint Kaifong Association Research Council had 
advocated the equality of use for both Chinese and English since 1963. As neighbourhood 
organizations which provided charitable works and welfare services, such as relief, job 
referrals, financial aids, medical services and free education, kaifong associations served as 
one of the main informal channels of communications between the colonial government and 
the Chinese communities. They represented the interests of the Chinese communities to the 
authorities, and publicized and explained the governmental policies to the public.11 Kaifong 
leaders mostly worked in the tertiary sector, whose ‘outward appearances’, ‘living styles’ and 
‘outlook’ showed ‘very little sign of having been ‘‘westernized’’’.12 In the late 1960s, about 
67 per cent of kaifong leaders were born in China. 60 per cent of them had lived in China up 
to twenty years old. 98 per cent of them came from southern China, mainly the Canton 
region. In terms of education level, most of these kaifong leaders were middle-aged men with 
high school or better education. Only 13 per cent of them possessed university degrees. The 
education level of these leaders indicated that their level of English was not high. Most of 
them (67 per cent) did not speak English at all. Only 15 per cent of them used English names. 
Among those who were not born in Hong Kong, only very few (24 per cent) of them had 
																																																						
11 Lau, Society and Politics, pp. 131-2; Aline K. Wong, ‘Chinese Community Leadership in a Colonial Setting: 
The Hong Kong Neighbourhood Associations’, Asian Survey, 12:7 (1972), pp. 590-1. 
12 Ibid., pp. 596-7.  
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sought naturalization. With the decline of kaifong associations in the 1960s due to their 
inability to recruit young leaders, government officials were ‘increasingly reluctant’ to treat 
kaifong leaders as ‘spokesmen of Chinese society’.13 Therefore, the request of kaifong 
leaders for wider use of Chinese language in governmental affairs could be interpreted as 
instrumentalism, an ambition to maintain and raise their personal status. 
 
Another advisory body, Heung Yee Kuk, which was a rural advisory council established to 
advise government’s administration in the New Territories in 1926, also demanded Chinese 
to be legalized as an official language. On 28 September 1967, the Executive Committee of 
the Kuk unanimously supported the proposal of its former Chairman, Chan Yat-sun. 
According to Chan, villagers often received communications from the government in English 
and had to seek assistance. By making Chinese the official language, the communication 
barrier between the colonial state and the villagers in the New Territories could be lowered.14 
  
Since 1964, the language issue started capturing the attention of Urban Councillors. In a 
meeting of the Urban Council in October 1964, Brook Bernacchi, a lawyer and an elected 
Urban Councillor, proposed that the status of official language should be granted to the 
Chinese language.15 He argued by making arrangements to enable bilingual proceedings and 
establish simultaneous translations in the Council, the communication barrier between the 
government and the people could be overcome. As an elected member of the Council and the 
founder of the Reform Club, which advocated political reform, the setting up of 
democratically elected colonial institutions, Bernacchi believed that more Chinese speaking 
people could serve the colonial administration if Chinese became the official language. In 
																																																						
13 Lau, Society and Politics, p. 133.  
14 HKRS 70-3-26-3, ‘Chinese as an Official Language’, South China Morning Post, 29 September 1967. 
15 Hong Kong Government Printer, Hong Kong Urban Council, Official Record of Proceedings, (Hong Kong, 
October 1964), pp. 306-13.  
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1965, another elected Urban Councillor, Henry Hung-lick Hu demanded equality between 
English and Chinese languages. As the Vice-Chairman of the Reform Club, Hu believed that 
by making Chinese the official language of Hong Kong, some unfair government measures 
could be eliminated: ‘A sense of equality and true social justice among the inhabitants of this 
colony’ could be promoted. To pursue language equality, Hu argued that a Chinese 
translation should be attached in all documents of the Urban Council and of the Urban 
Services Department in a public meeting of the Council in August 1965. In October, Hu put 
forward a motion at the Urban Council. For ‘the betterment of Hong Kong as a whole and for 
achieving the fundamental fairness of its inhabitants’, the colonial government should resolve 
the language problem by introducing a system to ensure that all Chinese correspondence 
would be responded to in Chinese. The motion was carried with eighteen votes for, nil 
against and five abstentions.16 In December 1966, another Urban Councillor, Elsie Elliot 
similarly called for the legalization of Chinese as the official language at the Urban Council 
Annual Conventional Debate: ‘The government of Hong Kong must regard all permanent 
inhabitants of Hong Kong as citizens, with citizen rights, by respecting the language of the 
over 90 per cent majority, which should be introduced either as the official language or as 
equal with English’.17  
 
The status of Chinese as a bureaucratic language triggered a simultaneous discussion by 
student organizations. In December 1964, the Current Affairs Committee of the Hong Kong 
University Students’ Union Council issued a press statement on behalf of its members, 
persuading the government to enhance the official status of the Chinese language. These 
																																																						
16 Information about and quotes of Henry Hu are acquired from Chinese University of Hong Kong, Special 
Collection, Henry Hu, ‘The Language Issue from a Councillor’s Point of View’, CU Student, 2:7, 15 October 
1970. 
17 HKRS70-3-26-2, Extract from the speech by Elsie Elliot at the Urban Council Annual Conventional Debate, 1 
December 1966.  
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students argued that it was ‘imperative’ for both English and Chinese languages to be given 
‘an equal place’. An unfair language policy may be misinterpreted as ‘the colonial 
government’s indifference to promoting Chinese culture as a kind of suppression of native 
culture and language’.18 In February 1965, the language issue captured increased attentions 
from students when a dispute over the language of instruction emerged in a student forum 
held in the University of Hong Kong. Subsequently, many students requested another 
meeting to secure reforms. More than 500 students attended this meeting, held in April 1965. 
It was agreed that both Chinese and English could be used as the languages of instruction in 
any future meetings.19  
 
In 1967, a three-year Chinese-English Dictionary project was announced by the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, the first university in the colony to adopt Chinese as the medium 
of instruction. To promote Chinese Studies and provide a basic reference work which was 
similar to the Concise Oxford Dictionary in English, Dr. Lin Yutang, a philology expert and 
writer, was responsible personally for translating Chinese phrases into idiomatic English.20  
Since the publication of Robert Henry Matthews’s Chinese English Dictionary in 1931, 
‘significant changes and revolutionary discoveries have taken place in the fields of 
humanities, art, social sciences, politics, science and technology’. The project was therefore 
timely. It provided the general public with ‘a more adequate and up-to-date reference 
work’.21 These developments further stimulated discussions over the status of the Chinese 
language.  
																																																						
18 HKRS 70-3-26-2, ‘Do Not Suppress Chinese Language, Students Urge’, South China Morning Post, 3 
December 1964. 
19 Lam, Understanding the Political Culture, p. 126.  
20 HKRS 70-3-26-, ‘Chinese University’s Dictionary Project’, South China Morning Post, 31 January 1967; 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Special Collection, University Bulletin, 3:7, February 1967, p. 4.  
21 Chinese University of Hong Kong, Special Collection, University Bulletin, 9:3, December 1972, pp. 2-3. 
According to the University Bulletin issued by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Lin’s dictionary contained 
45,000 entries of words, phrases and idioms. It also ‘has many distinctive features which make it outstanding 
and different from its predecessors’. For instance, instead of providing only the meaning of a single character, 
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In the student newsletter of the University of Hong Kong, Undergrad, students argued that 
the leftist riots broke out mainly due to the presence of communication barrier between the 
colonial state and the Chinese communities. To improve political communications and 
strengthen people’s sense of belonging to Hong Kong, Chinese should be legalized as the 
official language of the colony.22 In December 1967, Undergrad conducted a survey. The 
result suggested that majority of the undergraduates in the University of Hong Kong favoured 
Chinese to be legalized as an official language: 60 per cent of the interviewed students 
supported the notion that Chinese should be made the official language of Hong Kong; and 
74 percent believed that the general status of Hong Kong Chinese would be greatly enhanced 
if the government granted Chinese language the official status.23 In May 1968, Undergrad 
criticized the absence of a concrete governmental proposal which granted the Chinese and 
English languages equal legal status. Students expressed their discontent about the colonial 
state’s lack of plans to solve technical problems in the implementation of wider use of 
Chinese in administration, such as translation services and employment of interpreters. They 
urged the setting up of a Language Committee to investigate the impact of making Chinese 
an official language on the existing political and educational system. The government should, 
they argued, implement language reforms gradually.24 
 
																																																						
the dictionary illustrates the meaning and the use of each word, which was mostly formed by two or more 
characters. The variants in Chinese characters were fully indicated. A built-in tonal system, which was called 
‘the Guoyu Romanized System’, was used to differentiate words. To locate the lead characters easily, Lin 
invented the Instant Index System. The appendices of the dictionary also provided information of daily use, such 
as weights, measures, numerals, chemical elements and dynasties.  
22 Hong Kong University, Special Collection, ‘中文應與英文共列為官方語言’, Undergrad, no. 14, 1 
November 1967, p. 1. 
23 HKRS 70-3-26-2, P. Mak, ‘Students Want Chinese Made Official’, Hong Kong Standard, 17 December 1967. 
24 Hong Kong University, Special Collection, ‘請即成立「中文為官方語言」調查委員會’, Undergrad, no. 9, 
1 May 1968, p. 4. 	
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In late October 1967, the university students’ first joint publication argued that the colonial 
state should legalize Chinese as an official language since the majority of the Chinese 
population in Hong Kong did not speak English but Chinese: ‘With Chinese as an official 
language, we can rightly make use of those otherwise left out to enhance efficiency’.25 In 
January 1968, due to the students’ increased interest, seven post-secondary institutions 
organized a seminar on the language issue at Chung Chi College in the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. The seminar concluded that the use of Chinese as an additional official language 
would help to improve the effectiveness of the administration by removing the 
communication barrier between the bureaucracy and the Chinese population.26 The fact that 
demands of political elites and students were linked to a perceived failure of political 
communication, which alluded to as the cause of the 1967 riots, laid the foundation for a 
wider movement in 1970. 
 
Political Activism and Increased Press Coverage 
 
To arouse attention from the British government, Urban Councillor, Denny Huang Mong-
hwa, sent a letter to a British newspaper on 4 June 1969, demanding a ‘wholly local, internal, 
self-governing administration’ in the colony.27 In late 1969, to make Chinese the official 
language and seek educational reforms, Huang set up the Society to Promote Chinese 
Education. The Society was ‘supported by a number of leading persons in education circle, 
notably heads of private secondary Chinese schools having close connections with Taiwan’. 
According to Town Talk, after the formation of the Society, the language issue ‘had been 
given intermittent publicity in the leading Chinese press, particularly Wah Kiu and Kung 
																																																						
25 HKRS 70-3-26-2, P. Mak, ‘Make Chinese Official: Students’, Hong Kong Standard, 31 October 1967.  
26 HKRS 70-3-26-2, ‘崇基研討會昨發表公報：中文列為官方語言裨益市民有助施政’, Hong Kong Times, 
23 January, 1968.	
27 P. Moss, No Babylon:  A Hong Kong Scrapbook (Lincoln, 2006), p. 247. 
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Sheung’.28 In 1970, the movement gained momentum. Previously uncoordinated and 
unconnected organizations and bodies now joined together to form ad hoc coalitions, fighting 
for the official status of the Chinese language. Three prominent organizations started to 
campaign for the official status of the Chinese language actively after student publications 
and organizations organized a seminar in the Chinese YMCA in June 1970: the All Hong 
Kong Working Party to Promote Chinese as Official Language (WPCOL), the Federation for 
the Promotion of Chinese as an Official Language in Hong Kong, the operational group of 
which was the Campaign for Chinese as an Official Language (CCOL) and the Hong Kong 
Federation of Students (HKFS).   
 
In 1970, the All Hong Kong Working Party to Promote Chinese as Official Language was 
formed. It comprised of nineteen bodies, which included the Chinese Civil Servants 
Association, the Heung Yee Kuk, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong and 
four student unions.29 Its individual supporters included kaifong members and academic 
figures in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Denny Huang was elected as the Chairman of the 
organization. As the Urban Councillor during the period from 1967 to 1986, Huang was 
publicly known as a critic of the colonial government. During his service, he requested the 
colonial state to introduce elections in the Legislative and Executive Councils. The 
organization’s agenda mainly focused on promoting equality between Chinese and English 
languages. In the early 1970s, many ordinary citizens in Hong Kong still encountered 
‘language discrimination’: for example, the Tiger Standard noted that ‘colonialism still 
pervades the atmosphere in this city to such a degree that it is almost mandatory for a Chinese 
																																																						
28 HKRS455-4-4, ‘Special Supplement on the Use of Chinese as an Official Language’, Town Talk, 27 August 
1970, p. 1. 
29 The Chinese Manufactures’ Association represented most of the small-scale factories and was critical of the 
colonial government’s commercial, industrial and social policies. See David Clayton, ‘From ‘‘Free’’ to ‘‘Fair’’ 
Trade: The Evolution of Labour Laws in Colonial Hong Kong’, Journal of imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 35:2 (2007), p. 271. 
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to speak English in order to receive decent service from these (bureaucratic) organizations’.30 
In a report written by James So, the City District Officer of Wong Tai Sin, many respondents 
shared similar experiences: ‘Whenever they have any dealings with government under 
existing arrangements, they feel inferior if they do not know English and are not able to write 
in English to government’. They believed that a correspondence to the colonial government 
written in English ‘would be dealt with more expeditiously and favourably than one written 
in Chinese’.31 According to David Baird, such ‘language discrimination’ was not atypical:  
 
Unable to obtain satisfaction from the complaints department of a public utility, a 
Chinese rang off, then called again, this time speaking in English instead of 
Cantonese. Immediately, the haughty attitudes of the official he addressed switched to 
one of deference and helpfulness…Although 98 per cent of the population (in Hong 
Kong) is Chinese, English is the official language and many Chinese use it daily for 
reasons that vary from commercial necessity to snobbishness.32   
 
By legalizing Chinese as an official language used in the Legislative and Urban Councils, the 
WPCOL believed that discriminations towards people who did not speak English could be 
reduced. By making a Chinese version for all official communications and documents 
available, information could also be transmitted from the bureaucracy to the Chinese 
communities without any barriers. The Chinese population could have better understanding 
of the government policies. Activists also predicted that language reform would lead more 
Chinese people to get directly involved in bureaucratic politics. 
 
																																																						
30 HKRS 70-3-26-2, ‘Resolution’, Tiger Standard, 1 January 1967.  
31 HKRS 455-4-4, James Y. C. So, ‘Report on Chinese as an Official Language’, (date not specified) August 
1970, p. 2.  
32 D. Baird, Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 35, 27 August 1970. 
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Both the Campaign for Chinese as an Official Language and the Hong Kong Federation of 
Students were student bodies. The CCOL consisted of eleven student bodies. The HKFS 
represented nine post-secondary colleges, including Baptist College, Northcote Teachers 
Training College, New Asia College, Technical College, Sir Robert Black Teachers Training 
College, Chung Chi College, United College, Lingnan College and the University of Hong 
Kong. These student activists believed that Chinese school graduates would have better 
career prospects if official status was granted to the Chinese language. Racial equality could 
also be achieved if English competency was no longer the only standard requirement for 
appointment to most administrative posts. As students of Raimondi College had pointed out 
in their publication, if the language policy was revised, non-English educated Chinese with 
great capability could enjoy equal opportunity their counterparts had. They could be elected 
as members of Urban Council and serve the public.33  
 
In mid-1970, activism increased. A signature campaign was initiated by the WPCOL under 
the supervision of Huang. During the first weekend of December 1970, more than 30,000 
signatures were collected in Wong Tai Sin.34 By March 1971, the Chinese language 
campaign said to have collected 330,000 signatures.35 As the activists adopted a door-to-door 
strategy and started their signature campaigns in Wong Tai Sin, where a large number of 
resettlement blocks were located, they were able to collect a substantial amount of signatures 
within a short period of time from the people in the lower strata the society.36 However, 
according to the Chairman of the Wong Tai Sin Kaifong Welfare Association, some people 
																																																						
33 HKRS 488-3-36, ‘Weekly Progress Report: Chinese as an Official Language’, 23 November 1970, memo 
from C.D.O. (Central) to C.D.C. (Hong Kong), pp. 1-2. 
34 HKRS 488-3-36, Extracted from minutes of C.D.C. (Kowloon)’s meeting with the Kowloon C.D.O.s, 16 
December 1970.  
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gave their signatures only because ‘they did not want to be pestered by the campaigners’.37 A 
signature on a piece of paper did not necessarily convey compelling support. The number of 
signatures was not a reliable indicator of the level of popular support for the movement.   
Meanwhile, the CCOL gave the government a deadline until 29 August 1970 to issue a 
definite statement in response to the language issue. For propaganda purpose, the CCOL also 
produced some yellow-fisted T-shirts for sale, on which the Chinese as an official language 
slogan was stamped. Handbills were subsequently distributed to the public. In September 
1970, the Chairman of the CCOL, Lam Hung-chow announced that plans had been made to 
boycott classes if government continued to neglect the language issue. Lam publicly ‘urged 
students to do something more meaningful than just attending classes’.38 Almost at the same 
time, 30,000 copies of language pamphlets were printed and distributed by the HKFS. They 
also planned to carry out a survey to ascertain public views on the language issue in ten city 
districts and five districts in the New Territories.  
 
The campaign was not a unitary movement with one goal. Apart from instrumental concerns 
and personal interests, ideological motivations, including the pursuit of localization and 
democratization, the notion of racial equality and cultural nationalism played an important 
role in determining people’s positions in the campaign. Whenever activists found possible 
and saw it fit, they were willing to inhabit various ideas and exploit the mass for their own 
benefits. To appeal for the support from the bulk of the population, they often avoided overt 
political overtones in their activities and slogans. Moreover, ‘acquiescence, transience, fear of 
China, satisfaction, conservatism, rationality and reluctance to share power’ constituted the 
tendency of avoiding political participation, particularly among the middle-aged and elderly 
																																																						
37 HKRS 455-4-4, ‘Chinese as an Official Language, Weekly Progress Report (9.12.70-15.12.70)’, memo from 
C.D.O. (Wong Tai Sin) to C.D.C. (Kowloon), 15 December 1970. 
38 HKRS 455-4-4, Notes on open forum organized by student union of H.K.U. at the City Hall, 19 September 
1970, p. 1.  
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groups of Hong Kong Chinese.39 To respond to the complex situation, the campaigners never 
limited themselves to nationalistic doctrines and political ideologies. This flexibility was 
particular important given the influence of communism on local political life. 
 
Many Hong Kong Chinese of the older generation fled to Hong Kong as refugees to escape 
from political chaos initiated by the Chinese Communist government, such as the Great Leap 
Forward, the Hundred Flowers Movement and the Cultural Revolution. The ‘indiscriminate 
bombing campaign’ in the 1967 riots by the leftists further added weight to this view.40 
Knowing that many Hong Kong Chinese were sceptical towards the Chinese Communist 
Party, all three organizations suspended their activities on the Chinese National Day, 1 
October 1971, to avoid association with the Chinese Communist Party. Rhetoric employed in 
slogans was also intentionally apolitical to make the language campaign more welcoming and 
less alarming to the public. The Hong Kong University Student Union’s poster, for instance, 
used the slogan, ‘Justice, Hearts of Public, a People, Her Dignity’.41 The meaning behind the 
term ‘official language’ was vague and rarely defined. Another pamphlet issued by the 
students also did not mention constitutional reform. Instead, it focused on racial equality and 
appealed to the cultural aspect of the movement: ‘There is four million Chinese population in 
Hong Kong, and Chinese has not been used for a hundred years. Why? Culture and tradition 
of five thousand years has been forgone; Why cannot Chinese use Chinese?’42 These tactics 
depoliticized the campaign, which was presented as a technical issue, to improve political 
communications, not to change policies or institute democracy.  
																																																						
39 Hoadley, ‘Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese’, p. 614.  
40 Tsang, A Modern History, p. 187. 
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As the majority of the language activists were educated social elites, such as students and 
Urban Councillors, they were particularly aware of the approaches they used to pursue their 
ends and how it would affect their professional reputations. To avoid being labelled as 
radicals and isolating support from the masses, the activists presented themselves as orderly 
citizens who complied with the law. They resorted to moderate and legitimate means: inter 
alia, Huang’s petition sent to the United Nations, open letters issued by the HKFS, and 
forums, public opinion polls and signature campaigns organized by organizations jointly. 
These tactics engaged the public in their campaign through opinion polls and signature 
campaigns. Demands were presented as the public will. For example, in the position paper, 
James Chui, the Chairman of the HKFS Language Action Committee made the following 
statement: ‘Though the political set-up of Hong Kong is not a democracy, it has proved in the 
past not too unwilling to take note of public opinion. The popular desire of making Chinese 
an official language should be heeded’.43 In his letter to Anthony Royle, a British MP, Chui 
pointed out the sharp contrast between the approaches adopted by the police force and the 
student activists. He stressed that, on the one hand, ‘only peaceful means, such as public 
polls, forums and signature campaigns etc., were employed’ by the students; however, on the 
other hand, the Hong Kong police force and Urban Council were ‘mishandling’ a ‘peaceful 
demonstration’.44 The disparity captured the attention of the public. People tended to 
sympathize with the activists.  
 
																																																						
43 FCO 40/341, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Position Paper of the Hong Kong Federation of Students on 
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Nevertheless, the student activists were not as moderate as they portrayed themselves in 
public. In Chui’s letter to Royle, the student representative first hinted that the movement was 
powerful in numbers: it was not only supported by the majority in Hong Kong, but also a 
number of overseas Chinese student associations and international bodies. For example, the 
National Union of Students of the United Kingdom alone consisted of 500,000 members. He 
threatened to escalate actions, which would affect the public order, if the colonial government 
failed to respond to their demands:  
 
Reluctance of the Hong Kong government to take swift and decisive actions to heed 
public desire will convince the public, in particular students, that peaceful means 
through negotiations, are ineffective in the promotion of social justice. Undoubtedly 
such loss in confidence in the authorities is detrimental to the interest of the 
community at large and will only invite troubles to all parties concerned.45   
 
Similar language could be found in the HKFS’s letter to F. K. Li, the Deputy Secretary for 
Home Affairs:  
 
 
Significantly the Chinese language campaign marks the participation of the younger 
generation of Chinese in Hong Kong (with the active support of overseas Chinese 
students) local affairs. Any further delay of the government will only lead to a loss of 
confidence in the authorities and will only invite troubles to all parties concerned. I 
hope you would agree that an enlightened and liberal attitude of the Hong Kong and 
																																																						
45 Ibid., p. 2. 
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British government is essential in the promotion of the wellbeing of the community at 
large.46 
 
The radicalness of the student activists can also be seen when the student activists tried to 
draft their own legislation. The fourth report of the Chinese Language Committee was issued 
in July 1971, in which the Committee recommended that the government to consider 
declaring that both Chinese and English ‘Fat Ting U Man’ (official languages). However, it 
came to the students’ concern that the Committee ‘has failed to recommend government how 
Chinese and English should be declared official languages’. The status and usage of the 
Chinese language were not guaranteed unless formal legislation was enacted. Being impatient 
at the slow progress made by the government to implement the new language policy, the 
Legal Sub-committee of the Chinese Language Study Committee of the HKFS decided to 
draft their own legislation, presented to Anthony Royle, J. Sweetman, the Deputy Secretary 
for Home Affairs, Sir Kenneth Ping-fan Fung and P. C. Woo, Unofficial Members of the 
Executive and Legislative Councils. The proposition, which was divided into four parts, 
provided a schedule for implementation. According to the HKFS, the new language policy 
should be carried out in four stages. ‘The more important ordinances and subsidiary 
legislation affecting the general public’ should be first translated into Chinese. Laws 
‘affecting the general public, are nevertheless of comparatively lesser importance’ should be 
translated into Chinese at stage two. And the translation of the ordinances that ‘affecting 
special sections of the public’ and ‘of limited interest’ should be scheduled into the third and 
fourth stages.47 Despite their repeated reiteration that the draft was ‘merely an example, open 
to alternation after due consultation’, along with their language of coercion employed in their 
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letters, this move could be interpreted as radically subverting the existing policy and 
system.48 According to the constitution, the Legislative Council was the only institution that 
possessed the power of enacting and amending laws and ordinances. Throughout the 
campaign, on the one hand, language activists portrayed themselves as orderly moderates by 
adopting the tactics of depoliticization and resorting to legitimate means to mobilize public 
opinions; on the other hand, they employed coercive language and subverted the authority of 
the Legislative Council by proposing a new draft of legislation. These strategies reinforced 
each other, pressurizing the colonial government effectively.  
 
The activists’ depoliticized strategy successfully captured the attention of the press. The 
Chinese Press Review made the following observation:  
 
Since the beginnings of July 1970, there have been intermittent reports in the Chinese 
press in connection with making Chinese another official language in Hong Kong.  
Out of the sixteen major non-Communist Chinese papers, eleven gave editorial 
comments on this issue. All of them endorsed the principle that Chinese must be made 
an official language alongside English. Though some of them realized that there are 
technical difficulties involved in the process, they claimed that government should 
surmount them instead of using them as excuses. 49 
 
Over the next month, newspaper coverage increased. In late September 1970, the Chinese 
Press Review recorded that reports about the language movement ‘appear(ed) in Chinese 
non-Communist press almost daily’. The newspapers did not only cover information of and 
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action taken by organizations, student bodies and individuals, they also published editorial 
comments on the language campaign. All sixteen major non-Communist Chinese papers 
‘agreed that in principle Chinese should also be made an official language in Hong Kong’.50 
The rhetoric employed in newspapers indicated that the campaign was received positively. 
Wah Kiu Yat Po suggested that wider use of Chinese language by the colonial administration 
was ‘constructive’ as it would help to ‘build up trust and mutual reliance between the 
government and the public’.51 The Hong Kong Standard described the campaign as a 
‘language crusade’.52  Historically, the term ‘crusade’ was often used to refer to ‘the holy 
war’ which was undertaken according to ‘the will of God’ from the eleventh century to the 
thirteen century, liberating the suppressed Christians in the East. It therefore carried the 
connotation of justice, suggesting that the cause of the language movement was legitimate. 
The choice of the term ‘crusade’ implied that the rights of Hong Kong Chinese were 
suppressed by the colonial bureaucrats.  
 
Government’s Reponses and Public Reception  
 
The colonial government was aware of increased interest in the language issue. During the 
meeting of the Legislative Council on 28 February 1968, for example, the Governor, David 
Trench said that the colonial government would start ‘considering further, as we have done 
with some success for many years, ways and means of giving our two main languages here, 
Chinese and English, as near equality of use and status as it is practically possible to do’.53 
Trench reassured the public that Chinese would continue to be used as a medium of ordinary 
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communication for official purposes. However, there were practical difficulties if laws had to 
be written in Chinese. Moving towards a bilingual society was ‘a process’ required ‘taking 
numerous small and specific steps, not of making one sweeping gesture’. Therefore, the 
colonial government needed time to ‘iron out the practical difficulties of using both 
languages, without creating confusion, in as many selected circumstances as possible’.54   
 
After Trench’s speech, on 30 March 1968, circulars about the official use of Chinese 
language were issued to the heads of all departments by A. T. Clark, the Principal Assistant 
Colonial Secretary. In the circular, Clark suggested that although many departments had 
already adopted the practice of writing letters in Chinese or sending Chinese translations with 
formal replies, ‘the effect that one or two offices do not reply to Chinese letters in Chinese, 
and still issue important printed or cyclostyled notices, warning or advices to humble people’ 
continued to attract public criticisms. Clark sent the department instructions on the subject to 
these high ranked bureaucrats and ordered them to make ‘suitable arrangements’ within one 
month.55 Besides, a report was written by C. K. K. Wong, both the Assistant Secretary and 
the City District Officer of Sham Shui Po, to assess to what extent had Chinese been used in 
government departments and the inadequacies so far. Wong uncovered that although a 
number of departments had already adopted the practice of using Chinese more widely in 
correspondences, they have misplaced the emphasis on ‘translation’:  
 
The assumption there is that translated texts will read just as easily as the English 
original. Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. Between English and Chinese, the 
linguistic differences are immense and their modes of presentation of ideas are not 
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easy to reconcile. I myself find that, in an alarming proportion of translated letters and 
notices, much of the original subtlety in putting across an idea is lost in the course of 
translation.56   
 
The current translators did not possess enough special subject knowledge to provide accurate 
and precise interpretations of letters and notices. Instead of translating the English documents 
and letters into Chinese literally, Wong recommended that all official publications which 
affected the Chinese communities should be rewritten in Chinese.57 Other City District 
Officers responded to Wong’s paper. Despite the internal investigations and communications, 
no official language reform had been introduced in the late 1960s.  
 
In 1970, the language issue revived. The fact that information related to the movement could 
be found in almost all newspapers reflected ‘the public’s increasing interest in the 
development of this issue’.58 The increased press coverage on the language movement 
influenced public opinions. Town Talk stated that at a public forum, ‘an unanimous stand’ 
was taken by the secondary and post-secondary student bodies that ‘Chinese must be made an 
official language in Hong Kong and be given equal status’.59 In response to the society’s 
increasing interest in the language issue and the pressure exerted by these organizations, the 
colonial government announced that a Chinese Language Committee was to be set up on 18 
September 1970. The Committee was responsible for examining the use of the Chinese 
language in administration, legislation and education. It was consisted of five members, 
including T. L. Yang, a District Judge, T. C. Lai, who was from the Department of Extra-
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Mural Studies in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, G. M. B. Salmon, who represented 
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, M. A. B. Steveson, the Deputy Director of 
Government Information Services and F. K. Li, the Deputy Secretary for Home Affairs. In 
order to assess the public feelings on the language policy and the movement, the City District 
Officers were required to produce a weekly situation report and forward that to the City 
District Commissioners.60 These ‘special arrangements’ were made with the City District 
Officers ‘to see, on behalf of the (Chinese Language) Committee, members of the public who 
wish to make known their opinion on this matter’.61 The City District Officers then conveyed 
these views to the Language Committee. They were also responsible for submitting another 
bi-weekly report to the Committee, which was a collection of specific examples of cases that 
an English letter or document should be accompanied by a Chinese translation.  
 
The formation of the Chinese Language Committee was received by the majority of the 
public positively. According to the City District Officer of Wan Chai, although some people 
suspected that the formation of the Committee ‘was only a tactical move calculated to silence 
the critics without intending to do anything’, most people ‘welcomed government’s proposal 
to set up a committee to study the issue’.62 Some press welcomed the setting up of a formal 
Language Committee. Hong Kong Times, for instance, believed the setting up of the 
Committee was ‘a positive step’ taken by the colonial state in response to the public opinions. 
Wah Kiu Man Po also suggested that ‘this move taken by the government shows it pays heed 
to public opinion’. 63  
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However, activists were dissatisfied with the government’s arrangement. Denny Huang 
condemned the government-appointed Committee as an unrepresentative bureaucratic ‘farce’, 
in which four of five members were connected with the colonial state: ‘The Committee was 
not what people want because it did not include in its terms of reference the study of Chinese 
being made an official language’.64 To express his discontent, Huang claimed that he would 
ignore the Committee and would not submit any representation to it. The Chairman of the 
Hong Kong University Students’ Union, John Ng similarly argued that the Language 
Committee only represented ‘to a great extent the point of view of government rather than 
that of a cross section of the society’.65 To protest against the lack of representativeness of the 
Committee’s membership, the language leaders announced that they would boycott the 
Committee in October 1970. 
 
According to a report written by the Kowloon City District Commissioner, David Lai, the 
cause of the language movement was widely supported by the public:  
 
There is widespread endorsement and sympathy with this agitation among the 
public…For the average person the need for better communication with government 
is still felt despite the actions taken by government so far in using Chinese as an 
alternative medium of communication. There is a widespread feeling that the use of 
Chinese by government departments so far has not been as widespread and certainly 
not as effective as Colonial Secretary has suggested in his speech in Legislative 
Council.66 
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The majority of the population believed that to improve political communication between the 
colonial state and the Chinese society, ‘Chinese should be made an official language’. Many 
held that ‘unless Chinese was made an official language, users of English would still be given 
preferential treatment’.67 
 
These shifting popular sentiments influenced the colonial state’s ruling strategies. However, 
instead of appointing some ‘representative’ members to the Language Committee, the 
colonial state attempted to weaken the movement by communicating with the public through 
City District Officers. The City District Officers were instructed to brief their staff of official 
line of thinking before they started talking to the general public. They should explain to the 
public that the language issue was ‘more complicated than it appears to be’ and point out that 
the government ‘has been making genuine effort to meet the need of non-English speaking 
people’. They were also told to ‘act systematically and discreetly’ to ‘isolate the support for 
the movement, particularly for Denny Huang’s group’. For example, in their conversations 
with their contacts, they should hint that Huang’s enthusiasm was associated with his seeking 
re-election to the Urban Council in April 1971.68 In 1971, the Chinese Language Committee 
examined the intelligence supplied by City District Officers closely and produced the first 
report in February. The Committee took public opinions into consideration and advised that 
simultaneous interpretation in English and Cantonese should be provided in any open 
meeting of the Legislative and Urban Councils. Similar facilities should also be introduced in 
boards and committees with members who did not speak English.69 
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Reactions to the first language report were mixed. Urban Councillors, D. J. R. Blaker and 
Elsie Elliott both welcomed the introduction of simultaneous interpretation in the Councils, 
considered that to be the first stage of enabling more Chinese to participate in political 
affairs. Chinese language newspapers were also supportive. Sing Tao Man Pao suggested that 
if the recommendations of the Committee were to be carried out, the status of the Chinese 
language would be enhanced substantially. They were also confident that the Governor would 
consider the advice offered by the Committee seriously.70 Wah Kiu Yat Po believed that all 
the suggestions of the Committee were ‘reasonable’ and ‘realistic’. They were ‘happy to note 
the alacrity with which the Committee has tackled its job’.71 Nevertheless, some press and 
activists held a completely opposite view. Hong Kong Daily News, for instance, expressed its 
disappointment:  
 
It is disappointing that having spent so much time, energy and material resources, the 
Chinese Language Committee has come up only with the recommendations that 
simultaneous interpretation facilities should be provided in open meetings of the 
Legislative and Urban Council and that government should start training simultaneous 
interpreters. Still, this is better than nothing. Undeniably, there is a feeling that the 
appointment by the government of the Chinese Language Committee is a delaying 
tactic.72   
 
Huang was ‘disappointed’ that the Committee made no mention of making Chinese the 
official language in its report. The Chairman of the HKFS, James Chui said that he was ‘not 
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very happy with the report’. To Chui, the Committee was relying on ‘a delaying tactic’ and 
the recommendations were only a ‘small success’ in the whole language campaign.73    
The Committee submitted the second report on 28 April, in which it responded to the 
activists’ demands. It recommended the colonial government to give Chinese and English 
‘equality of use and status as far as practically possible’. A senior officer should be appointed 
‘to keep a constant check on government’s performance’ in the use of Chinese in official 
business. The government should ‘pool existing facilities for the translation of technical 
terms to stimulate further translation and to provide all departments with official 
glossaries’.74   
 
The second report was received favourably by Tin Tin Yat Po:  
 
We applaud the Committee for its recommendation that instruction giving effect to 
bilingualism in forms, letters, public notices, etc. should be incorporated in General 
Regulations to provide the sanction of disciplinary proceedings when the instructions 
are not complied with. We believe that the Committee is sincere in raising this 
proposal, and that government will accept it. The new recommendation is to lay down 
a fixed rule for all government officers concerned. What a wonderful thing to do.75 
 
Wah Kiu Man Po also pointed out that ‘people from all walks of life fully endorse the 
‘‘equality of status’’ of Chinese in government documents to the public’.76 Even the HKFS 
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supported the second report ‘whole-heartedly’ despite their suggestion that the government 
should show more sincerity and speed up dealing with the language issue.77 However, the 
report was criticized by Urban Councillor, Henry Hu, who asserted that ‘the current language 
campaign would not have been necessary if government had followed its declared policy on 
‘‘near equality of use and status’’ for both Chinese and English’.78 On 29 April 1971, Truth 
Daily criticized the Committee’s recommendation that ‘in case of dispute, the English version 
should prevail’. According to Truth Daily, if the English version was serving as the basis, it 
implied that the Chinese version was less important. Consequently, the public would not 
attach much value to the Chinese version and this was ‘certainly a heavy blow on the status 
of the Chinese language’.79 
 
In face of the negative responses, the Governor announced in May that recommendations 
made in the first report of the Committee were accepted. The third report, which mainly dealt 
with the use of the Chinese language in courts, was published by the Committee in late June. 
The Committee recommended that all bills and ordinances should be published in both 
languages in the future. Present legislation should be translated into Chinese in stages. In 
lower courts, oral proceedings should be conducted in both Cantonese and English. However, 
the Committee also suggested that ‘equal status does not necessarily imply equal use in every 
single instance’: ‘Status denotes the rank of one language in relation to another, whereas use 
concerns communication’. In higher courts, the existing system should be preserved and 
courts records should continue to be kept in English.80   
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At this point, the public interest towards the language issue subsided. The inconsistency of 
the Committee statements and the third report however provoked a bitter response from the 
student activists. To express their discontent, a report was submitted by ten law students of 
the University of Hong Kong to the Legal Sub-Committee of the Chinese Language 
Committee. On 16 July 1971, the HKFS issued a position paper and forwarded it to the 
Committee to reiterate their demand of making Chinese the official language of Hong Kong:  
 
The Hong Kong Federation of Students wholeheartedly agrees with the Legal Sub-
Committee of the Chinese Language Committee ‘equal status does not necessarily 
imply equal use in every single instance. Status denotes language in relation to 
another, whereas use concerns communication’ (Section A: Paragraph 8 of the 3rd 
Report of the Chinese Language Committee). However, in sharp contradiction to the 
above statement, the Chinese Language Committee has stated time and time again 
that it is working on the principle of giving ‘as near equality in status and usage to the 
Chinese language as English’. We strongly dissent from this. We believe status, 
which is a matter of respect, should be absolutely equal, whereas in the light of 
practicability, and technical difficulties, it may very well be true that Chinese cannot 
attain the same level of usage as English, but this is no hindrance to giving both 
languages equality in status.… We strongly advocate that legislation to be enacted to 
the effect of declaring both Chinese and English official languages of Hong Kong, 
equal in status, with the usage of Chinese language defined in specific areas.81  
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On 22 July 1971, the HKFS sent a letter using similar language to Anthony Royle, who was 
now the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
They argued that it was ‘the popular desire of all sectors of all community that Chinese 
language be recognized officially as equal in the status to the English language’. The HKFS 
accused the Committee of adopting ‘a delaying tactic’ and did not make any concrete 
recommendations of making Chinese the official language of Hong Kong in spite of nine 
months’ investigation.82   
 
On 26 July 1971, the Committee finished and published the fourth and final report, in which 
they recommended the colonial government to train a class of specialist translators, who 
should be administrated by a central authority, instead of the Central Grades Division at the 
moment. The Direction of Education should also examine how the standard of both 
languages could be improved in secondary schools. They also recommended the government 
to consider ‘promulgating a firm policy, in a suitable manner, that Chinese and English are 
‘‘Fat Ting U Man’’, that is to say, official languages’.83 
 
In spite of the Committee’s recommendation, there were little signs indicating that the 
government was going to enact a legislation to make Chinese as an official language of Hong 
Kong immediately in 1971. To exert more pressure on the colonial government, the HKFS 
escalated their action. On 30 August 1971, the HKFS wrote to both the Acting Secretary for 
Home Affairs, F. K. Li and Anthony Royle to reaffirm their demand of enacting a new 
legislation to declare both Chinese and English the official languages of Hong Kong. Being 
impatient at the slow progress, the students ‘decided to draft their own legislation making 
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Chinese an official language in Hong Kong’.84 The law members from the HKFS had 
prepared a detailed legal document ‘telling the government how it should declare an official 
language’.85 The draft, passed to the Secretariat for Home Affairs, was discussed in the 
meeting held between the Home Affairs Department and the student representatives in 
September. On 10 September, 30,000 copies of language pamphlets were printed and 
distributed by the students to advocate a legislative declaration of Chinese as an official 
language. An open letter was then issued to the Unofficial Members of the Executive and 
Legislative Councils (UMELCO) on 14 September, which subsequently led to a meeting 
between the UMELCO and the HKFS on 17 September. Besides, the HKFS sought support 
from student bodies and figures of political importance outside Hong Kong. For example, 
they approached the National Union of Students in London, which later agreed ‘to give full 
support to your campaign, and will take all the actions you request on this matter’.86 James 
Johnson, a Labour Party MP, raised the language issue in the House of Commons in late 
November 1971. An open letter was sent to the new Governor, Murray MacLehose on 1 
December to ‘urge him to remove government red-tape’ on the language issue.87 
 
In response, on 15 December 1971, the Colonial Secretary, Hugh Norman-Walker reiterated 
that the Language Committee’s first report, which dealt with the use of Chinese at meetings 
of the Legislative and Urban Councils, had been accepted by the Governor. Norman-Walker 
also stated that the Governor would soon approve the second report, which would then be 
passed to the Financial Committee of Legislative Council. The third report, which contained 
many controversial recommendations, would be submitted to the Executive Council after it 
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had been considered by the Chief Justice, the Attorney General and the departments 
concerned. The extent to which the recommendations in the fourth report would be adopted 
depended upon the decisions made on the other three reports. Although the colonial state was 
unable to give a definite date, the new simultaneous interpretation system should be in full 
operation by mid-1972.88 
 
The punctual response of the government was well-received by the public. The focus of the 
political discourse shifted away from the language movement to other more important topics, 
such as the Diaoyu Islands movement. As a result, the language movement became less 
prominent. Nonetheless, London was also aware of the tensions over the language issue in 
Hong Kong:  
 
During the past twelve months the Chinese language issue has been the subject of 
representations from various quarters and in November and December it was the 
subject of Parliamentary Questions by Mr. James Johnson and Mr. James Sillars to 
which Mr Royle replied on 16 November and 7 December.89 
 
Copies of the Committee’s reports were sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in late 
1971.90 In the course of the next three years, the colonial administration trained translators 
and promoted the wider use of Chinese in administration. A new division, the Development, 
Training and Research Division, set up in April 1973, improved translation standards.91 To 
ensure that government’s declared intention of using Chinese as widely as possible in 
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different departments and official business, the Chinese Language Branch was set up. The 
Director of Home Affairs had been appointed as the Chinese Language Authority in January 
1974. In February 1974, the prolonged struggle of the language activists finally paid off. The 
Official Languages Bill passed its final reading in the Legislative Council.92 The language 
requirement for the Urban Council membership was revised in late 1974. People who only 
spoke Cantonese and were able to read and write Chinese were eligible to serve the Urban 
Council.93 Both Chinese and English now possessed equal status and enjoyed equality of use. 
Although some ordinances and bills were still enacted in English, Chinese terms were used, 
and Chinese translations of the bills were published. In Magistrates’ Courts, Juvenile Courts, 
Labour Tribunals, Tenancy Tribunals and any inquiry by coroner, judiciary proceedings were 
henceforth ‘conducted in either the English language or the Chinese language as the court 
thinks fit’.94  
 
The language movement had demonstrated that mass political activism could influence policy 
formation. These activists organized informal political activities, such as signature campaigns 
and opinion polls, to mobilize the masses. They successfully captured the attention of the 
press and the public. Public opinions shifted, favouring legalization of Chinese as the official 
language of Hong Kong. In response, the colonial state set up the Chinese Language 
Committee. To understand shifting popular sentiments, City District Officers were instructed 
to solicit public opinions on a weekly basis on behalf of the Committee. These constructed 
‘public opinions’ were taken into consideration by the Committee in drafting four reports. 
These processes reveal that the reformist colonial administration became increasingly 
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responsive to popular demands. It also shows that Hong Kong’s political culture was 
changing, which will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Political Culture in Hong Kong 
 
Through observing the attitudes and motivations of participants who engaged in the language 
movement, we can reveal what encouraged people to engage in the campaign, and make 
inferences about Hong Kong’s political culture in the early 1970s. This section shows that 
despite having the common goal of promoting wider use of the Chinese language in official 
communications, the language campaign was far from monolithic, with supporters holding a 
range of beliefs.  
 
The young generation was politically conscious and ideologically driven. To many students, 
the language campaign was a movement through which self-determination could be pursued. 
Since the late 1960s, political awareness increased, particularly among the students of higher 
education. They were critical of the colonial administration, and advocated increased political 
participation as a citizen’s obligation. For instance, the editor of Undergrad criticized the 
current educational system as failing to address fully civil education and politics, resulting in 
the absence of public political consciousness. To become a true intellectual young person 
with self-consciousness, the editor urged the young generation to acquire better 
understandings of the existing social and political problems.95 In another article titled ‘From 
Apathy to Inertia’ in Undergrad, published in May 1968, the author criticized that university 
students, saying that they were ‘supposed to have more understanding on the nature of these 
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voting rights than other youths in Hong Kong’. They were however not fulfilling their civic 
responsibilities. The author argued that holding press conference was insufficient and 
advocated students to be more politically active. The HKFS and the student unions ‘should 
take up a leading role in pushing students to participate in social affairs’.96 An editorial in the 
student newsletter of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, CU Student, also encouraged 
students to take up ‘intellectual responsibility’ and provide solutions to improve the condition 
of the colony: ‘We students have a dual role as learners about problems and their various 
solutions, and as intellectual who identify problems and suggest new solution’.97  
 
Influenced by the social climate of increased political awareness, the young generation, in 
particular the university students, viewed participation in the language movement as a civic 
duty. They believed that only by granting the Chinese language the official status would 
Chinese-speaking people take up appointed or elected positions in the colonial 
administration. According to Undergrad, the campaign had ‘very profound implications’. 
The movement was interpreted by ‘a sector of’ participants as ‘the beginning of popular 
political movements in Hong Kong’. It was viewed as ‘the first step towards democratization 
and decolonization of this community’: ‘We must all understand that ultimately we are 
actually bargaining for the power of the people of Hong Kong to decide their own affairs’. 
The student press also stressed that it was crucial for students to develop this perspective:  
 
It is high time that we should join together to discuss the role of the campaign and 
whole context of political reforms in Hong Kong...The campaigners for the Chinese 
language movement should not be afraid to pronounce their long-term ideals to 
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reform the political system of Hong Kong.98  
 
Student motivations reveal a shifting political culture. These post-war baby boomers held a 
less favourable view of the colonial state than traditional elites. They also considered 
engagement in politics to be an obligation.  
 
Similar political attitudes were found among some educated elites. For example, the 
organizer of the campaign, Denny Huang was well-known as a critic of the colonial 
administration. Huang criticized the Committee’s suggestion as having ‘very little effect’ as it 
did not provide grounds for non-English speaking people to become Councillors. Like the 
student activists, Huang was politically motivated. He admitted that the ultimate goal of the 
movement was to see people who spoke only Cantonese become Councillors, ‘a real step 
forward’ to ‘make Chinese feel they had a real stake in the Councils’. The WPCOL was 
pragmatic but the ultimate agenda of Huang and student activists was to empower the 
Chinese population and increase their participation in public affairs.99  
 
Some students were by contrast motivated by nationalism. Their political allegiance towards 
the PRC could be observed from the rhetoric they employed in the movement. In late 1970, 
Denny Huang and some student committee members had a ‘very hot discussion’ on whether 
Chinese in Hong Kong should be called ‘Hua Ren’ (華人, ethnically Chinese) or ‘Zhongguo 
Ren’ (中國人, which had multiple meanings, could be used to refer to people associated with 
China, either by reason of ancestry, nationality, citizenship, heredity, place of residence, or 
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other affiliations) in the campaign. The Chinese in Hong Kong were ‘Zhongguo Ren’.100 
Although the term ‘Hua Ren’ was not adopted mainly because of activists’ deliberate attempt 
to exclude Chinese who were British subjects by birth or naturalization in their movement, 
the choice of word definitely reflected some students’ political orientation towards the 
mainland China in the 1970s. In a HKFS language pamphlet, the theme of nationalism was 
adopted: ‘The era when Chinese are second-rate people is gone; we are no longer people 
being pushed around; Chinese people in Hong Kong have risen to roar at any unreasonable 
things.’ Most importantly, it was stressed that Hong Kong was ‘an integral part of Chinese 
territory’. The pamphlet was soon denounced by the Secretariat for Home Affairs, which 
argued that its content was ‘un-factual’. Activists were therefore asked to cross out this 
sentence along with a few others.101 Positive attitudes towards China was attributable to the 
belief that China would be more liberal and open in the near future. Students’ optimism could 
be observed in an editorial called ‘Hong Kong is Ours’ in CU Student:  
 
After going through the disturbances, most people feel at heart that Hong Kong lacks 
a sense of security. Some even note that it will only be a little over twenty years 
before Kowloon is returned to China and by that time people will have to live under 
communist rule. Therefore, some people try their best to leave Hong Kong and even 
congratulate themselves on their ‘far-sightedness’ in making the move... Actually 
those people who worry too far into the future and as a result lose faith in Hong Kong 
are troubling themselves without a sound cause. Apart from the possibility that many 
changes may occur in twenty years’ time in this ever-changing world, even if Hong 
Kong is returned back to China, we will only be as a matter of course moving from a 
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colony back to our mother country– and instead of being colonial subjects, we will 
become masters of this piece of land. Unless a person is forgetful of his ancestry, or 
else he will never be ashamed of returning to his mother country…The political 
situation viewed objectively has shown this to be the best course. But in twenty years’ 
time even if the ruling authority in China remains unchanged, its internal 
organizations will most certainly have undergone changes. According to the 
observation of sociologists, a forecast into the future of capitalism and communism is 
that as the former is gradually moving towards the Left while the latter towards the 
Right, someday the two will finally meet at a mid-point and the two systems will be 
merged into one.102   
 
Throughout the movement, unlike the middle-aged and elderly groups who held a negative 
attitude towards China, some student activists repeatedly identified themselves as Chinese 
politically. They showed no hesitation to reveal to the public that they were campaigning for 
a national course. Although that does not necessarily suggest they were leftists and allegiant 
to the Communist regime in China, the majority of students definitely held a positive attitude 
towards the Chinese Communist regime. In essence, although the aim of the language 
movement was to introduce language reforms in administration, legislation and education in 
Hong Kong, the campaign itself was inseparable from Chinese nationalism. 
 
The language movement had a cultural dimension: in this sense it was not ‘non-ideological’, 
merely ‘issue-driven’. As the City District Officer in Eastern District, M. Leung had 
observed, unlike any other political agitation for constitutional reforms, the language 
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campaign was ‘one with a cultural appeal’.103 Participants did not treat the language 
campaign only as a political movement. A substantial amount of supporters of the campaign 
were driven by cultural nationalism: enthusiasm to promote Chinese culture, enhance the 
status of Chinese language and achieve racial equality. The theme of promoting Chinese 
culture was adopted by the HKFS in their position paper:  
 
The cultural heritage of the Chinese civilization has a history of over 4,000 years. It is 
a great asset to the whole community. Preservation and development of the Chinese 
culture would be greatly facilitated and encouraged by giving Chinese an official 
status.104  
 
In his report in mid-1970, Wong Tai Sin City District Officer, James So stated that student 
bodies were ‘motivated by a sense of national pride’: ‘Since Hong Kong is inhabited by over 
98 per cent Chinese, the Chinese language should take equal place with the English 
language’.105  According to So, most students were ‘in favour of the movement’ and their 
reaction to it was ‘filled with emotion’. These students considered it ‘an insult to the Chinese 
community in Hong Kong’ for not being able to use Chinese language in the colonial 
administration.106 An editorial in CU Student described the Chinese language as ‘the 
language of history’, and the campaign as ‘a call of an ethnic group’: ‘One can ignore the 
voice of an individual, one can ignore the voice of an organization, but the voice of an ethnic 
group could never be unheard’. The author advocated ethnic equality: ‘When two ethnic 
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groups live in one place, if they were treated unequally, surely there would not be any long-
lasting peace and tranquillity’.107  
 
The claims made by the Chairman of the To Promote Chinese as an Official Language 
Committee of Hong Kong Baptist College Student Union, Dominic Shui, supported So’s 
assessment. Shui suggested that their organization was ‘campaigning for a national cause’, ‘a 
succession’ of the May Fourth movement. Similar to the language movement, the May 
Fourth movement was initiated by the youths, intellectuals and students. It was a nationalist 
movement that took place in 1919 after the allied powers secretly agreed to accept Japan’s 
position in Shandong during the Versailles Peace Conference. In response to the unfair 
agreement, students organized protests in Beijing. To strengthen China’s national power, 
Confucian values, such as the classical relationships between the emperor and his ministers, 
and fathers and sons, were denounced. Efforts were also made to promote vernacular 
language in order to allow highly educated intellectuals from institutions to communicate 
with ordinary people.108 1969 was the Jubilee of the movement. Throughout the year of 1969, 
the details and impacts of the May Fourth movement were widely covered by student 
newsletters and magazines. The Undergrad even published a ‘May Fourth Special Edition’ 
on 4 May 1969, in which all articles and editorials were about the movement. Students were 
influenced by the ideas of the May Fourth and saw a parallel between it and the current 
language movement in 1970. The May Fourth movement symbolized the criticism against 
traditional ideas and the existing system. By coining the term ‘May Fourth movement’, the 
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student activists showed that they upheld the ‘sacred duty to arouse Chinese community to 
respect the Chinese culture’.109  
 
Western educated elites in an Asian society were inclined to find the concept of nationalism 
appealing when they challenged the status quo. After the 1967 riots, there was an ‘identity-
crisis’. These intellectual youths, as a result, were ‘vulnerable to political ideologies which 
(could) offer them new identities’. As the notion of nationalism placed cultural identity at the 
centre of its concern, the young generation could construct a new political identity from 
concept of nationalism. On the one hand, nationalism legitimated their claims to political 
self-determination; on the other hand, the concept allowed them to refer to their indigenous 
identity. Within this new identity, the student activists and elites could ‘play the leading role 
directing the right for independence’. In the case of Hong Kong, instead of independence, 
self-determination and local autonomy were pursued. Local culture could also be recreated.110  
According to John Breuilly, an influential theorist, nationalism should exclude political 
movements which demand independence on the basis of universal principles.111 Nonetheless, 
the language campaign justified their demand by appealing to universal human rights. For 
instance, in the position paper issued by the HKFS in 1971, language of universalism was 
adopted by students to justify their claims:  
 
The Chinese population in Hong Kong, apart from being the overwhelming majority 
of 98 per cent of the total population, also contributes the most towards the growth 
and prosperity of Hong Kong...Social and political equality are basic human rights in 
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a society. It is a gesture of respect to make the language of an ethnic group an official 
language. The demand to make Chinese language an official language is a political 
right that should not be denied then.112   
 
The difficulty to separate the elements of universalism from nationalist movements was 
recognized by Breuilly: ‘In all ways, the universalist theme of human rights and political self-
determination are inextricably linked with nationalist themes of cultural identity in modern 
colonialism’.113 In this movement, the claims to self-determination were grounded upon an 
appeal to universal human rights. The language movement in Hong Kong merged hopes for 
self-determination, cultural nationalism and calls on universalism. 
 
The demands of the movement were consequently paradoxical. On the one hand, activists 
demanded the enhancement of the status of their native language as the official language; on 
the other hand, many participants still viewed the Chinese language as inferior to the English 
language. In a letter to the editor of the Truth Daily, a supporter of the campaign 
recommended that if legal or technical difficulties, such as confusion at courts, and cost and 
time involved in training interpretators and translating all the documents from English into 
Chinese, were anticipated in replying to letters using Chinese language, the colonial 
government’s reply should be sent with English translation. In any cases of dispute, ‘the 
English version should prevail’.114 The suggestion of using the English clauses as ‘the basis’ 
of the Chinese version indicated that the notion of English being a more appropriate language 
to be used in formal occasions was still deeply rooted in many people’s mind. A 
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contemptuous attitude towards Chinese language was fairly common in the early 1970s. 
Prejudice that English-written correspondence should be given preferential treatment and the 
status Chinese language was inferior when compared to that of English ‘existed not only in 
the mind of many government officials but also the general public’.115 The fact that a number 
of the supporters still showed degrees of contempt towards the Chinese language sub-
consciously suggested that we should not take the rhetoric employed in the slogans literally at 
its face value.  
 
Nonetheless, some students did engage in the movement because of non-ideological 
concerns: their future career prospects. Both the City District Commissioner of Kowloon and 
the City District Officer of Wong Tai Sin observed that student activists mostly came from 
schools and universities using Chinese as the medium of instruction. David Lai made the 
following comment in his report:  
 
The hard-core of the agitation lies in the Federation of Hong Kong Catholic Students 
and the College Students Association of Hong Kong. Membership of these two 
organizations consists largely of Chinese University students and post-secondary 
college students. These students feel that they are being discriminated against in terms 
of job opportunities and they see the adoption of Chinese as an official language as a 
means to improve their prospects (at present the only job they could get in 
government is to be teachers).116 
 
James So made similar observations:  
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The two student bodies, (the Federation of Hong Kong Catholic Students and the 
College Students Association of Hong Kong) on the other hand, are joining in the 
bandwagon for selfish aims. Both these student bodies are mainly composed of 
students from three colleges of the Chinese University and other colleges like Chu 
Hoi and Baptist College whose English standard is, generally speaking, not as good as 
students from Hong Kong University. Hence graduates from these colleges are not 
able to compete on a par with graduates from H.K.U. for jobs. They therefore 
consider if Chinese could be made official languages they would stand a much better 
chance in competing with H.K.U. graduates for jobs.117 
 
The political culture within the young generation was far from uniform. Secondary school 
students were reluctant to politicize the campaign. Most of the secondary school students 
who participated in a seminar on the language issue held in Ying Wah College on 17 
November 1970 were ‘scared to associate themselves too closely with any of the campaign 
promoters, and therefore, made no reference to any of the three organizations throughout the 
seminar’.118 Political culture within the young generation divided between those in secondary 
and tertiary education. 
 
Denny Huang’s declaration of his decision of running for the next Urban Council election 
further fractured the movement. Some post-secondary students expressed their 
disappointment by calling Huang a ‘hypocrite’ and asserted that he only started the 
movement with a ‘self-seeking purpose’.119 There was also information suggesting that 
Huang ‘may be connected with Taiwan’ and was helping Taiwan to intensify her influence in 
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Hong Kong, although no source of financial support could be traced.120 Student 
representatives felt that Huang wanted to dominate the movement.121 Many gradually 
withdrew, ‘fed up’ that the campaign representatives never consulted them and had never 
informed them how their donations were spent.122  
 
As the editor of Wah Kiu Yat Po pointed out, instead of serving any political purpose, many 
people engaged due to pragmatism. They wanted Chinese to be used in their workplace. Also, 
the Chinese language was ‘fluent, classical and beautiful’, and therefore should receive the 
‘dignity’ that it deserved. They were probably reluctant to politicize the movement.123 This 
tendency was particularly prevalent among the middle aged and elderly groups, and could be 
explained by ‘the tradition of paternalism in Chinese politics, and the refugee experience’.124 
In Chinese culture, the relationship between the government and people should be ‘analogous 
to that which should exist between parents and children or between a shepherd and his 
flock’.125 In other words, subjects should have absolute obedience and show respect to the 
authorities. Such traditional concept definitely had led many becoming reluctant to get 
involved in any issue related to politics. Secondly, to many Hong Kong Chinese, the colony 
was a ‘life boat’ in the chaotic ‘sea’ of China. To avoid being drawn into political turmoil, 
many ‘naturally don’t want to rock it (the life boat)’.126   
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For the older generation, their engagement in the language movement was driven often by 
instrumental and pragmatic concerns. For example, for non-English speaking middle-aged 
community leaders, such as the kaifong leaders, their involvement in the language campaign 
was clearly neither politically nor culturally driven, but ‘dictated by considerations of 
personal status that were somehow impeded by their insufficient English and the inferior 
position of Chinese language in official usage’.127 Grassroots groups also tended to 
participate in the language campaign because of pragmatic concerns:  
 
For the average person the need for better communication with government is still felt 
despite the actions taken by government so far in using Chinese as an alternative 
medium of communication. There is a widespread feeling that the use of Chinese by 
government departments so far has not been as widespread and certainly not as 
effective as C.S. has suggested in his speech in Legco.128  
 
By the early 1970s, some governmental documents and letters were only available in English. 
As the Colonial Secretariat had pointed out in January 1971, many documents were still 
found either without a Chinese version or with one but were never used.129 For example, in 
the Inland Revenue Department, the following forms and letters were only written in English: 
letter requesting members of public to make a salary tax return, appointment card for the 
public, notice for recovery of tax, salaries tax, notice of assessment and demand for tax.130 
This practice had brought serious inconvenience to the Chinese people who did not read 
English. It also caused a number of people coming to City District Offices requesting their 
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staff to translate and explain the content.131 For the older generation and the grassroots 
groups, defence of local political autonomy and culture was not their concern. They engaged 
as the wider use of Chinese language would be convenient. 
 
Participants disagreed on tactics and timing. For some activists, the declaration of Chinese as 
the official language was ‘tantamount to putting the cart before the horse’ and had neglected 
‘the feasibility and practicability of employing Chinese as a lingua franca in every sector of 
the administration’.132 Many also questioned the meaning of ‘official’ and the necessity of 
making Chinese an official language. The middle and upper classes, in particular, found the 
campaigners’ tactics, such as organizing class boycotts and sending petition to the authorities, 
radical. They claimed that they ‘favoured a milder and patient approach’. For instance, C. P. 
So, the Chairman of a multi-storey building in Tsim Sha Tsui, did support the idea that 
Chinese language should be used widely, but did not take side with the students and involved 
in the campaign physically as he found it ‘unnecessary’. He believed that the formation of the 
Language Committee had showed that the colonial government ‘was already making a hard 
attempt to widen the use of Chinese’.133 Industrials and businessmen were relatively 
‘indifferent’ to the issue. Many professionals were also reluctant to engage in the movement. 
The City District Officer of Kowloon City interviewed two anonymous company executives 
regarding their views towards the language campaign. Both suggested that ‘they did not mind 
signing’ for the movement but ‘did not want to be too much involved’ and put down their 
addresses.134 Civil servants also criticized the active involvement of Tsin Sai-nin, the 
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Chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants Association in the movement. They 
believed that his cooperation with the All Working Party would ‘give the impression that all 
members of Chinese Civil Servants supported the campaign’, which ‘in fact is far from 
truth’.135 Diverging opinions suggested that divisions did exist among the supporters . The 
political culture in Hong Kong was far from uniform. The middle and upper classes despised 
‘radical’ informal political activities and were reluctant to engage in the movement directly. 
Compared to most of the students, they were relatively politically conservative.  
 
Most of the working class and lower-income groups were either disinterested in the language 
issue or simply avoided getting involved. By late 1970, most people interviewed by the staff 
of City District Office confessed that ‘they had not bothered to acquaint themselves with the 
issue’.136 In his assessment of public reaction to the language issue in October 1970, the 
Kowloon City District Officer made the following comment: ‘During the last week, although 
my staff made a special effort to elicit opinions on this use, our contacts did not seem to be 
very interested’.137 The City District Officer of Wong Tai Sin, James So, similarly pointed 
out that ‘generally speaking, this movement fails to arouse much interest among people in the 
district’. 138 By contrast some workers were openly hostile. For example, Huang received a 
letter of death threat from ‘a group of workers’, who clearly believed Huang’s All Working 
Party did not represent all workers and did not want to be involved in the movement. They 
asked Huang not to ‘do something which has nothing to do with the masses’ and ‘sacrifice 
the public’ for himself. Accusation was also made against Huang of ‘using the workers as 
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tools’ to pursue his own political ambition.139 Town Talk also suggested that there was ‘a 
general sense of apathy and indifference’ towards the language movement ‘amongst the 
working class and the lower and lower middle income groups’ that they have contacted.140 
Nonetheless, other factory workers and apprentices in Kowloon City expressed that they 
‘would support the campaign heartily because they did not know English’.141 This indicates 
that sweeping conclusions cannot be always made about the relationship between political 
attitudes and social classes. 
 
One divisive issue was ‘nationalism’, which aroused suspicion of the working class inclined 
to the Chinese Communist Party in China. In a letter to the editor of the South China 
Morning Post, a reader described the language movement as a ‘ballyhoo’ and called the 
organizers of this ‘trouble-making campaign’ ‘rats’ who were receiving support from the 
leftists and plotting against the colonial government.142 A reader named C. G. Koo wrote to 
the South China Morning Post and made the following comment:  
 
As I said before this adoption of Cantonese as the official Chinese language is the 
most expedient but a very short-sighted policy. Let’s face it, the days of Hong Kong 
as a British colony is bound to be numbered.  At such time, most of the Hong Kong 
Chinese will be part of either Chinese People’s Republic or the Republic of China, 
some will be dispersed overseas. Whenever they go, ‘Kuo Yu’ will be the main means 
of dialogue and teaching in Chinese. Therefore, as a long term view, ‘Kuo Yu’ should 
be taught early and well for the sake of the younger generation even if the present 
																																																						
139 HKRS 285-1-1, ‘Dr Huang Receives Threat’, South China Morning Post, 22 October 1970. 
140 ‘Special Supplement on the Use of Chinese as an Official Language’, Town Talk, p. 5. 
141 HKRS 285-1-1, ‘中文教育與法定語文’, Wah Kiu Yat Po, 5 October, 1970; ‘Why Change’, South China 
Morning Post, 25 September 1970. 
142 HKRS 285-1-1, ‘Too Much Ballyhoo’, South China Morning Post, 29 September 1970. 
	 123	
generation rejects it. Everyone has a right to speak their own dialect, but in choosing 
an official language, one needs wisdom and foresight.143  
 
 A reader of China Mail shared similar stance and criticized the campaign as an emotional 
issue that wasted the time and money of the government:  
 
As may have expected its (the Language Committee) first recommendations were for 
simultaneous translations in the Urban and Legislative Council… Presumably the 
translators will be given copies of the few speeches made and will not have to contend 
with any of the parry and thrust of debate. For this relatively simple job the pay scale 
recommend goes up to a staggering $5,223. If nothing else, it’s certainly an incentive 
to be bilingual. It is also an indication of just how much the cost of this nothing-more-
than-emotional issue is going to cost. Anyway, its supporters will surely be able to 
find the remedy from the surpluses that have been building up in the budgets each 
year…No matter whether you support Beijing or Taipei, the language must be 
Mandarin. To say Cantonese should be official is like saying that the Yorkshire 
dialect should be the language of England, the Kentucky drawl the language of 
America or Breton the language of France. This report should be marked one out of 
ten. Try again.144   
 
The City District Officer of Central, Ng Chak-Lam also observed that the movement had 
waned: ‘Some heat has apparently been taken out of this issue, and I doubt if it is still 
worthwhile to compile a weekly report’.145 Jack So, the City District Officer of Kwun Tong 
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pointed out that ‘people in the district are no longer interested in the issue’. As a result, his 
staffs were ‘unable to collect any prompted comments of significance’.146 In a meeting of the 
Kowloon City District Council in December 1970, most City District Officers reported that 
there was no special activity launched by the student activists in the past two weeks.147 As the 
government’s response was well received by the public. Student activities seemed to have 
died down. People who joined the campaign because of pragmatism gradually showed less 
interest to the campaign. By the end of March in 1971, the heat of the language campaign has 
gone. The Deputy Secretary of Home Affairs, F.K. Li therefore ordered that the bi-weekly 
returns made by the City District Officers were no longer required and could be 
discontinued.148  
 
Conclusion 
 
The language movement shows that a reformist colonial administration was responsive to 
shifting popular sentiments. In response to a coalition demanding legal status of Chinese 
language, the colonial government set up the Chinese Language Committee to investigate the 
issue. To help the bureaucrats to better understand the changing public opinions, City District 
Officers produced Town Talk every week, which was disseminated to high ranked policy 
makers. Besides, they also gathered diverse views of different social classes and age groups 
on a weekly basis on behalf of the Committee. The colonial government accepted the 
Committee’s recommendations, and understood the importance of respecting and responding 
to public opinions. Simultaneous translation was provided in Urban and Legislative Councils 
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meetings. Interpretators were recruited and trained. In 1974, Chinese language finally gained 
the official status.  
 
As the Legislative Councillor, Hilton Cheong-Leen had said during the second reading of the 
Official Languages Bill, ‘In the years to come, the Official Languages Bill would be seen to 
have done much to reaffirm the cultural dignity and pride of the Chinese residents of Hong 
Kong.’149  In hindsight, the later generations attributed the pursuit of the equality and the 
promotion of Chinese culture as the main cause of the movement. Archival evidence shows 
that the language movement was far from monolithic with a fixed agenda. In no way was the 
movement ‘non-ideological’. The quests for political self-determination, cultural nationalism, 
racial equality, career prospects, social status and even more convenience in every day’s life 
were all equally important in driving the movement. Ideological and instrumental concerns 
intertwined. 
 
A distinctive Hong Kong identity, which was built upon the differences between the colony 
and the mainland China, had not taken full shape in the early 1970s. Activists consistently 
appealed to both cultural and political nationalism to justify their resistance to the colonial 
government’s language policy. Although language activists and movement supporters often 
only identified themselves as Chinese culturally and rarely made direct associations with the 
Chinese Communist regime, optimism towards Hong Kong’s return to China and the future 
development of the PRC was expressed. In essence, although the aim of the language 
movement was to introduce language reforms in administration, legislation and education in 
Hong Kong, the campaign was inseparable from Chinese nationalism. 
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The language movement demonstrated that Hong Kong had many political cultures. The 
young generation, which was often portrayed by scholars as politically active, was far more 
divided. University students and elites, who were both ideologically and instrumentally 
motivated, engaged in social movements vigorously. They were critical of the colonial 
administration and politically conscious. They also perceived informal political engagement 
as their rights and appropriate means to express their grievances. The secondary students, 
however, held a more cautious attitude towards political activism. The middle-aged and 
elderly groups were relatively indifferent to politics. Many of them joined the movement 
solely due to instrumental concerns. In general, the upper and middle classes showed concern 
towards the language issue. They however, displayed contempt towards informal political 
activities and considered them ‘radical’. Many were reluctant to participate in the movement. 
The working class and grassroots groups were predominantly indifferent. Some expressed 
concerns over political activism due to their fear towards officialdom and political instability.  
 
The passage of the Official Languages Bill removed the language barrier between the 
bureaucracy and the public, and increased the stake of the Chinese population of Hong Kong 
in politics. More Chinese speaking people could now serve the government. These changes 
paved the way for increased political activism and a more open political culture in the mid 
and late 1970s. These changes are discussed next.  
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III. The Anti-Corruption Movement 
 
 
By the 1960s, bureaucratic corruption was systematically operating in various governmental 
departments, and for the colonial government, it aroused from Chinese culture, built on social 
‘relationships’ instead of ‘laws and regulations’, exacerbated by language barrier between the 
colonial administration and various Chinese communities.1 After the 1966 Star Ferry riots 
and the 1967 riots, the colonial state increasingly responded to popular demands in order to 
enhance legitimacy and close the ‘communication gap’ between itself and the Chinese 
communities. As Chapter 2 has demonstrated, the language policy was perceived as a pre-
requisite for improved colonial rule. Another major reform was the formation of the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, ‘one of the most important 
developments in Hong Kong since 1945’.2 The ICAC ‘generated invaluable political 
dividends for British rule’, enhancing the credibility of the colonial state.3 It symbolized the 
emergence of a ‘local political culture’, creating an impression that Hong Kong was more 
civilized than other Asian countries, including China, where corruption remained 
entrenched.4  
 
The ICAC has become a subject of recent revisionism, which had placed stress on 
incremental shifts, rather than changes brought about by the creation of the ICAC. Mark 
Hampton has explored British legal and political culture, how it adapted and transmitted to 
the context of Hong Kong.5 Observing the transforming anti-corruption measures from the 
																																																						
1	Ray Yep, 靜默革命:香港廉政百年共業 (Silent Revolution: 100 Years of Development of Hong Kong in Anti-
Corruption), (Hong Kong, 2014), pp. 7-8.. 
2 Ray Yep, ‘The Crusade against Corruption in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a Zealous 
Reformer or Reluctant Hero?’, China Information 27:2 (2013), p. 198. 
3 Goodstadt, Uneasy Partner, p. 156; also quoted in Carroll, A Concise History, p. 175.  
4 Tsang, A Modern History, p. 276. 
5 Mark Hampton, ‘British Legal Culture and Colonial Governance: The Attack on Corruption in Hong Kong, 
1968-1974’, Britain and the World, 5:2 (2012), p. 239. 
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Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 1968 to the setting up of the ICAC, he argued that the 
implementation of anti-corruption measures in colonial Hong Kong was due to the 
incompatibility between political corruption and ‘British ideas of good government’.6 British 
legal norms, in particular, the Fugitive Offenders Act, however served as an obstacle to 
eradicate corruption in Hong Kong, as will be detailed later.7 Ray Yep has emphasized 
decades of cumulative efforts made by Governors ruling before Murray MacLehose, 
including Robert Brown Black and David Trench. Reforms pushed by these former 
Governors in the context of escalating tensions between Hong Kong community and London 
in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the passage of the Prevention of Bribery Bill in 1970, paved 
the way for the setting up of the ICAC.8 Lam Wai-man has provided a brief account of 
student-led anti-corruption movement after the escape of Peter Godber, the Deputy District 
Police Commander of Kowloon, in 1973.9 In June, Godber was put on the watch list after 
evidence indicating that he possessed a huge amount of unexplained wealth. His 
disappearance in Hong Kong resulted in public criticisms. Students subsequently initiated an 
anti-corruption movement. Lam examined how students mobilized the public. She pointed 
out that the campaign received ‘extensive’ publicity and the scale of participation was 
‘considerable’.10 It demonstrated the ‘political sophistication of the young political forces’.11 
 
These scholars have not considered fully how anti-corruption movements facilitated the 
formation of the ICAC and how general political culture was affected by the formation of the 
ICAC. Although Hampton asserted that the setting up of the ICAC ‘was the culmination of 
anti-corruption campaigns emerging from Hong Kong’s Chinese grassroots during a period 
																																																						
6 Ibid., p. 224; Mark Hampton, Hong Kong and British Culture, 1945-97 (Manchester, 2015), pp. 145-59. 
7 Hampton, ‘British Legal Culture’, p. 224.  
8 Yep, ‘The Crusade against Corruption’, pp. 197-221. 
9 Lam, Understanding the Political Culture, pp. 156-63. 
10 Ibid., pp. 161-2. 
11 Ibid., p. 163. 
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of political crisis’, he did not examine the public discourse of anti-corruption closely.12 He 
researched the roles of Elsie Elliott and Alan Ellis but did not detail the networks of these 
activists. Yep focused on how changing dynamics between the British government and the 
colonial government led to anti-corruption reforms in 1974. He only noted ‘growing local 
frustrations’ among the Chinese communities.13 Lam failed to analyse non-student-led anti-
corruption movements, and relied on published sources, such as student magazines and 
newspapers. She also failed to elaborate relations between these student movements and the 
implementation of new anti-corruption measures. We have a fragmentary understanding of 
the anti-corruption movement, which operated by and large, initiated by a newspaper, student 
activists and individual campaigners, and supported by the wider public.  
 
Using under-exploited archival evidence on corruption from the National Archives in London 
and the Public Record Office in Hong Kong, complemented by Elsie Elliott’s manuscripts 
held at the Baptist University Library, Hong Kong, this chapter provides the first 
comprehensive study of anti-corruption social movements. This analysis shows that anti-
corruption reforms were implemented after the emergence of various social movements, 
suggesting that the legislative and institutional changes were responses to shifting public 
sentiments, and state records show that the colonial administration was actively investigating 
changing popular opinions. The surviving data is fragmentary but supports the overall thesis 
that shifting public opinions influenced policy making.  
 
The chapter divides into the following sections. The first investigates various anti-corruption 
campaigns, including the China Mail’s opinion poll campaign, the student-led anti-corruption 
																																																						
12 Hampton, ‘British Legal Culture’, p. 238. 
13 Yep, ‘The Crusade against Corruption’, p. 205. 
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movements and campaigns started by individuals, notably Elsie Elliot, James Johnson and 
Alan Ellis. It examines the connections between these campaigns and activists, the strategies 
they employed to mobilize the mass and the shifting popular sentiments towards corruption. 
The second analyses confidential correspondences between Hong Kong and London to reveal 
the relationship between social movements and policy formulation, explaining why activism 
led to the formation of the ICAC instead of the appointment of an external inquiry in 1974. 
The third studies the public reactions towards the Commission throughout the 1970s and how 
political culture in Hong Kong shifted due to its activities. 
 
 
Increased Press Coverage and Shifted Public Sentiments 
 
Serious corruption existed in Hong Kong in different governmental departments since the 
post-war period. Taking the Commerce and Industry Department as an example, it was 
commonly known that officers welcomed gifts at Chinese seasonal festivals and businessmen 
viewed this as ‘an accepted practice’.14 During the Korean War, the embargo imposed by the 
United States on China created opportunities for corruption. Many officials actively assisted 
big companies to import and export a large quantity of ‘strategic goods’ to the mainland.15 
These corrupt inspectors were mainly expatriates, notably Portuguese and Eurasians.16 By 
1962, a report by the Anti-Corruption Branch of Hong Kong police estimated that 90 per cent 
to 95 per cent of the Inspectorate (about 200 officers) were or had been corrupt.17 Prior to the 
1970s, measures to prosecute corruption were insufficient and ineffective. The 
Misdemeanours Punishments Ordinance enacted in 1898 was the first corruption-related 
																																																						
14 HKRS 163-1-2838, ‘Corruption in Preventive Service: Commerce & Industry Department’, enclosed in 
memo from H. W. E. Heath, Commissioner of Police to Colonial Secretary, 27 July 1962, p. 2. 
15 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 19 
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legislation. Any public servant who received bribe or person who offered bribes was liable to 
two-year of imprisonment and a fine not exceeding $500. Nonetheless, a department which 
dealt with corruption specifically did not emerge until 1948 when the Anti-Corruption and 
Narcotics Branch was formed. In 1948, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was enacted, 
outlining that when an accused person who was in possession of pecuniary resources 
disproportionate to his source of income but failed to explain the wealth, magistrates would 
take this into consideration and accept this as the evidence of corruption.18 However, 
corruption investigations were still carried out by the police force, which was most 
notoriously known for corrupt practices. In spite of the introduction of Prevention of Bribery 
Ordinance in 1970, which outlined that officials were liable to dismissal if they were unable 
to provide a satisfactory account to explain why they were living beyond their salaries, 
bureaucratic corruption continued to exist. For example, people paid the License Unit of the 
Transport Department an illegal fee of $200 as ‘commission’ or ‘tea money’ during the 
process of application in order to obtain a taxi license without a garage paper. Similar 
collection of ‘water’, ‘tea money’, ‘black money’, ‘ghost money’ or ‘fix up fee’ could be 
found in numerous other departments, such as the Public Works Department and the 
Resettlement Department.19 
 
By 1970, scandals of corruption within the police force were widespread, from police officers 
collecting ‘protection fees’ from gamblers and triads, to them receiving promotion fees 
within the Police Department. The public was dissatisfied with the police force. As Elsie 
Elliott had pointed out, ‘this deep mistrust of the existing machinery is colony-wide’ in the 
																																																						
18 Yep, 靜默革命:香港廉政百年共業, p. 197. 
19 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘Corruption in the Government’, Chinese Press Review, no. 218, 8-14 March 1973. 
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early 1970s.20 Discussions of corruption increased during the enactment of the Prevention of 
Bribery Bill. Town Talk made the following observation: 
 
This, again, is a subject which has attracted widespread attention. There seems no 
doubt that the consensus of opinion among a wide variety of people is that the 
proposed measures seem likely to be more effective than the existing legislation, 
though some people wondered whether they would be really effective against big 
racketeers.21 
 
Most people believed that the Anti-Corruption Branch should be detached from the police 
force:  
 
The most widespread comment relates to the fact that the Anti-Corruption Branch of 
the police force will continue to be responsible for taking action against alleged 
offenders. People just do not seem to think that the Anti-Corruption Branch can give 
the legislation the full effect that government, and the public desire.22 
 
By November 1969, ‘the most widespread comment continued to be the effect that the Anti-
Corruption Branch should not locate in the police but independent’.23 The Bill also increased 
press coverage of corruption. Many newspapers criticized the colonial administration’s 
attitude to corruption. Hong Kong Standard regarded corruption in the colony as ‘the way of 
life in Hong Kong’ and a ‘social cancer’, which was ‘too deep rooted to be up-rooted and too 
rewarding to be stamped out’. The ‘laissez-faire devil-may-care attitude’ and the current 
‘permissive system’ were blamed for the widespread of corruption.24 China Mail even 
																																																						
20 MSS.13 7-6, letter from Elsie Elliott to Murray MacLehose, 29 March 1972. 
21 HKRS 286-1-8, ‘Prevention of Bribery Bill’, Town Talk, 31 July 1969, p. 1. 
22 Ibid. 
23 HKRS 286-1-9, ‘Prevention of Bribery Bill’, Town Talk, 5 November 1970, p. 1. 
24 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘Is Corruption A Way of Life?’, Hong Kong Standard, 8 February 1973.  
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asserted that one ‘would have to be deaf, dumb and blind not to realise corruption is rampant 
in Hong Kong’.25 The colonial state was increasingly criticized for its ‘ostrich-like attitude’ 
towards corruption.26 Chinese press, such as Kung Sheung Daily News, Kung Sheung Evening 
News and Hong Kong Times similarly complained that past records suggested that the 
colonial government’s attempts to eradicate corruption were inefficient. Instead of catching 
‘tigers’, only ‘small fry’ was caught.27 The escalation of popular discontent could be 
observed by Tom Pendry, the Labour MP , who found ‘a great deal of anti-British feeling’ in 
the colony when he visited Hong Kong in 1973.28  
 
The situation was made worse in 1973, when Peter Godber, the former Chief Police 
Superintendent was able to flee to the United Kingdom in June although he was under 
investigation and failed to explain his wealth of $4.3 million. Within two months, another 
Police Superintendent Ernest Hunt was charged due to corruption. These episodes led to 
increased public concern over police corruption. Anti-corruption campaigns were initiated by 
journalists, student organizations and individual activists. The press started calling for the 
separation of the Anti-Corruption Branch from the police force. Sing Tao Man Pao and Hong 
Kong Standard both reported that majority of people believed that the branch should be 
independent.29 By October 1973, South China Morning Post recorded how social attitudes 
were changing:  
 
From silent, resentful tolerance of corruption and big boys who get away with it, the 
mood of the people has changed to an indignant and censorious outcry against both 
																																																						
25 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘What You Think About Corruption’, China Mail, 26 March 1973. 
26 HKRS 70-6-339-1, Rodney Tasker, ‘Ostriches Ignore Corruption’, China Mail, 13 November 1973. 
27 ‘Corruption in the Government’, Chinese Press Review. 
28 HKRS 70-6-340-2, ‘Extract from the Debate on the Address of the House of Commons on Wednesday, 31 
October 1973’, HKGIS, 8 November 1973, p. 4. 
29 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘議員及市民多認為反貪污部門獨立	工作效率提高’, Sing Tao Man Pao, 14 July 1973 
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those who accept bribes and the administration who allows them to abuse the norms 
of society with such profligacy and contumely.30 
 
Eradicating corruption was declared ‘the unanimous demand of all citizens in Hong Kong’.31 
As the next section reveals this shift in public sentiments had numerous components, which 
need to be analysed separately.  
 
Political Activism 
a) China Mail Campaign 
 
China Mail started protesting against corruption in 1970, before the escape of Peter Godber. 
The circulation figure of China Mail was approximately 21,300 copies in 1970. With an 
estimated readership of 76,000 in 1971, it was the ‘most widely-read afternoon English 
language newspaper in Hong Kong’.32 Its audience comprised young people (30,000 aged 
between 20-34) and educated readers. The majority were bilingual (58,000), students 
(32,000), professional (16,000) and clerical (11,000).33 71 per cent (54,000) of its readers 
were male. Its campaign called for the intervention of the Scotland Yard, to set up an 
independent public inquiry into corruption. The newspaper disclosed the seriousness of 
corruption within the bureaucracy. Citizens’ experiences of being exploited by the police 
were regularly published. Practical and ideological concerns reinforced each other. Readers 
engaged for instrumental reasons: ‘I work in the off-course gambling organization. I can say 
that if we do not pay, there is no chance of doing business.’34 Social injustice was a 
motivator:  
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33 Ibid. 
34	‘What You Think About Corruption’.	
	 135	
 
Corruption in Hong Kong has become unofficially legalized. I feel that corruption is 
inseparable from the social structure and its judiciary system…. What’s more, I 
wonder if you have heard of the Rent Collectors. They make more money than the 
Governor.35 
 
There was sympathy for the exploited poor: 
  
 
I saw a police constable asking an old newspaper seller for laisee (red pockets) 
recently.…The old man, who looks weak and poor, sells only a few papers in front of 
a café in Matauwei Road. I do not think he can support himself. I did not know how 
much he had given the PC. But I wonder how much he could pay.36 
 
To enhance the credibility of its claims and appeal for public support, China Mail published 
first-hand accounts of policemen:  
 
I am just an ordinary policeman. I have been working in the force for over fifteen 
years but I must say I have achieved nothing. I only passed my promotion exam last 
year. I saw in the Hong Kong Commercial Daily that your newspaper has started an 
anti-corruption campaign so I would like to take this chance to speak out my 
grievances. The outsiders’ belief is right that there is corruption in the police force. 
But do you know that senior officers are more corrupt? They squeeze money from 
their subordinates…. You can never guess how much a detective sergeant Class I had 
to give his superior. Now I tell you, it was about $100,000. In every division, there 
were three to seven chief detectives. Yet, still there were people who were willing to 
pay such a large sum of money to get their job. Why? Do you know that a detective 
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superintendent got more than $100,000 a month? He was very much better off than 
the Governor. Inside the force, there is only one promotion chance for everyone in a 
year. But if you want to become a detective constable, you have to pay $3,000-
$5,000, and if a DPC wants to be promoted to a DSGT, he has to pay, according to 
the present system, $30,000 to $50,000. You will have to devote all your time in 
raising the money when you receive the order to go to the Police Training School for 
CID training. If you fail to get the required sum, your beautiful dreams of the future 
will be shattered.37 
 
In March 1973, the newspaper escalated its campaign. It set up a hot-line for its readers so 
that they could report corrupt practices without providing their names and information. 
Opinion polls were also carried out to collect readers’ views towards corruption and reforms, 
and replies were published, before being sent to the Governor, Murray MacLehose.  
 
The campaign captured further elite attention and galvanized the young generation. The 
editor believed that the campaign had ‘destroyed at least one myth about the Hong Kong’, 
that people ‘don’t care about graft’. More than 800 replies were received by 26 March 1973, 
less than a month after the campaign began. These replies were perceived to be representative 
of public opinions, strengthening the claim that these voices should be listened by the 
colonial government: they were ‘from all walks of life’, including doctors, lawyers, 
housewives and even policemen.38 And the number reached more than 1,000 by early April 
1973.39 The poll results in March suggested that the public had ‘no confidence in the police, 
the fire services and of the government’: 97 per cent of respondents believed there was 
corruption in the police force, 95 per cent argued that there was corrupt practices in the fire 
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services; 94 per cent was convinced that there was corruption in the government. 95 per cent 
demanded an inquiry to be ordered, with 85 per cent hoping that inquiry would be in public. 
In terms of the appointment of the investigators, China Mail claimed that only approximately 
16 per cent want a combination of Hong Kong and English investigators, 20 per cent believed 
that the inquiry should be carried out by local investigators. The majority (57 per cent) 
expressed their demands of having English investigations.40  
 
The campaign attracted mixed responses. Some readers were pessimistic: ‘I compliment you 
on your attempt to do something, but I fear that you will be beaten by the Establishment. 
Good luck and keep trying.’41 Some readers believed that the investigation should be carried 
out by students instead of the Metropolitan Police.42 Most published comments supported that 
idea that the Anti-Corruption Branch must be divorced from the police force.43 ‘Make it 
Independent’ even became the headline on 6 June.44 While the orientation of the press was 
supported by Sir Ivo Rigby, the Chief Justice of Hong Kong, some disagreed and argued that 
‘Hong Kong’s affairs and legislation, and Hong Kong’s problem should be solved by and in 
Hong Kong’. The ‘Godber incident’ should not ‘be the precedent of Britain interfering in 
Hong Kong’s domestic politics’.45 P. C. Woo, the Unofficial Member of Executive and 
Legislative Councils similarly asserted that corruption in Hong Kong should be dealt with at 
a local government level by locals.46 
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China Mail’s campaign was influential and important because it provided an independent 
source of information for MPs in London and raised awareness about corruption in Hong 
Kong. The campaign gained good publicity in Britain and James Johnson, for example 
praised the Mail’s efforts: ‘This kind of thing (corruption) concerns me a great deal. The 
China Mail is doing a fine job in campaigning corruption. I think an official inquiry is the 
only way to deal with it.’47 Johnson submitted a parliamentary question to the Foreign 
Secretary using similar wordings that were found in China Mail: ‘If he is aware of the 
widespread anxiety amongst the public in Hong Kong regarding corruption in the police 
force, fire services and government departments, and if he will institute an inquiry?’48 On 28 
March, Johnson and a group of retired Hong Kong civil servants started a campaign in 
London to pressurize the Whitehall to set up an inquiry into allegations of corruption within 
Hong Kong’s civil service. The China Mail campaign was also reported by The Guardian. 49 
In April, Johnson, along with two other Labour MPs, Kenneth Marks and Daniel Jones, 
announced their plans to visit the colony to investigate corruption through China Mail.50 
 
On 20 September 1973, China Mail published a petition to the Governor. The paper 
mentioned the 1967 riots and implied that political stability would be affected if corruption 
was not addressed in new ways. The Godber incident made this campaign timely and gave it 
a strong resonance: 
 
…Hong Kong today is living through its great crisis of confidence since the bloody 
days and nights of 1967…. This atmosphere of cynicism and distrust, if allowed to 
continue, will destroy the confidence of Hong Kong to tackle the very real problem 
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50 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘MPs to Prove Corruption’, China Mail, 11 April 1973. 
	 139	
that face the colony in an increasing competitive world.…Today, because of Peter 
Godber, the standing and reputation of Hong Kong police –unjustly-perhaps– has 
never been lower in public esteem. The one bad apple, it is argued, must have 
polluted half the barrel.51 
 
The newspaper then recommended institutional reforms and the appointment of Jack Cater, 
the Secretary of Home Affairs to investigate corruption: 
 
The only organization empowered to separate truth from rumour in these allegations 
is the Anti-Corruption Branch. And that, because it is controlled by the police, is seen 
by the public– again unjustly perhaps– as a prejudiced court. So it is essential in the 
interests of justice and the wellbeing of Hong Kong that the Anti-Corruption Branch 
should be re-established in a way that will inspire total confidence in its work. The 
first move must be the appointment at its head of a man of unimpeachable integrity 
and wide experience of life in Hong Kong. A man who is known and trusted by the 
public and who is impervious to intimidation. Does such a man exist in Hong Kong 
today? It is now being widely suggested that there does. He is Mr. Jack Cater.52 
 
The China Mail campaign was however limited as it was restricted to its elite bilingual 
audience, and lasted for a relatively short period of time, from 1973 to mid-1974. The 
campaign continued to pay attention to corruption after the ICAC was formed in February 
1974. For example, in March, the paper criticized that some people could not reach ICAC 
through its hot line.53 The paper also reported the changing relationship between the ICAC 
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and the police force.54 Nonetheless, the campaign ended in August 1974 due to the closure of 
the newspaper itself. The paper had been ‘losing money for some time’ despite ‘changes of 
format and editorial staff’ in 1973.55 The campaign was still significant. It demonstrated 
increased engagement in the political discourse among the young generation and elites, who 
paid close attention to the issue of corruption. The campaign was also influential as it 
informed both the MPs in London and other press in Hong Kong. For example, the interview 
of Charles Sutcliffe, the Commissioner of Police with China Mail was ‘picked up’ by ‘a 
number of Chinese newspapers’.56  
 
Influenced by newspaper campaigning led by China Mail, the public was mobilized, and it 
became evident that most people who engaged in the debate regarding anti-corruption 
measures favoured the separation of the Anti-Corruption Branch from the police. According 
to Town Talk, there were ‘reports from four district on public feelings on the question of 
whether the Anti-Corruption Branch should be separated from the Police, all of which were 
in favour of such (a) move’.57 From her contacts with the public, Helen Lai, the Yau Mai Tei 
City District Officer, asserted that the majority of the population believed that the creation of 
an independent establishment was necessary: ‘The general public thinks that there should be 
some kind of a watch-dog over the entire government and perhaps especially over the 
police’.58  
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b) Student Movements 
 
Students were discontent over the way the colonial government handled corruption. Chinese 
University of Hong Kong students for example considered the Prevention of Bribery 
Ordinance enacted in 1970 ‘unacceptable’, as it had ‘apparently violate(d) certain rights 
customarily granted people under British rule’. They were the sceptical about the notion that 
evidence from unknown sources could be used and the law’s potential negative impacts on 
innocent people:  
 
…even if anonymous evidence can be considered valid in a court of law – a 
questionable item in itself, it is dubious rights of the government to deprive a man of 
his inalienable innocence only to protect one who may be a misinformer…. when the 
definition of corruption is so broad as to include, for example, acceptance of 
entertainment from a business associate likely to want to win a favour. The possibility 
does exist that an innocent man may have all his family’s accounts investigated, 
perhaps because of a recent dinner party. Here the law is so broad that citizens are 
totally dependent on the intelligence and integrity of the court’s individual 
interpretation of justice, and have little guaranteed protection under the law. 59 
 
Most importantly, the students believed that the Anti-Corruption Branch should be separated 
from the police force: ‘For one thing, the police, primary target of graft accusations are still 
the authority used to investigate corruption cases. If so, they will not be so dependably 
vigilant against their self-interests’.60 
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The Godber case in particular captured the attention of university students. In the summer of 
1973, the HKFS, along with about 1,200 post-secondary students started a signature 
campaign to pursue Godber’s extradition. Apart from uprooting the problem of corruption in 
the colony, there were a number of ideological factors which mobilized students to engage in 
the movement. The pursuit of social justice was one. Many university students aimed at 
exposing the misdeeds of the colonial state and establishing a just social system.61 Students  
presented the anti-corruption movement as endorsed by Hong Kong people:  
 
Corruption is serious in various departments in the colonial government, which 
threatened the lives of four million citizens in Hong Kong. We promote the anti-
corruption movement based on the interest of the entire society. The aim was to 
request the colonial government to face the problem of corruption. Therefore, the 
movement is just, and is the unanimous will of all residents in Hong Kong.62  
 
Students were anti-colonial in outlook. For example, students at the Chinese University 
attributed the problem of corruption to the unjust nature of colonialism:  
 
When we look at the Godber incident, we should not look at the surface of the 
problems but analyse why and how it happened, in order to bring out the ‘new 
problem’. Understanding the nature of this event would deepen the understanding of 
our society: A society like this, with the system of colonialism, is a system designed 
for rulers.63 
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The HKFS also adopted an anti-colonial slogan: ‘Anti-Capitalism, Anti-Colonialism and 
Anti-Imperialism’.64 Some participants even compared the movement to Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolution to overthrow the Qing Dynasty.65 Others later joined the campaign as they 
believed the state had violated the freedom of speech. On 12 July, the colonial government 
announced the possibility of suing three local newspapers for ‘disclosing identity of the 
persons being investigated’. The Federation condemned this move as an ‘irritating measure of 
attempted suppression of the freedom of speech in the colony’, which they had to protect 
against.66 These different ideologies added weight to students’ claim that institutional reforms 
were necessary to eradicate corruption in Hong Kong.   
 
Despite different motives, most students believed that the escape of Godber demonstrated 
that senior officials were involved in corruption. In order to press for the extradition of 
Godber and the order of a public inquiry, they petitioned both the Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath and the opposition leader in the English Parliament, Harold Wilson. The HKFS 
expressed anger in response to the British government’s reluctance to extradite Godber: 
 
The general public in Hong Kong are indignant over the escape of Godber. It is no 
answer to the question ‘why isn’t Godber brought back to Hong Kong’ to say that 
‘because the UK law says that he is not returnable under the UK law’. This may well 
be a good answer to the question ‘why should Godber be protected by the UK law?’ 
Is it because the UK endorses the conduct and behaviour of Godber? Is it because the 
UK considers herself to be under a moral obligation to protect Godber? Or is it 
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because the UK government is minded to ‘accord to the colony an imperial brush 
off’?67 
 
Student representatives demanded the British government amend the Fugitive Offenders Act 
enacted in 1967, which outlined that an offence was only extraditable if it was also an offence 
in the British laws. Apart from petitioning, students also organized a signature campaign. The 
signature campaign portrayed the student-led anti-corruption movement as a mass movement 
and hence legitimated their demands of extraditing Godber. The campaign was later joined 
by twelve other student organizations and developed into the Thirteen Anti-Corruption Group 
in August 1973, including the 70’s Biweekly Group.68 The 70’s Biweekly Group was known 
for its connections with left wing bodies in Britain. To strengthen the movement, student 
activists rallied for external support. In August 1973, the Group and local student bodies 
agreed to cooperate with six leftist students’ and workers’ unions in England, namely 
International Marxist Group, Fourth International, International Socialists, Labour Party 
Young Socialists, Social Labour League and Solidarity, to press for the extradition of 
Godber.69  
 
To appeal for public support, the HKFS organized public forums and put up posters across 
the colony. The satirical poster portrayed Godber as a man who was ‘podgy’ because of 
‘high-ranking office and excellent living environment’, with the hobby of ‘collecting $500 
notes’. It described him of having the speciality of being ‘able to move in and out freely 
under supervision’ due to his ‘extraordinary friendship with world’s big financial bosses’.70 
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The Federation eventually collected 50,000 signatures.71 The ineffectiveness of the existing 
ant-corruption measures also led student organizations to plan setting up an anti-corruption 
force of its own to ‘fight corruption its own way’.72 This could be interpreted as a radical plan 
to subvert the authority of the existing Anti-Corruption Branch. Students intended to equip 
the squad with ‘spy-eye cameras’ in order to collect evidence on corruption. However, 
instead of sending the evidence to the Anti-Corruption Branch, they would disclose their 
findings to the public through mass media.73 Nonetheless, the plan was not executed, possibly 
due to a lack of funding. Compared to the China Mail campaign, the student anti-corruption 
signature campaign was of a much bigger scale, targeting supporters of all social classes and 
age groups. Rather than appealing merely to bilingual elites, posters and pamphlets printed in 
Chinese could be easily understood by the general public. Public forums were also organized 
to educate and mobilize the public.  
 
Nonetheless, compared to the campaign of China Mail, the student movement’s influence 
was confined to Hong Kong. According to Town Talk, it ‘produced mixed reactions’: ‘Those 
in favour said that the campaign was more meaningful than Senkaku issue while others 
commented that the students had no right to display misleading posters as if Godber was 
already a convicted criminal’.74 The adult members of the society were inclined to be pro-
status quo and held a politically conservative attitude towards propaganda used by the 
students. They argued that the design of the posters ‘damaged the image of the police to quite 
a large extent’. For example, area committee members believed that the colonial state ‘should 
control the design of handbills and posters more strictly’. A headmaster also pointed out that 
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the government was ‘far too patient’ in handling post-secondary school students.75 The 
general public also ‘did not believe the students efforts would bear fruits’.76 Different 
responses were recorded towards the signature campaign in various districts. For instance, in 
Western District, ‘the general public were generous in giving their signatures in support’.77 
Yet in Kwun Tong, ‘many sensible people’ which were of the middle-aged and elderly 
groups, including some kaifong leaders, teachers and headmasters, did not ‘approve the 
signature drive’ organized by the students and felt that ‘the government was already trying its 
best to extradite Mr Godber back to the colony’.78 In Mong Kok, many parents showed little 
interest to the signature campaign and expressed their hopes that students ‘would not stir up 
any trouble regarding the issue’.79 Political conservatism persisted among middle-aged and 
elderly groups in Hong Kong, before the formation of the ICAC. 
 
Student organizations demonstrated. The HKFS held three ‘Bring Godber Back’ rallies, with 
the last one held in Morse Park, a venue which was not listed as an approved site by the 
colonial state. According to the Colonial Secretary, Hugh Norman-Walker, ‘there has been 
some backing for the proposed demonstrations among students, especially the Hong Kong 
Federation of Students’.80 However, the student demonstration failed to appeal to the general 
public. Norman-Walker anticipated that the demonstration would be poorly attended: ‘We are 
nevertheless not expecting any mass support: the preliminary police estimate is that there 
may be up to 500 involved in the Victoria Park meeting.’81 Although the meeting was ‘better 
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attended’, the general atmosphere was ‘unexciting’.82  
 
According to Town Talk, sympathizers believed the rallies were ‘held for a good cause’. 
Young leaders were praised for the ‘sensible and orderly manner’ they had when organizing 
the rally in Victoria Park. Only ‘a few people’ found the slogan ‘Is it true that an anti-
corruption rally is a crime whilst corruption itself is not a crime’ appealing.83 The general 
response was indifferent due to the absence of adequate publicity and people’s reluctance to 
take part in any rallies.84 Views towards the Morse Park demonstration were more ‘divided’. 
While ‘the overwhelming majority’ considered students’ interest in corruption ‘a healthy 
sign’, they believed that demonstrating was ‘unreasonable’.85 Many ‘adult members’ argued 
that students ‘should have cooperated by holding rally where it was permitted’.86 Well-
educated people within the upper and middle classes, such as teachers and white-collared 
workers, ‘strongly criticized the students who insisted in organizing the anti-Godber rally at 
Morse Park’.87 The ‘older people’ were ‘critical of the organizers’ as they worried that 
holding a mass gathering close to former resettlement estates might spark off riots. They also 
expressed concerns over the possibility that ‘young people had become so radical and 
restless’ and might ‘get out of hand’, which could be ‘a threat to the social stability and good 
order of Hong Kong’.88 A few contacts even stated that the government should ‘consider 
taking action against the organizers for holding an illegal rally’.89  
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Different age groups had contrasting outlooks. The middle-aged and elderly groups evidently 
valued political stability. The young generation, by contrast, endorsed political activism. In 
general, they ‘approved of the rally’ and considered that to be ‘the most popular way’ to 
‘express themselves’. Some university students even pointed out that Morse Park should be 
included in the list of approved mass rally sites as the site near Hung Hom Ferry Pier was ‘no 
longer usable’.90  
 
The signature campaign was received more positively. The older generation viewed political 
activism ‘with dislike and concern’, worried that ‘social order and discipline will inevitably 
be undermined’. The upper class in general considered political engagement ‘undignified and 
unbecoming of their status’.91 As a respondent pointed out most people would not engage in 
social movements; but they ‘render(ed) their moral support to the students in their rally 
against corruption’.92 The student movement gradually waned in late 1973. 
 
c) Individual Campaigners  
 
Elsie Elliott, who had been anti-corruption pioneering crusader in Hong Kong since the 
1960s, continued her campaign in the 1970s. Elliott was known as ‘one of the colony’s 
longest campaigners against corruption’.93 As an Urban Councillor, she started pursuing the 
establishment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry from the 1960s. She believed the police 
force was corrupt and the existing anti-corruption devices were ineffectual. From time to 
time, she wrote to Governors, MPs and officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to 
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campaign against corruption in different sectors and press for an institutional change. She 
even visited London in 1966, but failed to convince the Labour government to set up a Royal 
Commission to report on the problem. Elliott was liable to ‘publish anything she received’.94 
She had good connections with a number of newspapers, including the China Mail, the Hong 
Kong Standard, the South China Morning Post and the Star, and requested them to 
investigate cases.95 Her demands were too radical for politicians in London in the 1960s. For 
instance, Nigel Fisher, an MP in the House of Commons described Elliott as ‘a very irrational 
person of somewhat extreme views’ despite the fact that there was ‘no doubt some corruption 
does exist in Hong Kong.’96  
 
Elliott’s strategy was to portray herself as representative of ordinary Chinese citizens whose 
voices were unheard. For example, in a petition to MacLehose, she argued that ‘public 
opinion is growing against corruption as more young people are educated’.97 In 1973, she 
tactically exploited the Godber incident and employed the rhetoric of ‘law and order’ to 
justify her cause:  
 
As to Godber, he has bought a lot of suffering to a lot of Chinese families, and should 
not be allowed to use his privilege position as an Englishman to get away with it. The 
Chinese people cannot be expected to respect law and order if Godber is allowed to 
escape.98 
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Similar rhetoric is found in her petitions and open letters: ‘One can only conclude that the 
injustices in the recent amnesty and the continual use of tainted witnesses against those under 
indictment, as well as the failure of all channels of communication between the upper and 
lower ranks, pose a threat to public law and order.’99 She also implied that turmoil would 
break out if the government failed to strengthen anti-corruption measures and extradite 
Godber: ‘(I) am forced to the conclusion that governments understand only revolution, 
rioting, strikes and disturbances: until these occur, they conveniently shut their eyes: the 
more’s the pity.’100 As a public figure, her letters received attention and policy makers replied 
to her. 
 
In contrast to the China Mail’s campaign, Elliott’s movement was supported by ordinary 
people whose grievances could not be addressed through formal political channels. A citizen 
for example, expressed his respect to Elliott in his letter:  
 
We should thank you for the good and valuable service you have rendered to the 
public of Hong Kong. I personally admire your courage, justice and untiring effort to 
fight for right and justice for the welfare of the public and I can earnestly say you are 
the best Urban Councillor I have ever known.101  
 
With widespread distrust in the police force, Elliott was a conduit for personal appeals for 
redress. As she noted: ‘people want to report crime, and often report it to me’.102 Hong Kong 
Chinese sent their complaints to Elliott, who forwarded their letters to high ranked civil 
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servants and relevant departments in the colonial state and the London government. For fear 
of victimization, many of these complaints were anonymous.103 This indicates that although 
fear towards officialdom continued to exist among the grassroots groups, they would report 
to trust-worthy civil servants when their interests were at stake: they were less passive.  
 
As noted above, Elliott’s personal network enabled her to take this campaign outside the 
colony, and she wanted to use this campaign to open wide ranging critique of colonial 
governance. As such, she maintained a good relationship with a number of MPs. When she 
was being accused of having given $5,000 to encourage demonstrators to take part in Star 
Ferry riots in 1966, she was as well supported by House of Lords from the Opposition 
Deputy Leader, Lord Shepherd and his Labour party colleague, Lord Brockway, who pleaded 
to clear her name. In the 1970s, she worked particularly close with James Johnson to press 
for an anti-corruption institutional change and the introduction of limited democracy in Hong 
Kong. She often passed information in Hong Kong to Johnson through letters.104 Elliott and 
Johnson both believed that the fundamental problem causing corruption was absence of 
democracy in the colony:  
 
It is an appalling scandal that the government possess not one elected member, either 
in Legislative Council or at a higher level, to go on the Executive Council….it is 
impossible for the people to have their grievances deal with, or even considered 
adequately, unless there are some members who plea their cause and put their case in 
public in the Legislative Council.105 
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Johnson was a prominent figure in the campaign against corruption in Hong Kong. In 1967, 
he argued that the appointment of a Royal Commission of Enquiry was necessary to address 
corruption in the colony. He also proposed that members of the Commission should be led by 
‘a man of unquestioned integrity’. In other words, a person who was not ‘directly connected 
with Hong Kong’. Members should include an MP from each of the three parties 
(Conservative, Labour and Liberal) and people with wide experience of working in the 
police, for example the Inspector General of Colonial Police.106 From time to time, he pressed 
for changes during parliamentary discussions.107 To allow Parliamentarians in London to 
better understand the situation in Hong Kong, he compared corruption and crimes in Hong 
Kong to Switzerland: ‘Bodies, human beings, gold, narcotics and so on are smuggled 
between the colony and the mainland. It seems to be like an oriental Switzerland.’108 Johnson 
also initiated meetings with the staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in order to 
urge the British government to strengthen anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong.109 To 
wipe out corruption, he argued that the introduction of limited democracy in the colony was 
necessary. 
 
As with press and student campaigns, Elliott’s cause received more attention from the press 
and the public due to the escape of Godber. The Star, for example, published Elliott’s lengthy 
editorials and comments about corruption in 1974.110 Star also explicitly showed its 
endorsement to Elliott by suggesting that including Elliott as one of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission’s four advisory committees was ‘a step in the right direction’, ‘one of the most 
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welcome moves’: she had in ‘abundance what our official graft-fighters have yet to earn. And 
that is public trust…never has her honesty, integrity or sincerity been questioned. And those 
qualities are what our Anti-Corruption Commission vitally need.’111 Apart from approaching 
local newspapers, Elliott shared corruption stories with newspapers in the United Kingdom. 
For example, in late 1973, she gave The Guardian information about corruption within the 
police force and explained how that ‘amounted to a widespread system of alternate 
taxation’.112  
 
As Hampton has noted, Elliott was in close contact with Alan Ellis, who was a former police 
officer in the colony. In 1963, Ellis was dismissed on the grounds of his temperamental 
unsuitability. He believed that his discharge was related to corruption and maladministration 
within the police force. Since then, he had petitioned the press and the British government to 
urge the investigation of the termination of his probationary appointment. In November 1973, 
when it was rumoured that there might be a plot against Elliott, Ellis wrote to Anthony Royle, 
the Under-Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He supported Elliott publicly, 
noting: ‘She is a dear, courageous, sincere and sometimes dotty friend of mine. Dotty, I say, 
because in her relentless pursuit of truth and justice from the cancer of administration 
corruption, she does things which you and I might never at least without great self-thought 
do.’113 Like Johnson and Elliott, Ellis supported the setting up of an externally-appointed 
Commission of Inquiry and was critical of the franchise of the Legislative Council. Royle had 
written to Ellis to reaffirm his decision not to intervene in his case in April 1972. As Royle 
did not consider a further inquiry was necessary: the action taken in respect of the case of 
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Ellis was proper and his claims were unsubstantiated. Despite Royle’s earlier reply, Ellis 
continued writing to different newspapers to press for reforms. For example, he emphasized 
the seriousness of corruption in Hong Kong  and shared his story of dismissal with China 
Mail and The Guardian to draw the attention of audience in Hong Kong and Britain to 
corruption in the colony.114 He also wrote to politicians in the British government, including 
MPs Johnson and Enoch Powell, Anthony Royle and Andrew Stewart, claiming that his 
inquiry of 1963 had had many defects. In his letters, Ellis often invoked the danger of the 
deterioration of the principle of the rule of law: ‘…you will know that it is most undesirable 
for any civil servant, of whatever rank, to feel confident that he is above the rule of law and 
the system of public accountability upon which the constitution of this country relies.’115 He 
similarly warned the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that if no stringent anti-corruption 
measures were introduced, riots may break out. He stated that:  
 
…unless the FCO comes up with a solution soon there may be quite peaceful 
demonstration which could develop into civil disturbances, all hinged on Godber. It is 
my opinion that the FCO may have days rather than weeks during which to find a 
solution and avoid possible disturbances.116 
 
His campaign led the Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department to request the Overseas 
Police Adviser to re-investigate his case in April 1973: ‘In order to get rid of Mr Ellis, the 
minister said he would ask you to look through the papers’.117 However, the Foreign Office 
concluded that ‘the action taken in respect of Mr Ellis was not only proper but within the 
discretion of the Commissioner of Police in respect of probationary officer’. The allegations 
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of maladministration and corruption of senior officers in the police force were therefore 
‘totally unsubstantiated’.118 Ellis continued his campaign after April 1973: ‘Mr Ellis has 
contacts in the press, and several newspapers have recently mentioned his campaign for such 
an enquiry’.119 He wrote to Royle again to assert that ‘an externally-appointed judicial 
inquiry is the best way to examine the matter (corruption) long term’ even after the 
announcement of the formation of the ICAC.120 
 
Many civic organizations and local leaders echoed individual campaigners and urged the 
colonial administration to implement legislative and institutional changes. Edmund Chow, 
the Secretary of the Civil Association, said he was ‘shocked’ that the report did not 
recommend an outright separation: ‘This should have been his first recommendation’.121 Wu 
Shing-sheun, the Chairman of the Hung Hom Kaifong Association. similarly voiced his 
concern: he was ‘very disappointed’ that the report did not suggest setting up of an 
independent Commission.122 As Town Talk reported confidentially, ‘virtually all our contacts 
expressed disappointment and dismay because there was no definite proposal to set up an 
independent anti-corruption organization’.123 
 
Unlike the China Mail ‘s campaign and the student-led anti-corruption movement, the 
campaign initiated by these individual activists did not stop in 1974. In 1975, Elliott 
expressed her disappointment with ICAC’s first year performance: ‘The Commission is 
costing Hong Kong too much money and puts too few people in jail for too short a term’.124 
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She continued to ask for a Royal Commission. Elliott’s claim was supported by Urban 
Councillor, Tsin Sai-nin and a former police inspector, Alan Ellis.125 She continued to write 
to newspapers or was interviewed by journalists, including those from the South China 
Morning Post and Times, taking these opportunities to raise ongoing concerns of corruption, 
and criticizing the ICAC. She called the ICAC ‘little more than a cosmetic exercise’ which 
only had arrested ‘a lot of small fry, but none of the high-ups’.126 She also argued that people 
who were ‘less fortunate’ could not afford lawyers nor had anyone to make their case known 
to public. Therefore, they were unlikely to be able to prove themselves innocent under the 
new anti-corruption legislation.127 Elliott cooperated with Johnson after the formation of the 
ICAC. For instance, she wrote to him and to Daily Express in early 1975 to complain that 
‘the new so-called ‘‘independent’’ Commission Against Corruption was not independent’; 
noting that no charges could be laid without the permission of Attorney General’s Office. 
Elliott’s claim regarding malpractices in the Legal Department was forwarded to the 
Secretary of State by Johnson. Johnson also supported Elliott’s campaign by making use of 
newspapers. For example, he appeared in several interviews on Independent Television and 
London Broadcasting in February 1975. After the police unrest in 1977, Elliott wrote an open 
letter to the Hong Kong government and British MPs to urge the formation of a Royal 
Commission: ‘With deep-rooted corruption such as existed in Yau Ma Tei fruit market, it is 
most unlikely that the ICAC, even with the best intentions, has been able to get to the root of 
the matter by listening to tainted witness(es)’. 
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Throughout the period Elliott, supported by her network of personal contacts in Hong Kong 
and London, argued that the current practices and amnesty ‘posed a threat to law and public 
order’.128 By the end of the 1970s, the campaign had however lost its earlier intensity. 
According to a MOOD report in 1977, there was ‘little support’ for Elliott’s accusation that 
the state was an ‘inhumane, oppressive administration’ despite the existence of ‘a certain 
degree of suspicion and distrust’.129 By 1978, Elliott’s view ‘represented in the press as very 
much a minority view’.130 This suggests the ICAC had altered public perceptions: people 
believed that corruption was being controlled. The chapter now considers these campaigns 
from the colonial government’s perspective.  
 
Government’s Responses  
The ICAC 
 
As Yep has rightly argued, the creation of ICAC was a cumulative process which could date 
back to the 1960s.131 In 1960, the Governor, Robert Brown Black had accepted the 
recommendation that an expert should be appointed to review the organization and operation 
of the Branch. Initially, the Committee suggested the appointment of ‘a highly qualified 
expert on anti-corruption procedures from Scotland Yard or some other suitable source to 
take on the task’.132 This British government was disinterested: 
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We have been considering this enquiry in consultation with the Home Office, and I 
am afraid that the result is not very encouraging. The advice which we have received 
from them is that it is very doubtful whether there is any United Kingdom police 
officer who has the experience of investigating corruption to the extent that would be 
demanded by the assignment you suggest. No police force in the United Kingdom, 
even including the Metropolitan Police, has specially trained officers for this sort of 
anti-corruption work.133  
 
The idea was dropped. Instead a Special Working Party to review the organization and 
operation of the Branch was set up in 1961.  
 
In 1962, locals started advocating the separation of the Anti-Corruption Branch from the 
police force:  
 
There was a strong feeling among those who were heard by the Working Party on 
Public Cooperation that the Anti-Corruption Branch should not be a part of the police 
force. It was stated that the public are reluctant to complain to the police of whom 
they are afraid of and there was danger in using police staff in the branch because 
they can put the techniques and knowledge which they acquire to bad use when, as 
frequently happens, they are posted to other branches of the force. We consider a 
further justification for this view is that nearly 50 per cent of all complaints about 
corruption concern the police force itself.134   
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The Secretary of Chinese Affairs agreed that ‘on principle’, there should be a separation. 
Nonetheless, ‘in view of administrative difficulties’, it was agreed that the Branch should 
remain with the police force. It was believed that an institutional separation would be a 
‘tantamount to implying that the police is not capable of becoming faithful’.135 Besides, the 
Advisory Committee was aware of the danger that ‘civilians permanently employed in such 
work would themselves become corrupted’. Effective measures to deal with these non-police 
officers were lacking. In the end, they ‘reluctantly’ argued that ‘the Anti-Corruption Branch 
must continue to be staffed by serving members of the police force and must remain under 
the authority of the Commissioner of Police’.136 In April 1962, to increase the efficiency of 
the Branch, two additional Senior Inspectors, two more Inspectors and five other Corporals 
were appointed. 
 
The call for an independent organization to investigate police corruption persisted throughout 
the 1960s. In 1969, the news that corruption and protection rackets existed in the mini-bus 
business attracted attention. Town Talk recorded that there was ‘widespread support for the 
idea that corruption allegations should be investigated by an organization separate from the 
police and for tougher legislation’.137 The amendment of the Prevention of Bribery Bill 
dominated the public discourse in the colony in 1970: most people believed that ‘the Anti-
Corruption Branch should not locate in the police but independent or semi-independent’.138 
However, social discontent only escalated after activists and the press exploited the Godber 
incident in 1973. 
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The Godber case ‘revived the demand for the Anti-Corruption Branch to be taken away from 
the police force and made an independent body’.139 The event, according to the Governor, 
was ‘a subject of raucous criticisms of both (the) informed and uninformed’.140 The British 
government did not only face pressure from Hong Kong residents, but also those of its own 
country. Student movements, the campaigning of China Mail and MPs in the House of 
Commons in 1973 put pressure on the British government to intervene. British newspapers 
started to report news about corruption in Hong Kong. The Times for example argued that 
unless Hong Kong’s corruption problem and trade of drugs can be eliminated, Britain’s 
reputation must suffer.141 The Sunday Times argued that Hong Kong corrupt police should be 
blamed for their failure to stop the flow of drugs.142 The Guardian closely reported any 
development of cases of corruption, from MP’s questions and Elliott’s speeches, to the stories 
of former police officers, such as those of Ellis and Iqbal Hussain Khan.143 The Guardian 
even interviewed a former policemen in Hong Kong, who revealed ‘how pervasive police 
corruption is and the compromises which even an honest policeman is forced to accept in 
order to survive’. Corruption penetrated in every single corner of the colony and it had 
‘acquired its own cosy jargon’. It was certainly not exclusively a Chinese culture: ‘To British 
inspectors, bribers and corrupt retainers are ‘‘squeeze’’; to the Chinese rank and files and 
officers they are ‘‘squeeze’; to the Pakistanis, they are ‘‘curry’’.’144  
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Due to the extensive coverage of corruption in the press in both Hong Kong and Britain after 
the escape of Godber, in mid-1973, a number of petitions from individuals in Britain were 
received by the British government. For example, a group of ‘complainants’ petitioned the 
Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and asked the state to have ‘direct immediate 
investigation into serious malpractices’ in Hong Kong in order to avoid ‘funny incidents’ like 
‘Watergate’.145 A person named T. P. Carter from Wiltshire also expressed his disturbance 
after reading a report on the escape of Godber from the Sunday Times. He claimed that he 
was ‘completely at a loss to understand’ why the British government was unwilling to 
instigate a Royal Commission.146 Robert Moore, a lecturer in the University of Aberdeen, 
even argued that refusal of the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Act to extradite Godber 
was racist.147 These petitions concerned the British government, creating opportunities to 
discuss the necessity of creating an independent Anti-Corruption Branch.  
 
Shifting public attitudes in Hong Kong and Britain played an important role in the formation 
of the new Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The Governor’s decision to 
set up an enquiry to review the legislative and administrative measures for the prevention of 
corruption in the public service and investigate the escape of Godber was influenced by the 
changing public sentiments:  
 
But the man’s escape has caused great disquiet. So far as I have been able to establish 
the facts surrounding his escape, while these highlight various legal problems, they 
indicate that there were considerable difficulties that inhibited the police from doing 
anything effective to prevent his departure. However, as you can imagine, this is hard 
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for the public and press to accept, if stated by police or the government.…I have 
therefore, with the agreement of the Executive Council, set up an enquiry under the 
Commission of Enquiry Ordinance to report on the facts.148 
 
On 13 June, a one-man Commission of Inquiry to investigate corruption and the escape of 
Godber was set up, led by Justice Alastair Blair-Kerr. As David Ford, the Director of 
Information Services Department, suggested, the appointment of Blair-Kerr to be the 
Commissioner was ‘a conscious decision’ to ‘bring the whole problem out into the open’ in 
response to the rising public discontent.149 In response to lack of public confidence in the 
police force, instead of a Police Officer, Blair-Kerr, a Senior Puisne Judge was appointed to 
be the investigator. To show that the colonial administration respected public opinions, it was 
announced in July 1973 that public views on whether or not the Branch should be divorced 
from the police force were invited. This move was welcomed by the general public.150 The 
two Blair-Kerr reports were then published in the public domain. As there was ‘considerable 
public interest in this report’, the government was just ‘in a position to publish it as soon as 
possible’.151 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also agreed increased administrative 
transparency in this inquiry would ‘allay public suspicion that senior officials helped Godber 
to leave the country’.152 A press release was also issued at the time of the report’s publication 
announcing the acceptance of its recommendations to ‘reassure the public about the vigour 
and sincerity of police action on corruption’.153 
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In terms of institutional changes, the British government was clearly aware of the ‘good deal 
of pressure building for an UK appointed enquiry’ in the colony. M. J. Macoun, the Overseas 
Police Adviser supported the initial appointment of an external Commission of Enquiry to 
investigate corruption within the police force. As that would be ‘more desirable and 
effective’ and could indicate the British government’s determination ‘to accept its 
responsibility as the administrating authority’ of a colony.154 Nevertheless, officials were 
aware of the potential public responses predicted by Town Talk that the setting up an external 
enquiry would be ‘a major blow to Hong Kong’s amour propre’. And that could also be seen 
as the British government’s lack of confidence in the colonial state’s ability to settle its own 
affairs. MacLehose was also ‘totally opposed to an outside enquiry’.155 The idea was 
therefore dropped in August 1973.156 
 
On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, had made it clear he was 
‘inclined to the former course (separation)’ as ‘it would command greater public 
confidence’.157 The detachment of the Branch from the police force ‘would have sufficient 
immediate cosmetic effect to hold opinion in Hong Kong and also the House of 
Commons’.158 Taking public opinions into account, MacLehose endorsed an independent 
branch:  
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Clearly the public would have more confidence in a unit that was entirely independent, 
and separation from any department of the government, including the police. We have 
therefore decided, on the advice of the Executive Council to set up a separate Anti-
Corruption Commission under a civilian Commissioner.159  
 
The ICAC was designed to be a ‘civilian organization’ with few police elements in which and 
giving preference to local candidates rather than expatriates.160 The revised language policy 
had allowed more Hong Kong Chinese who did not read English to work as civil servants. 
These private correspondences between high ranked officials reveal that shifting popular 
sentiments played an important role in leading to the independence of the Anti-Corruption 
Branch.  
 
Driven by shifting public sentiments, the ICAC was formed in February 1974, and consisted 
of three departments: the Corruption Prevention Department, the Operations Department and 
the Community Relations Department. It was headed by Jack Cater. John Prendergast, the 
former Director of the Special Branch, became the Director of Operations. To close the 
previous operational loopholes, the Commissioner now possessed more power compared to 
any of his predecessors. He was only responsible to the Governor. He was empowered to 
appoint officers and terminate any appointment without assigning reasons. He could also 
investigate suspected offences under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and examine 
practices in any government departments and public bodies. Most importantly, a number of 
new advisory bodies were set up within the ICAC in response to public opinions, in which 
members of the public would be represented. For example, the Advisory Council on 
Corruption was set up to make recommendations to the ICAC on corruption matters. A 
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Citizen Advisory Committee on Community Relations was also formed, representing the 
community and was responsible for advising on the work of Community Relations 
Department.161  
 
Despite the implementation of numerous anti-corruption reforms since 1960, the Anti-
Corruption Branch was not separated from the police force until 1974. Previous attempts 
made by different Governors to press for an institutional reform were unsuccessful. Reform 
coincided with the agitation of social movements on this issue. These movements, 
newspapers and activists exploited the Godber incident. Public opinions were mobilized in 
the colony, and this must have put pressure on the Governor to renegotiate with the British 
government for an independent Commission. In England, questions were raised by anti-
corruption activists in parliamentary discussions. Corruption in Hong Kong was widely 
covered in various newspapers, making it much more difficult for the British government to 
avoid intervening, to put pressure on the Governor to institute reforms. Archival evidence 
demonstrates that the colonial administration had been monitoring shifting public opinions 
closely, which were then fed back to the policy making process. Changing political culture 
eased institutional reform, the establishment of the ICAC in 1974. 
 
Public Reception of the ICAC’s Formation 
 
Reform was welcomed. Town Talk stated that the ‘government’s decision to separate anti-
corruption work from the police and the appointment of Mr. Jack Cater to lead the fight 
against graft won almost universal approval’.162 According to the Chinese Press Review, 
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among the editorials which had commented on the second report of the Blair-Kerr 
Commission of Inquiry, ‘most of them were satisfied with it as a whole’.163 The Chinese 
Press Review later revealed that ‘the majority of the papers showed faith in the new 
Commissioner and leader Mr. J. Cater’164. However, there were also negative responses. For 
instance, Elliott argued that the Commission was only ‘arrested a lot of small fry, but none of 
the high-ups, and has made virtually no in road into the syndicates which control 
corruption.’165  
 
The unique power that ICAC possessed led to a growing concern over the abuse of its new 
authority. Star was worried that the new ICAC might become a ‘second police force’. The 
new ‘powerful armoury (of) legal weapons for ‘‘Cater raiders’’’ was ‘almost unprecedented 
in Hong Kong’s legal history’.166 The Reform Club expressed similar concerns over the 
possibility that the Commission would turn into a ‘secret police’.167 South China Morning 
Post urged the colonial administration to ‘control the revolution’: ‘it is essential that the 
government remains vigilant and keeps more than a fatherly eye on this rapidly growing 
youngster, the ICAC Revolutions, even quiet ones, can get out of hand.’168  
 
When the Arms and Ammunition Order passed in 1975 permitting ICAC officers to carry 
weapons in the course of duty, the public became extremely concerned about the ‘excessive’ 
power that the Commission possessed. Many contemporaries deemed the legislation 
‘unnecessary’ and failed to understand the decision. The fact that ICAC was not a military 
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organization and administrative staff received no special training irritated the public.169 The 
speech made by Hilton Cheong-Leen, a Legislative Councillor in 1976, captured the public’s 
fear: ‘I would at the same time seek to remind the Commissioner that continuous vigilance 
and caution is at all times necessary to ensure that the powers given under the amended bill 
will not be abused.’ Lo Tak-shing, another Legislative Councillor regarded new legislative 
reforms as ‘quite exceptional and unprecedented’.170 Contemporaries referred the 
Commission as ‘another Frankenstein’.171 In response to criticisms in the public domain, the 
administration set up an ICAC Complaints Committee in December 1977 to monitor and 
review the handling of any complaints against the ICAC, identify any faults in ICAC 
procedures which led or might lead to complaints and make recommendations to the 
Governor regarding the practice of ICAC when considered necessary.172 
 
The Extradition of Godber 
 
It was as widely believed that Godber was able to escape because he was a British subject, 
protected by other senior officials in the colony and the British government. According to 
Town Talk, ‘many people urged that Godber be brought back for a fair trial and ‘did not 
understand why this could not be done’.173 People felt that the colonial state ‘should settle the 
Godber case expeditiously so to prevent trouble and disorder arising from increased 
resentment from all walks of life’.174 To restore public confidence, MacLehose negotiated 
with London to return Godber for trial. However, the Fugitive Offenders Act enacted in 1967 
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created obstacles to the extradition as it outlined that return was only possible when the 
offence concerned constituted an offence to the law in both countries under the double 
criminality rule. Godber’s failure to explain his 4.3 million wealth was not a crime in British 
laws. He could not be returned. Aware of popular sentiments on this issue, MacLehose 
repeatedly pressed for the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Acts to return Godber:  
 
We consider it essential that the Fugitive Offenders Act be amended to allow for the 
extradition to Hong Kong of any person charged in Hong Kong with an offence 
carrying a maximum twelve months’ imprisonment or more.…If the Fugitive 
Offenders Act is amended, it is highly desirable that the Amendment is made 
retrospective as to catch Godber. The public in Hong Kong will be deeply 
disappointed by an amendment which does not do so.175  
 
In October, aware of the escalating public discontent, MacLehose reiterated to the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office that ‘a decision that the law could not be amended to catch 
Godber would be received with disappointment and anger here’.176 Andrew Stuart from the 
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department agreed: ‘…it is not a question of changing the law 
to catch one man, but of the case of Mr. Godber illuminating an illogicality in the law which 
might now be changed on general grounds.’177 This was a legislative loophole. The British 
government had the ultimate control over the legislation of its dependent territories. MPs, 
such as Johnson, supported the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Act. Nevertheless, the 
Attorney-General was ‘most reluctant to consider an amendment’. He expressed strong 
opposition as he believed changing the law just to deal with a single case ‘tended to produce 
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‘‘bad law’’’.178 Besides, if the ultimate goal was to extradite Godber, it would be necessary to 
change the law retrospectively. Godber would certainly ‘get the wind’ of the legislative 
proposal and attempt to leave the country.179  The Home Office concluded it was ‘not at the 
present convinced that it would be desirable or politically easy’ to withdraw the double 
criminality rule.180 
 
Shifting public opinions did not lead to changes in the Fugitive Offenders Act. In November 
1973, the Home Office ruled that the amendment of the Act would only ‘lay the government 
open to criticism’ and it ‘did not consider that a strong enough case had been presented by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ to persuade the Home Secretary to make an 
amendment.181 The Chief Whip argued that the introduction of such retrospective changes 
would attract ‘considerable opposition in the House of Commons’.182 In early October 1973, 
Royle decided to drop the idea of amending the Fugitive Offenders Act. This suggests that 
public opinions could not pressurize the British government to implement legislative 
changes, especially when the Crown’s reputation would be compromised and the change was 
applied to more than one single territory.  
 
In 1974, Godber returned to the colony because Ernest Hunt, another corrupt police 
superintendent, provided evidence of Godber’s corruption as a witness.183 Some questioned 
the wisdom of spending substantial time and money in pursuing the case against Godber.184 
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Nonetheless, news of Godber’s arrest in Britain came as ‘a happy surprise to many 
people’.185 Numerous community leaders ‘warmly applauded the ICAC effort’. According to 
MOOD, the Godber affairs played an important role in restoring public confidence in the 
colonial state as ‘the unrelenting efforts’ of the Commission had ‘left people in doubt’ to 
realise that ‘the government means business’. It impressed those who formerly speculated the 
creation of the ICAC was ‘window dressing’ or ‘pouring old wine into new bottles’.186 This 
case impacted on local political culture. 
 
Political Culture  
 
The setting up of the ICAC had a huge impact on Hong Kong’s political culture. With the 
introduction of new anti-corruption measures, increased education and the influence of mass 
media, public engagement in politics increased. After the formation of the Commission, 
people were less reluctant to report corruption. Their fear towards officialdom was greatly 
reduced. This changing political attitude formed a strong contrast with the political culture in 
the early 1970s. Prior to the setting up of the ICAC, political culture in Hong Kong was 
relatively conservative. The public in general was either reluctant to engage in social 
movements or unwilling to disclose their identities when they were involved. Such 
reservation in politics could be observed when people reported cases of corruption and shared 
their views on newspapers anonymously. Campaigns, such as the China Mail one, 
emphasized that when dialling their hot lines, people were not obliged to give their names.187 
The speech made by the HKFS revealed similar fear towards officialdom: ‘members of the 
public will be more than willing to talk about grievances providing government has shown its 
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sincerity to guarantee the villains will be properly handled’.188 As the previous section 
indicated, before the formation of the ICAC, political conservatism persisted. The middle-
aged and elderly groups, who largely disapproved of direct political confrontations, believing 
that such activism would undermine political stability. The upper and middle classes were 
pro-status quo and largely held a contemptuous attitude towards informal political activities. 
They avoided engaging in social movements. Grassroots groups moreover displayed cautious 
attitudes towards officialdom and distanced themselves from participatory politics. People of 
these social classes and age groups mostly believed that ‘tackling the evils and inequalities in 
corrupt Hong Kong’ was ‘rocking the boat’, indicating political conservatism.189  
 
State records reveal this political conservatism prevailed when people handled the issue of 
corruption. For example, in June 1973, the response to Blair-Kerr’s appeal for information 
from the public ‘has been comparatively poor’. Blair-Kerr therefore had to reiterate that ‘the 
appeal was still open’ through mass media. To reduce people’s concern about criticizing the 
colonial administration, he repeatedly stressed that witnesses and people who offered 
evidence could be heard ‘in chambers with complete confidentially’ instead of public 
court.190 Prior to the formation of the ICAC, the only politically active group seemed to be 
the young generation, mainly the students and young workers. As an article in CU Student 
suggested: 
 
…the anti-corruption campaign has demonstrated a good phenomenon, which is the 
unity between students and workers. The youth organizations that initiated this 
movement were not only student parities but also included many groups consisted of 
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young workers. These young workers that were enthusiastic about social problems 
showed good leadership and positive social consciousness in the movement.191 
 
Similar calls to the public had to be made by Jack Cater after the ICAC formed. He 
advocated the ‘man in the street’ to be more active in providing information as ‘it is at this 
level that corruption begins, from a dollar to two dollars’.192 In October 1974, MacLehose 
also publicly commented that there would be no ‘real victory’ unless there were changes of 
attitudes throughout the community.193 
 
The political culture gradually shifted after the formation of the ICAC. According to MOOD, 
with publication of the Blair-Kerr reports, the extradition of Godber and the setting up of the 
ICAC, many people felt that the government was ‘prepared to take a fair and honest attitude 
about its own failings and shortcomings’. The colonial government was ‘not afraid of 
washing dirty linen in public’.194 These moves ‘have gradually built up public confidence in 
the government’s open minded attitude and sincere interest in public reactions’.195 The public 
was now ‘in no doubt’ that the colonial state was ‘fully determined to suppress corruption’ 
and had ‘no hesitation in tackling offenders no matter how important or prominent’.196 
Compared to the 1950s, the public was now ‘much more prone to take issue with the 
government over what they consider unjust official action’.197 Due to the state’s efforts in 
publicizing and explaining its policies through mass media and extended personal contact, 
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people were more inclined to believe that ‘public criticism and the pressure of public opinion 
can produce results’. As the colonial administration had become increasingly ‘sensitive and 
responsive’.198 This phenomenon was particularly obvious among the ‘young 
intelligentsia’.199  
 
The number of complaints reflected increased popular involvement in eradicating corruption 
since the creation of the ICAC. During the period from 15 February to 31 December 1974, 
the ICAC received 3,189 complaints.200 And during the twelve months before June 1975, 
over 7,000 reports were made with 3,408 concerned with corruption.201 By June 1975, the 
ICAC received ten complaints per day on average.202 However, it is important to note that 
most of these complaints were anonymous, and the public ‘maintained a rather sceptical 
attitude’ towards the Commission.203 Of the 3,189 complaints taken in the first ten months, 
only 1,063 reports contained adequate information to become actual cases on which full 
investigations were launched. The relatively low persecution rate could be attributed to ‘the 
reluctance or refusal of witnesses to provide the necessary evidence to substantiate 
complaints of corruption’. According to Prendergast, some of the anonymous reports had 
provided sufficient information about corruption. Yet, it was impossible to return to the 
complainants for further details, and hence investigations could not be launched.204 Table 4 
revealed that almost half of complaints received by the Commission in the first fifteen 
months were made anonymously. To some extent, the high percentage of anonymous 
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North Lion’s Club, 15 March 1977. 
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complaints shows people’s persistent fear towards officialdom and their lack of confidence in 
the ICAC. 
 
Table 4: Complaints Made to the ICAC 
 Jun 1975 May 1975 Feb 1974-May 1975 
Anonymous  187 192 3,148 
Non-anonymous 81 83 1,553 
 
Source:  HKRS 70-6-340-3, ICAC Bulletin, 2 June 1975. 
 
Middle aged and elderly groups showed ‘fatalism inherited from traditional attitudes formed 
by experience under successive Chinese governments’. They rarely sought to question ‘the 
wrongs of officialdom, or to contest its actions’.205 The perception that politics was 
dangerous could be found in a number of Cantonese proverbs, such as ‘officials have two 
mouths’ (a traditional saying which means that authorities could always find excuse to justify 
their decisions), ‘the poor should never attempt to fight the wealthy, or the wealthy to fight 
the officialdom’ and ‘the governor of a prefecture can commit arson with impurity, but the 
people are not even allowed to light their lamps’.206 It was also commonly thought that 
despite public consultation, the colonial administration would ‘in the end take a decision 
rejecting some of the suggestions or recommendations from there’.207 People viewed the 
ICAC with ‘resentment and fear’ due to its image as ‘an all-powerful Gestapo’ although such 
comments had been ‘much less frequent’.208 As the rate of anonymous reports remained high 
and there were concerns that ‘malicious’ complaints were made if complainants did not have 
to disclose their identities, the Commission eventually was forced to announce in January 
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1976 that no action would be taken upon anonymous reports unless some forms of 
corroboration was available.209  
 
Mass media played an important role in the increase of political awareness and popular 
involvement in reporting corruption. According to professional market research findings, by 
1976, over 90 per cent of the households in Hong Kong owned or had access to television 
sets.210 MOOD stated that ‘the interest and attention of television views on public affairs 
programmes appeared to have enhanced’.211 Many high-income and middle-income families 
even owned more than one set. The convenient hire-purchase terms also enabled low-income 
families to rent second-hand and cheap TV sets.212 The diffusion of television technology 
allowed people of different social classes to have the access to both state and non-state-
funded TV programmes, which played an important role in the shift of general political 
culture. To educate the public about corruption and encourage them to identify themselves 
while reporting cases, the ICAC produced a television drama named ‘Quiet Revolution’ in 
mid-1976. All three television companies in Hong Kong, despite differences in approach, 
techniques and style, also produced programmes aiming at ‘exposure of social injustice, 
airing public grievances and criticism of unsatisfactory social system, government policies or 
service’.213 Commercial Television, for instance, produced a five-minute critical commentary 
named ‘Sound Off’ on current affairs in the evening of weekdays. The show criticized ‘the 
establishment’ by ‘ruthless exposure of misdeeds, maladministration or inhumanity of 
government’, including cases of corruption. It also acted as the spokesman of ‘the oppressed 
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211 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘The Impact of Television Pt I- Public Affairs Programmes by Commercial Stations’, 
MOOD, 9 June 1976, p. 1. 
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and inarticulate victims suffering in silence’.214 Selected victims were interviewed. The show 
had ‘a respectably high view rating’ and possessed many grassroots viewers who were 
informed and encouraged to participate in the political public discourse. Rediffusion 
Television also produced a weekly thirty-minute current affairs programme named ‘Life in 
Hong Kong’, exploring different social problems including corruption, which ‘obviously 
attracted a certain amount of attention’.215 ‘Focus’ produced by Television Broadcast Limited 
also claimed to ‘give moral and public pressure support’ for the ‘down-trodden underdog’ 
who were poor, oppressed or victimized. Although the credibility of reports in these shows 
were questionable, they successfully raised awareness of social injustice and political 
misdeeds in the colony. MOOD reported that criticized topics often received extensive 
publicity and ‘tended to become common subjects of dinner table or tea house 
conversations’.216 
 
Influenced by mass media and the changing reporting policy, the public was now more 
willing to identify themselves while reporting cases of corruption. Popular political attitudes 
shifted gradually:  
 
Members of the public are increasing coming to the Commission’s local offices not 
only to report corrupt but also to seek advice, to give information about non-
corruption criminal offences and even to lodge general complaints about rudeness, 
inefficiency or maladministration, as if with an all-purpose ‘ombudsman’.217  
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In the first six months of 1977, 901 identifiable corruption complaints were received in 
total.218 By mid-1977, it was estimated the percentage of identifiable complaints and people 
who reported corruption in person increased. (See Table 5 and 6.) 20 per cent of the 
corruption complaints were made in person, compared to 6 per cent in 1975 and 18 per cent 
in 1976.219 However, the average reporting rate of five to six cases per day was still lower 
than the average figure of ten reports per case in 1974. Also, since it was now impossible to 
make complaints about corruption anonymously, these figures may not accurately represent a 
drastic shift in Hong Kong’s political culture. As MOOD has suggested, by 1977, many in the 
grassroots level remained silent and were ‘not aware of the services available due to ‘simple 
ignorance, shyness or reluctance to approach government’.220 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Identifiable Complaints Made to the ICAC 
Year Percentage  
1974 35% 
1975 39% 
1976 47% 
First half of 1977 51% 
 
Source: ‘Summary of ICAC Annual Report’, 2 August 1976, p. 3. 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Corruption Reports Made in Person 
 
Year Percentage  
1975 6% 
1976 18% 
1977 20% 
 
Source: ibid. 
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Although the percentage of non-anonymous reports had increased, the total and average 
monthly number of reports the ICAC received had both dropped. It decreased significantly 
especially after 1977. (See Tables 7 and 8.) This may be related to the partial amnesty 
granted to the police force in late 1977. Prior to the creation of the ICAC, the Commissioner 
of Police, Charles Sutcliffe publicly asserted that he got the impression that the force was 
often being targeted by the press and ‘somebody’ would ‘not be satisfied until there is a 
scandal’.221 After the ICAC was formed, the unease within the police force grew. Some 
police launched a campaign against ICAC officers in late May 1974. They complained about 
the ‘harassing’ and ‘wild accusations’ they had to face.222 The Colonial Secretary, Deny 
Roberts initially ruled out the possibility of granting a general amnesty in regard to 
corruption offences committed before the formation of ICAC: ‘It would be totally wrong, and 
indeed a dereliction from the duty imposed by the law on the Commissioner, for the 
Commission to refuse to investigate past corruption where this emerged.’223 However, 
tensions escalated in January 1977. A number of ‘incidents of confrontations’ emerged 
between the Commission’s officials and police officers on duty in the street.224 By October, 
Brian Slevin recognized that ‘the strain that these (ICAC) investigations have placed not only 
on individuals but throughout the force’.225 With the police riot, an amnesty was granted on 5 
																																																						
221 HKRS 70-6-339-1, ‘You Are Preening Me from Getting Recruits: Police Chief Slams Press on Graft 
Stories’, Hong Kong Standard, 24 March 1973. 
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November 1977.226 As a result, eighty-three investigations had to be dropped.227 The amnesty 
was regarded as a severe blow to the morale and efficiency of the ICAC by the public, mainly 
due to the impression that the Commission became less active. As MacLehose had pointed 
out, ‘since the ‘‘partial amnesty’’ on 5 November last year, the question in many minds has 
been whether things would slip back into the bad old ways’.228 
 
Table 7: Number of Reports Received by ICAC 
Reports received  Jan-Jun 1976 Jan-Jun 1977 Jan-Jun 1978 
For ICAC consideration(total) 1367 (38.5%) 901 (29.8%) 575 (21.9%) 
(monthly average) 227.8 150.2 95.8 
Referred to 
government/departments/public 
bodies/others (total) 
2185 (61.5%) 2125 (70.2%) 2054 (78.1%) 
(monthly average) 364 354 312.3 
 
Source: FCO 40/1023, ‘Comparative Statistics for the First Six Months of the Years: 1976, 
1977, 1978’, p. 1. 
 
 
Table 8: Modes of Reports for ICAC Consideration 
 
Reports received  Jan-Jun 1976 Jan-Jun 1977 Jan-Jun 1978 
Anonymous 723 (52.9) 459 (50.9) 227 (48.2) 
Non-anonymous 644 (47.1) 442 (49.1) 298 (51.8) 
In person 247 159 139 
By telephone 179 144 85 
By letter 94 55 15 
Referred by 
government 
departments 
124 104 59 
																																																						
226 The formation of the ICAC created anxiety among the police force. The relationship between officials of the 
ICAC and the police force was hostile. Many police complained that the investigation procedures were unfair. 
On 27 October 1977, a mass meeting was held, participated by 3,000 police officers. A petition was also signed 
by 11,000 of the 17,400 members of the force. A mutiny soon took place, with the police demanding an 
amnesty. The ICAC however, continued to investigate cases. In September, 228 police officers were arrested. In 
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227 FCO 40/1022, ‘ICAC and Amnesty’, telegram from C. R. Staff to Quantrill, Thompson and Stewart, 9 
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Source: ibid. 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, apart from reporting to the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
directly, the most common way used by ordinary people to address their grievances in 
corruption was through petitions. This suggests a lack of trust in the Anti-Corruption Branch. 
Letters of complaint received by anti-corruption activists were mostly either anonymous or 
full names were not given. People did not want to reveal their names because they did not 
want to get themselves ‘involved into troubles’ and believed in doing so, ‘authority might 
take revenge’.229 For example, a person did not disclose his name but called himself ‘a 
supporter of good law and order’, wrote to Elliott in 1968. Elliott believed such practice 
‘indicates he fears victimization’.230 The complainant argued that ‘the local people think the 
government and all the lawyers are in collusion’ and urged the state to ‘take strongest action 
quickly to weed out these corrupt evil lawyers and their minions’. The letter was not 
neglected but then passed to the MP Nigel Fisher in a week’s time.231 It was also prevalent 
for people to write to the press anonymously, raising concerns on corruption.232 This practice 
effectively protected the identities of the victims and raised concern of the issue in public 
domain. Believing grievances would not be addressed by authorities in the colony, many 
wrote to politicians and royalty in the United Kingdom directly, both anonymously and non-
anonymously. For example, a resident named Lee Yuk Tak petitioned Edward Heath, the 
Prime Minister, directly in 1973, hoping to persecute an alleged corrupt ex-policeman.233 
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Although these cases were not neglected by the British authorities, they were often sent back 
to Hong Kong for investigation.  
 
 
This petitioning culture did not cease after the formation of the ICAC.234 An anonymous 
person for example, sent a petition to James Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, complaining 
that ‘all people in Hong Kong, especially the poor, are wondering what sort of government 
we are having’.235 Contrary to the British image of ‘integrity and fair-play’, ‘the majority (95 
per cent) of the British officers are crooks’.236 He demanded resignation of the chief 
Commissioner of Police and the dismissals of the remaining corrupt police officers.237 
Numerous similar petitions continued to be received by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office after the mid-1970s. Instead of forwarding his complaint against the police and judges 
to the ICAC, a persona named Pun Ting Chau, for instance, petitioned various staff in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Parliamentarians and the Governor.238 Such 
petitioning culture still existed in the late 1970s.239 Elliott continued to receive a high number 
of petitions and anonymous letters complaining against corruption.240 To some extent, this 
indicates the persistence of political conservatism and the absence of confidence in the ICAC. 
 
The Home Affairs Department conducted a MOOD opinion poll in 1980, assessing the public 
impression on the Commission six years after its establishment. The Commission itself was 
well known by the public: ‘All respondents knew of the existence of the ICAC and its general 
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aims.’241 The ICAC hot line- 266366 was also commonly known by the community.242 The 
institutional change restored people’s confidence in the colonial regime and was considered 
to be ‘generally successful’, except in the private sector.243 Most respondents appreciated the 
extensiveness and effectiveness of the Commission’s publicity and believed that it would 
handle all the complaints ‘promptly and thoroughly’.244 They felt that it ‘has done a good job 
in building up a respectable community image and so far successful efforts had been made 
towards long term aim of inculcating, amongst the general public, a healthy attitude towards 
corruption’.245 The report indicated a gradual change in the general political culture as it 
stated that there was ‘a readiness’ of the public to report corruption, with many young people 
in particular being enthusiastic about joining the ICAC.246 People now would go to the 
Commission to seek advice, to give information about non-corruption criminal offences and 
even to lodge general complaints about inefficacy or maladministration, showing increased 
political engagement and reduced fear towards politics. 
 
Nonetheless, MOOD also revealed the persistence of political conservatism in the colony:  
 
There was still a certain social stigma which discouraged direct involvement with or 
working in the ICAC. Less-educated housewives, for example, had said they would 
not like their children to work in the Commission. Some young people were also 
hesitant partly because they believed that their friends might keep them at arms’ 
length or at least with some suspicion.247  
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It was also indicated that work still had to be done to ‘correct’ the attitude of members of the 
grassroots level towards corruption.248 Most importantly, despite the expression of 
‘readiness’, ‘the majority of the respondents did not have any direct contact with the 
Commission and its staff’.249 This could be explained by the fact that the public, except for 
the students, who learned about the structure and duties of the ICAC through their Economic 
and Public Affairs syllabus, generally had superficial and ‘sketchy’ knowledge about the 
Commission and how it investigated corruption.250 The fear towards officialdom still existed, 
which could be observed when respondents from various social groups still held the notion 
that ICAC officials would abuse suspects by arresting them in early mornings or late 
evenings and having ‘long hours of interrogation in very cold-air conditioned rooms’.251 
 
Conclusion 
 
Activists called for either the separation of the Anti-Corruption Branch from the police force 
or the appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry. These demands were initially ignored 
by the British government. The creation of the ICAC was only made possible in 1973, when 
press, student organizations and activists exploited the escape of Peter Godber from Hong 
Kong to Britain and mobilized public opinion. China Mail’s campaign to set up a hot-line 
and conduct a survey successfully drew the attention of the public in Hong Kong, in 
particular its young intellectual readers. It also captured the attention of other newspapers and 
MPs, leading to further protest orchestrated by James Johnson and former civil servants in 
London. Signature campaigns and demonstrations organized by student organizations led by 
the HKFS also received positive responses from the young generation; although some adult 
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members of the society continued to criticize their political activism, denouncing it as a threat 
to political and social stability. Campaigners, notably Elliott, Johnson and Ellis, worked 
closely with each other and made good use of their connections with politicians and mass 
media to pursue their cause.  
 
These activists sought democratic reform and social justice. To pressurize the colonial 
government to introduce new anti-corruption measures, they made good use of the press, 
publicizing stories of corruption in the colonial bureaucracy. They presented the movement 
as endorsed by the majority of Hong Kong and noted that inaction risked social unrest. Anti-
corruption dominated the public discourse. The extensive coverage in newspapers and 
televisions in both Hong Kong and Britain led to increased petitions being sent to authorities 
in London. However, except the students, none of these activists organized demonstrations 
and adopted tactics of direct confrontation. The middle aged and elderly groups within the 
middle and upper classes were politically conservative.  
 
Although the formation of ICAC and strengthening of anti-corruption legislation in the 
colony undoubtedly were outcomes of accumulated efforts made by successive Governors 
and activists since the 1960s, archival records suggest that the emergence of anti-corruption 
campaigns and the shift of public opinions after the escape of Godber were inseparable. From 
the appointment of Blair-Kerr and the separation of the Branch from the police force, to the 
civilian composition of the Commission and the creation of the ICAC Complaints 
Committee: these were all direct responses to popular demands. Nonetheless, public 
sentiments did not always influence policy making. Despite public discontent over the escape 
of Godber, the Home Office refused to amend the Fugitive Offenders Act to extradite the 
corrupt police officer.  
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The ICAC restored public confidence in the colonial state. With increased political 
transparency, education, state propaganda and the influence of mass media, political culture 
shifted. People were more eager to engage in politics and express their grievances. There 
were increased reports of crimes and corruption. However, positivism was shattered in 1977 
by the issue of a partial amnesty to the police force. The fact that many continued to petition 
either activists or the authorities in London, instead of reporting to the Commission, also 
indicates the Commission had not fully gained the trust from the Chinese population. By 
1980, despite the fact that the Commission’s success was acknowledged, many people, in 
particular the grassroots level and the less educated class were reluctant to work in the ICAC, 
revealing the persistence of political conservatism among these groups in colonial Hong 
Kong. 
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IV.       The Campaign against Telephone Rate Increases 
 
In the mid-1970s, the general political culture in Hong Kong was shifting gradually. The 
legalization of Chinese lowered communication barriers between the colonial state and the 
Chinese communities. Chinese population’s stake in colonial administration was also 
enhanced with the revised language requirements in appointments of civil servants. The 
setting up of the ICAC and the successful extradition of Godber restored public confidence in 
a reformist government. The colonial administration was facing up its shortcomings and 
becoming more responsive to public opinions. Distrust and resentment of officialdom was 
falling, in particular among the educated young generation. Despite persistent political 
conservatism in certain classes and age groups, people in general expected the government to 
become more effective and were willing to report corrupt practices. Intolerance towards 
corruption is explored in this case study, a campaign against telephone rate increases in 1975.  
 
The Hong Kong Telephone Company reported a profit of HK$ 70 million in 1973, but it 
gained approval from the Advisory Committee on Telephone Services to increase rentals in 
early 1974. In August 1974, the company was planning to apply for a further rental increase, 
in response to cash shortages. It was however widely suspected that business practices were 
corrupt. Anti-corruption campaigning had focused on bureaucratic corruption. The campaign 
on telephone charge had a different target, and was the largest scale movement of consumer 
activism in Hong Kong in the 1970s.  
 
Despite the scale and significance of the protest, the campaign has not been studied closely. 
Lam Wai-man’s work provided an account of how different organizations, such as the Hong 
Kong Christian Industrial Committee, kaifong associations and chambers of commerce, 
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collaborated and formed coalitions to protest against rate increases. Nonetheless, she has not 
examined the strategies and rhetoric employed by these activists and assessed their 
effectiveness using robust methods. Lam also failed to assess how the campaign was 
perceived by different social classes and age groups.1 Reliant solely on published materials, 
such as newspapers and published state reports, she pointed out that ‘the general public 
reaction’ was ‘one of complete outrage’.2 This chapter uses archival sources to investigate 
how the colonial administration perceived and reacted to the campaign. It highlights the 
shifting popular sentiments of different social classes and age groups towards the event, and 
how district organizations and political coalitions protested. 
 
Increased Press Coverage and Shifted Public Sentiments 
 
The Hong Kong Telephone Company was a public utility company, granted a fifty-year 
monopoly in 1925. In 1951, the task of supervising the company was delegated to the 
Postmaster-General. Its dividends and levels of return were not subject to legal control, but 
when proposing rental increase, it had to seek approval from the Legislative Council.3 The 
company’s performance was often poor. Customers had to wait for a long period of time 
before getting their telephone lines installed. To improve its quality of services and prevent 
further mismanagement, an advisory body, the Advisory Committee on Telephone Services 
was set up in 1964.  
 
 
																																																						
1 Lam tried to quantify the public reactions by examining the ‘amount’ of public responses the movement 
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In August 1973, the company requested an increase in the telephone rate, the first time in ten 
years. The increase came into effect in January 1974, raising the existing rentals for business 
lines by 17 percent and residential lines by 19 per cent, respectively. As a result, the 
telephone rates for business lines rose from $350 to $410 per annum. For residential lines, the 
rentals increased from $235 to $280 per annum.4 According to Town Talk, reactions to the 
increase were ‘mixed’. Some housewives believed that the increase was ‘too great’. Many 
white collar workers, such as office executives in Central and businessmen in Sham Shui Po 
and Mong Kok, did not mind the increase given that the company promised to improve its 
services. The general public mostly believed that rising telephone charges were ‘inevitable’ 
due to the increased cost of living.5 The increase in early 1974 was not opposed. 
 
According to the report by the Advisory Committee on Telephone Services in 1972, Hong 
Kong Telephone Company’s expansion plans were ‘too conservative’. They only followed 
‘proven demand rather than assessing demand and meeting it as it arises’. The culminate 
waiting list has reached 38,271 by the end of 1972, compared with 31,177 in 1971.6 Unless it 
altered its existing policy, the number of people waiting for telephone lines would not fall, an 
indicator that its performance had not improved. Table 9 reveals the disparity between 
demand and supply of telephone lines. Although the installation rate increased from 72.58 per 
cent in 1972 to 92.32 per cent in 1975, the company still failed to meet the demand. The Star 
recorded the public dissatisfaction about the company’s service: ‘Our phones are 
cheap….Nonetheless, the waiting list is a barometer of the basic conflict of interest – and it is 
going up.’7 To improve its service, the company invested in new technologies and planned an 
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expansion programme. In May 1974, for example, the existing microwave system was 
extended from Hong Kong to Kwai Chung and Yuen Long to Kwai Chung after the 
introduction of Pulse Code Modulation. Outside Japan, the Hong Kong Telephone Company 
was the second company to use the system, which was considered by the company to be 
‘most up-to-date and advanced techniques presently available’.8 This microwave system 
improved transmission performance and also provided increased capacity for telephone 
channels. It also ensured that each telephone call was secret and no overhearing would occur 
between phone calls. 
 
Table 9: Applications Received and Lines Installed by the Hong Kong Telephone Company 
 
Year Application received Lines installed Installations as 
percentage of 
application 
1972 163,537 118,708 72.58% 
1973 168,775 140,063 82.99% 
1974 125,068 113,890 91.06% 
1975 115,236 107,536 93.32% 
Total 572,616 480,197 83.86% 
 
Source: HKRS 276-7-197, Telephone Service Statistics, November 1976. 
 
 
 
In August 1974, to finance its capital expansion programme, the Hong Kong Telephone 
Company sought approval from the Legislative Council for a 60 per cent increase in 
telephone charges. The company argued that compared to many other countries, Hong 
Kong’s telephone rates were low. While Hong Kong residential and business subscribers 
were paying $280 and $410 per annum, the charges were $434 and $829 in Malaysia and 
$489 and $734 in Singapore. The difference in rentals was even greater in European 
countries. For instance, the rates were $651 and $1026 in Belgium and $810 and $1,140 in 
																																																						
8 HKRS 276-8-351, ‘Extension of Hong Kong Telephone Microwave Network’, New Release, 15 May 1975, 
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France.9 From the perspective of the Telephone Company, the proposed increase therefore 
could be justified. Nonetheless, these figures ignored differences in international costs of 
living and did not deflate rates by prevailing income levels. 
 
The capital expansion programme moreover coincided with economic downturn. The growth 
rate of annual Gross Domestic Product fell from 14 per cent in 1973 to about 2.5 per cent in 
1974 and 1975. The index of real daily wage for industrial workers dropped from 159 in 1973 
to 141 in 1974 and 137 in 1975. Unemployment rose.10 Lam argued that ‘the government 
kept the public in the dark until mid-January 1975’ about the situation, and that ‘territory-
wide outrage’  was triggered in 1975.11 As early as in August 1974, however, there were 
rumours about the price changes. According to Town Talk, the proposed increase was 
‘vociferously opposed in all the districts’. For example, residents in Wan Chai and Yau Mai 
Tei condemned the increase as ‘unreasonable’, especially as the company netted a $70 
million profit in the previous year.12 People complained about poor service. There were 
requests for interventions by the Consumer Council, which was set up in 1974 to enhance 
consumer welfare.13 According to Y. K. Kan, the Chairman of the Consumer Council, the 
Council received ‘a large number of complaints’ about the proposed increase in telephone 
charges even though the Council had already issued a public statement suggesting they would 
not look into the matter.14  
 
																																																						
9 HKRS 618-1-567, ‘Inflation Puts up Phone Rental Charges’, South China Morning Post, 25 September 1974. 
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13 Ibid. 
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In September, reactions to the proposed increased remained ‘strong and unfavourable’.15 The 
Director of the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, Raymond Fung, indicated to the 
press that his organization, which consisted of fifty-two groups, including kaifongs, churches 
and students, would take ‘drastic measures’ to prevent the telephone rates from being 
raised.16 Business groups also petitioned the colonial government. The New Territories 
General Chamber of Commerce, for example, wrote to the Secretary for the New Territories 
to express grievances over the rate increases. The group believed that the increase would 
cause ‘an ill effect’ on the economy.  It also asserted that a public utility company should not 
be ‘earning excessive profit’.17 The Sha Tin of Commerce also complained to the District 
Officer of Sha Tin, arguing that increase in telephone rate would ‘accelerate inflation’ and 
‘add the difficulties of the public’.18 Heung Yee Kuk expressed similar concerns.19 In 
December, the Universal Consumers Association publicly condemned the company’s move 
to seek rental increases, and announced that it would make an ‘all-out effort’ to protest 
against the increase.20 By late 1974, therefore, the proposed increase had received 
considerable attention from a range of different groups and organizations. 
 
The proposed increase in telephone rates was widely reported and criticized by newspapers. 
South China Morning Post for instance argued that the increase was ‘an extremely 
irresponsible move’ which ‘completely ignored the current economic difficulties of the 
colony and the sentiment’.21 During the week from 17 to 22 December, six newspapers 
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showed ‘strong objection’ to the rumoured fee increase.22 News coverage increased and the 
topic was covered in seventeen editorials in the last week of December.23 Most of the 
editorials criticized the proposal. The communist leaning Hong Kong Commercial Daily 
argued that it was ‘unreasonable’ for the Telephone Company to seek another rate increase 
after its charges had increased the previous year. It also believed that such increase would 
lead to ‘chain reactions’ during the economic recession.24 Fai Po asserted that the increase 
was ‘most unfair’ given the $70 millions profit made by the Telephone Company in 1974.25 
Wah Kiu Yat Po suggested that that the Telephone Company should be nationalized to stop it 
from profiteering.26  
 
The adverse newspaper comments shaped public opinions and led to increased tensions 
between the company and its customers. According to Town Talk, there were ‘mounting 
tensions’ over the proposed telephone charge increases in early January: ‘City District 
Officers received strong protests from every sector of the population’.27 The main problem 
was the company’s revision of its rate in early 1974. Another increase in such a short period 
of time seemed unjustifiable. From the public’s perspective, the company was making profits, 
$70 million in 1973. The public did not realize the company had committed into buying 
cables and other equipment for expansion, which amounted to millions of dollars. It was 
difficult for the public to understand why this increase was necessary. The argument related 
to a simple one of public versus private interest: during a time of inflation and rising 
unemployment, as a public utility company, the interest of the whole community should be 
																																																						
22 HKRS 618-1-567, ‘Increase in Telephone Charges’, Chinese Press Review, no. 310, 17-22 December 1974, p. 
1. 
23 HKRS 618-1-567, ‘Increase in Telephone Charges’, Chinese Press Review, no. 312, 30 Dec 1974- 7 January 
1975, p. 1. 
24 Ibid., p. 3. 
25 Ibid., p. 4. 
26 Ibid., p. 6. 
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placed above profiteering. Many suspected that the poor financial situation was the result of 
mismanagement and corruption within the company. Town Talk revealed that there was an 
‘unanimous view’ that capital for expansion should be raised from shareholders, instead of 
consumers.28 The absence of an effective regulatory system to monitor the operation of the 
Hong Kong Telephone Company also led the colonial government to become a target. 
Middle-aged kaifong and community leaders started pressing for a government statement on 
the proposed increase.29 Some even radically suggested that the Telephone Company should 
be nationalized.30  
 
The widespread public reaction was due to the rate of take up of telephones. Table 10 reveals 
the increase of the number of direct line from 1967 to 1975. The number of direct lines nearly 
tripled in less than ten years, from 7.2 per 100 population in 1967 to 19.1 in 1975.31 In other 
words, about a quarter of the population had everyday access to telephones. Those without 
lines used the telephones of their friends and families. By December 1974, there were 
803,144 working lines in Hong Kong in total.32 
 
Table 10: Telephone Take-up Rate in Hong Kong (Direct Lines) 
 
Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Lines/ 
100 
7.24 8.67 10.08 11.46 13.91 15.88 17.70 18.48 19.11 
Station/
100  
9.13 10.74 12.44 14.14 17.02 19.38 21.65 22.75 23.60 
Populat
ion 
3,877,
700 
3,971,
500 
4,039,
700 
4,127,
800 
4,064,
400 
4,103,
500 
4,219,
300 
4,345,
200 
4,389,
900 
 
Source: HKRS 276-7-407, ‘Hong Kong Telephone Co. Ltd: Statistical Review’, attached in 
‘Statistical Review’, from I. Cowley, Forecasting, Directory and Marketing Department, to 
General Manager, Assistant G. M. Administration, Mr. Gaut, Chief Account, Manager of the 
																																																						
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 HKRS 70-7-472-2, ‘Seventeenth Periodical Report for the Period from 1st Jan to 31st Dec 1974’, Advisory 
Committee on Telephone Services, 28 July 1975, p. 7. 
32 Ibid., appendix E. 
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Engineering Branch, Manager, Operations, Heads of Divisions and Heads of Departments, 25 
February 1976.  
 
 
Tensions escalated after F. L. Walker, the general manager of the Telephone Company 
announced that the company had applied for a 70 per cent increase in telephone rate on 10 
January 1975.33 This led to extensive media coverage. In the second week of January, twenty 
newspaper editorials opposed the increase.34 Sing Tao Yat Pao and Kung Sheung Daily both 
described the proposed rate of increase as ‘shocking’.35 Sing Tao Yat Pao and Nam Wah Man 
Po even cited the Star Ferry riots in 1966 to warn the colonial government of the potential 
‘vicious chain reaction’ which may be caused by the increase.36 Wah Kiu Yat Po, Oriental 
Daily and Hong Kong Commercial Daily insisted that no increase should be allowed by the 
government.37 Leftist newspapers expressed disapproval to the proposed rise of charge. Wen 
Wei Pao suggested that as a public utility company which had close connection with the 
livelihood of people, such frequent increase in rate was unacceptable.38 Ta Kung Pao asserted 
that it was ‘too much’ for the company to ask for a 70 per cent increase given its profit and 
the recent charge revision.39  
 
Influenced by press opposition, the proposed telephone rate ‘polarized’ the government and 
the public.40 According to A. F. Neoh, the City Distirct Commissioner of Kowloon, the 
public was ‘resentful’ that the Telephone Company had applied for a high percentage of 
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35 Ibid., p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 4. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 3. 
39 Ibid. 
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increase during a time when living standards were not rising.41 As the City District 
Commissioner of Kowloon has pointed out, public discontent escalated: ‘Community 
pressure are rapidly building. In the past two weeks, C.D.O. have been feeling tensions in 
almost all their dealing with the public. At every point of contact, government stand 
accused.’42 On Hong Kong Island, it was also observed that a large number of local 
organizations had ‘reacted rather strongly’ to the proposed rate increase. Many considered the 
reasons for the increase ‘unjustified’ and ‘unacceptable’.43 The campaign was strengthening, 
against a backdrop of economic problems and stimulated by adverse newspaper coverage of 
the company’s proposal. 
 
In mid-January, Town Talk  reported that the issue ‘continued to dominate public attention’.44 
‘Some quarters’ felt that an increase of about 20 per cent was reasonable and believed that 
any higher increase would only create an impression that the government was ‘favouring the 
Telephone Company regardless of public interest’.45 Residents of the grassroots level in 
public housing estates complained that a 70 per cent increase would increase the rental to a 
level that was higher than their housing rent.46 Housewives and factory managers considered 
whether to cut telephone lines, a de facto boycott of services. Those who possessed more than 
one line, such as shop tenants and firm operators expressed great anger, claiming that they 
would cut down the number of lines to the minimum if the increase was approved.47  
 
																																																						
41 Ibid. 
42 HKRS 394-27-11, ‘Telephone Charges Increase’, memo from A. K. Neoh, City District Commissioner 
(Kowloon) to Deputy Director of Home Affairs, 8 January 1975, p. 1. 
43 HKRS 394-27-11, ‘Situation Report on Items of Special Current Interest’, memo from S. T. Tam, City 
District Commissioner (Hong Kong) to E. P. Ho, Director of Home Affairs, 9 January 1975, p. 1. 
44 HKRS 286-1-14, ‘Pressure for Government Line on Telephone Increases’, Town Talk, 16 January 1975, p. 1. 
45 Town Talk did not specify the location of these residential quarters, in ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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In late January, clarifications were made through the mass media by the company that the 
increase was necessary to prevent its bankruptcy. The company launched a counter publicity 
campaign to justify its price increases. It argued that, as it had ploughed most of its profits to 
the expansion programme, it needed additional revenue to cover costs. However, this 
argument was not widely accepted. People demanded the publication of financial 
statements.48 Most residents in both Kowloon and Hong Kong opposed the proposed 
increase, and backed a planned mass rally.49 Yet, this was not the consensual position: many 
residents also believed that an increase up to 20 per cent was acceptable in spite of the 
consensus that the company’s service had to be improved.50 
 
Political Culture 
 
The protest against telephone rate increases took a variety of forms that reveals the shifting 
political culture of the time, and highlights how campaigners were motivated by instrumental 
reasoning and by ideologies. As Town Talk has revealed, many believed the proposed 
increased was simply unjust: ‘…there was still a persistent belief that the Telephone 
Company was making an excessive profit and that the proposed increases were unjustified’.51 
Similar attitudes towards the event could be observed in the newspaper coverage. For 
example, a reader named C. H. Ho wrote to South China Morning Post arguing that the 
increase was unjust: ‘Undeniably, the Hong Kong Telephone Company is one of the 
monopolies which are making huge profits every year. It has no reason to raise telephone 
																																																						
48 HKRS 286-1-14, ‘Increase in Telephone Charges’, Town Talk, 23 January 1975, p. 2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 3. 
51 Ibid., p. 2. 
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charges twice within a very short time.’52 Many people joined the campaign because they 
were provoked by the concept of fairness:  
 
Why must the consumer pay for mismanagement in a company? The deficit arising is 
due to poor management planning and having worked themselves into a hole, Mr 
Walker expects the consumer to bale the company out by paying higher 
chargers…The Telephone Company is passing the buck for their management 
mistakes to the consumer.53 
 
Others got involved in the campaign due to their dissatisfaction in the company’s lack of 
administrative and financial transparency:  
 
Up till now, the public is kept in total darkness. We are not given any consistent 
explanation as to why the increase is needed. Mr Walker, by his action, or lack of it, 
obviously does not feel responsible for the public. I can understand why gentlemen 
should want to appeal to the elitist minority already in the power structures. But the 
day when major decisions affecting the public can be made without reference to the 
people is crumbling, even in colonial Hong Kong. If Mr Walker thinks he can get 
away with it simply labelling critics as irresponsible, he has yet much to learn.54  
 
Sing Tao Yat Pao similarly recorded that the public believed that examination on the increase 
of the telephone rentals should be made public.55 These comments found on Town Talk and 
published in the newspapers reveal instrumental and ideological concerns.  
																																																						
52 HKRS 618-1-567, C. H. Ho, ‘Boycott Campaign Proposed’, South China Morning Post, 9 September 1974.  
53 HKRS 618-1-567, ‘Subscriber’, ‘The Consumer Should Not Be Penalized’, South China Morning Post, 29 
January 1975. 
54 HKRS 618-1-567, ‘Public Has A Right to Know’, South China Morning Post, 14 January 1975. 
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Rather than participating in the rally, many people chose to write to the newspaper editors to 
express their grievances, indicating political conservatism. A subscriber, for instance, wrote 
to South China Morning Post anonymously after the government announced that a 30 per 
cent increase was approved on 22 January 1975. He made a recommendation that the 
company should break into a number of units in different districts through subsidiary 
franchise if it could not operate effectively as a single unit.56 Another reader of South China 
Morning Post complained to the press that it was ‘unjustifiable’ for the government to 
approve a 30 per cent increase in telephone rate before the completion of investigation by the 
Committee of Inquiry.57  
 
Nonetheless, there were some who were concerned that this incident could escalate, 
especially after Walker reiterated that most local people were unable to understand the 
Telephone Company’s accounts even if they were publicized. The impact of the riots of 1966 
and 1967 had left a strong impression on people, making them fearful of social unrest. As 
Town Talk pointed out:  
 
Quite a number of people were apprehensive over the possibility of a repeated 
circumstances and tensions which resulted in the Star Ferry riots several years ago. 
They felt that the telephone increase affected practically everyone in Hong Kong and 
any opposition was likely to be supported by the majority of the population.58 
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Tsz Wan Shan estate dwellers informed the City District Officer that ‘they were afraid that 
disturbances might break out if the government was to take the Telephone Company’s side 
and disregard public feeling’.59  
 
 
As Town Talk has pointed out, in ‘more vehement circles’, there was an explicit threat to 
resort to violence against the colonial state, including the use of bombs if the government 
ignored public opposition to the rate rises.60 Posters included inflammatory slogans, such as 
‘Hang P. C. Woo’, were placed in prominent locations, such as Waterloo Road and Pui Ching 
Road in Kowloon. This was a threat to use violence against the Chairman of the Telephone 
Advisory Committee because the Committee declared the proposed increase reasonable and 
Woo asked residents who could not afford to pay the rental to share telephone lines.61 Graffiti 
art also included the slogans ‘Hang Haddon Cave’ and ‘Hang P.C. Woo’. These were highly 
visual displays of protest. Artists daubed their remarks in red characters in various places of 
Kowloon. Although the Kowloon City District Commissioner believed that these visual 
protests may have been the work of a ‘lunatic fringe’, he also acknowledged that these 
extreme forms of protest indicated that ‘public resentment’ was ‘deep’.62 City District 
Officers also listened into and recorded spontaneous comments from the public, such as ‘If 
telephone charges were increased as much as it had been rumoured, it would not be unjust, if 
the fate conveyed by these characters were to begall the two gentlemen in question’.63 The 
form of the protest is revealing, indicating that the political culture in Hong Kong was not 
monolithically conservative. Radical means to voice grievances were sought when people’s 
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economic interest and livelihood were threatened.  
 
On a district level, the situation was tense. kaifong associations and Mutual Aid Committees, 
which represented a large number of middle-aged and elderly groups planned their actions to 
express discontent over the proposal. They also joined the collective lobbies.64 For example, 
Wong Tai Sin kaifongs met in early January to work out strategies to exert pressure on the 
colonial government. Choi Hung Mutual Aid Committee declared publicly that it opposed to 
the proposed increase.65 The Hong Kong and Kowloon Joint Kaifong Research Council also 
petitioned the Legislative Council on 11 January, arguing that any increases in telephone rate 
would ‘create a chain reaction and lead to disturbances similar to the one that followed the 
Star Ferry fare increase several years ago’.66 Many kaifongs and community organizations in 
Mong Kok, Shum Shui Po, Kwun Tong and the Western District by contrast decided to wait 
for the government to announce its stand before taking any further actions.67 By mid-January, 
many kaifong groups kept pressing the City District Officers in their areas for an official 
stance on the matter as they felt that the government ‘had remained doggedly silent’.68 Some 
had already taken action in form of signature campaigns, such as the Choi Hung Mutual Aid 
Committee. These grassroots organizations started to liaise with voluntary agencies such as 
Caritas and the Society for Community Organization, which had become ‘generally 
interested in the issue’.69 According to the Kowloon City District Commissioner, there was 
now a growing tendency for the Mutual Aid Committees to ‘confederate into united fronts’ in 
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opposition to the telephone rate increase.70 It was predicted that the formation of broad 
alliance would ‘offer fertile ground for consolidation of power for the more opportunistic’ 
and there was little the government could do to prevent it.71 In late January, the Choi Hung 
Mutual Aid Committee handed in a petition with 1,000 signatures to the Universal 
Consumers’ Association. The Tai Hang Tung Society for Community Organization also put 
on banners in the estate to protest against the proposed increase.72 This demonstrated that the 
middle-aged and elderly groups could also be mobilized when their interests were threatened.  
 
Resettlement estates formed their own lobbies. The Lei Cheng Uk Resettlement Estate 
Commercial and Industrial General Association, for example, petitioned the UMELCO, 
noting that the proposed increase was ‘unanimously opposed’ by their association. It 
submitted the public opinions in its district, which suggested that approval to the rise would 
only ‘accelerate social unease and bring about undesirable chain reactions’.73 The Hong Kong 
and Kowloon and New Territories Manufacturing and Commercial Association started a 
signature campaign in Tsz Wan Shan, although it was that the campaign ‘has not been very 
effective’.74 Residents in Ngau Tau Kok also petitioned the UMELCO, urging the 
government not to disregard public opinions:  
 
There was the occurrence of protesting posters against the increase of telephone 
rental. Though such move was rather irritating, that was the reaction of the citizens. It 
is a proper procedure of the government not to make any decision blindly in the 
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matter and the public opinions should not be disregarded. It should be realized that ‘a 
small defect will gradually spoil the whole’….At present, the social economy is in an 
unfavourable condition and many of the citizens are unable to make both ends 
meet.…The government should be sympathetic with the citizens.75 
  
The colonial administration was aware of the escalating social discontent. Officials predicted 
that ‘it will not be long before the other, less formalized but influenced groups’ to follow.76 
This was proven correct. In late January, a resettlement estate shop owner’s lobby escalated 
its action. The group represented twenty-three estates but the impetus of which came from 
Ngau Tau Kok and Jordan Valley Estates. They submitted a petition at the Colonial 
Secretariat, protesting against the telephone charge increase. Government officials believed 
that if the colonial administration did not respond, these organizations would escalate action, 
mobilizing a signature campaign.77 In February, ten representatives were sent by the Tai Wo 
Hau Resettlement Estate to meet with Oswald Cheung and Harry Fung, unofficial members 
of the Legislative Council, to voice their opposition on behalf of 3,000 telephone subscribers 
in the area. They reiterated publicly that they opposed to any kind of increase and would cut 
the telephone lines if necessary.78 Social movements were actively seeking governmental 
intervention when their interests were at stake.  
 
On 6 February, the Legislative Council unanimously approved the Telephone (Amendment) 
Bill which enabled the company to increase the telephone rental by 30 per cent. Public 
opinions, however, appeared to have been influenced by negative comments made by the 
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mass media.79 Many housewives and residents started to criticize the increase, mainly 
because they believed that the capital for expansion programme should be paid by 
shareholders instead of consumers, and no decision should be made before the Commission 
of Inquiry finished its investigation.80 However, in February, the campaign subsided, with ‘a 
cooling down of public vehemence’, a contrast to ‘the emotional outbursts’ that had followed 
the announcement of the purposed 70 per cent increase a month earlier. The following 
observation was recorded in Town Talk:  
 
In almost all the districts, the general feeling was that the increase was inevitable and 
although certain kaifong groups still pledged support to anti-increase campaigns, they 
added they were not keen about taking drastic action. Leaders in the anti-rent increase 
movement in group A and B housing estates said that they would rather save their 
energy for more effective action over proposed rent increases for shops in housing 
estates.81 
 
 
To assess shifting popular sentiments, the Home Affairs Department instructed the City 
District Officers to conduct an opinion poll. The City District Officers in Hong Kong 
interviewed 824 people to assess public reactions on the increase. 46 per cent believed the 
increase was acceptable and 19 per cent had no comments. Only 35 percent thought the 
decision was unacceptable. This result was impressionistic as there was no previous survey 
data to compare this finding with. Nonetheless, most City District Officers believed that the 
survey suggested ‘the emotion of general public has subsided to a large extent’.82 As 
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Legislative Councillor Oswald Cheung had suggested, ‘even a clever housewife cannot cook 
a meal without rice’.83 By this point, although some popular misconceptions on the financial 
situation of the company remained, the public had started understanding why the increase 
was necessary. As Town Talk had pointed out, ‘the television programmes and government 
press features certainly succeeded to a certain extent in explaining the issue’.84 The ‘middle 
class segments’, such as some building contractors and businessmen even became 
sympathetic for the financial difficulties the Telephone Company was experiencing.85 
According to Town Talk, the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry also helped to ease 
tensions:  
 
It was noticed that all districts that following the appointment of the Commission of 
Inquiry, public vehemence on this issue had cooled down considerably and over the 
Chinese New Year, very few comments on the issues were heard, the public generally 
welcomed the choice of members of the Commission, especially Sir Alastair Blair-
Kerr as the Chairman.86  
 
The campaign soon lost its momentum and waned from late February 1975. 
 
The section demonstrates that the proposed increase in telephone rental attracted universal 
attention from Hong Kong Chinese of different social classes and age groups. Participants 
were motivated not only by the instrumental concerns, but also ideologies such as justice and 
fairness. They also anticipated increased transparency in the company’s administration. This 
section also reveals a shifting political culture in Hong Kong among the middle-aged and 
elderly groups, as well as the grassroots groups. Unlike previous campaigns, the middle-aged 
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and elderly groups, such as the kaifong leaders, were less reluctant to engage in the 
campaign. They were not afraid to express their grievances when their interests were at stake. 
While some activists considered cutting their telephone lines to boycott the Telephone 
Company, others took the initiative to organize signature campaigns and petitions. People at 
the grassroots level, such as residents in resettlements estate also engaged in consumer 
activism in this case because their livelihoods were directly affected. Their rhetoric was 
radical, in extremist, inciting violence in the slogan ‘Hang P. C. Woo’. These were outliers. 
The memories of the Star Ferry riots in 1966 were fresh. People were genuinely concerned 
that the campaign might cause colony-wide social unrest, which they opposed. Direct 
confrontations did not occur. Political culture was on the whole liberal, advocating change 
via established political channels of communication.  
 
Political Activism 
 
To protest against the proposed increases in telephone rate, organizations collaborated 
informally and formed three coalitions. The primary lobby group was the Christian Industrial 
Committee, headed by Raymond Fung, which was considered by the colonial state to be ‘by 
far the largest political lobby’ and ‘the most successful’.87 Formed in 1966, with an interest in 
labour welfare policy and industrial safety, the Committee was influential, connecting more 
than 350 separate organizations, including kaifong associations, clansmen association and 
many voluntary agencies.88 It was driven by instrumental concerns and employed moderate 
language to exert pressure on the colonial government, requesting explanations of rate 
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increases. Believing the increase would have a drastic impact on people’s livelihood, it 
petitioned the UMELCO, from September 1974. It argued, for example:  
 
Our organization feels that the proposed increase is detrimental to Hong Kong’s 
worsening economic life, as a community and as families. Therefore we are writing to 
the Consumer Council to ask for an investigation, to you for your support, and to 
other community groups for a concerted effort.89 
 
It then requested an appointment formally with P. C. Woo, the Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee on Telephone Services.90 Under the chairmanship of L. K. Ding, an Urban 
Councillor, the organization was in close contact with a number of kaifong federal bodies, 
which involved influential figures in both Research Council and the Kaifong Advancement 
Association. To coerce the Telephone Company to withdraw its proposed increase, Ding 
publicly compared the campaign against telephone rate increase to the 1966 riots: 
 
It’s the timing; the proposal for an increase in rates has come at a time when people 
are troubled enough by unemployment and so on. We should try to avoid the rebellion 
of 1966 when we had a massive scale riot over a nickel increase. This time it’s not a 
nickel but hundreds of dollars.91  
 
The Committee deployed the example of the 1966 riots to put pressure on the Telephone 
Company and the colonial government. It was argued that disturbances would follow if 
public opinions were neglected and concessions were refused. There were also plans to rally 
for external support from Labour Parliamentarians in London.92 Together with some 
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influential figures in multi-storey building groups, such as Lee Wan Yuen, Wong Hoi, Wong 
Ping Ho and Wong Cham, Ding used their influence and requested an interview with the 
Secretary of Home Affairs in January 1975, which was aware of by the press and kaifongs in 
most districts.93 The Committee’s success of mobilizing a large number of organizations 
within a short period of time shows its organizational capacity, built on an expansive social 
network.  
 
A secondary lobby group was the Universal Consumers’ Association, an organization headed 
by Urban Councillor, Edmund Chow and William Shum, a civic candidate running for the 
coming Urban Council election. The Association aimed to ‘reveal profiteering in wholesale 
and retail outlets, to work against product inferiority, to censor over-exaggerated 
advertisement, to press for more sources of supply of consumer goods and to fight against 
price ragging by franchise or monopoly’.94 Most of the executive members of the 
organization were middle-class professionals, such as lawyers, accountants and architects. 
The Association was supported by more than forty supporting associations and district 
committees, ranging from kaifong associations to business cooperates in different districts. 
Organizations included, for example, Civic Association Hung Hom District, Hong Kong and 
Kowloon Mutual Aid Association, Kwai Chung Kaifong Association, the Reform Club, the 
Incorporated Owners of Pak Lee building and Daily Growth Investment Company.95 Since 
December 1974, the Association had expressed discontent over the proposed increase 
through the press to mobilize public opinions.96 On 10 January 1975, Chow held a public 
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meeting at the Hong Kong University Students Alumni Association in Edinburgh House, 
which was attended many kaifong leaders. According to a report by the Central City District 
Officer, the meeting was ‘jam-packed with people overflowing into the corridor’.97 It was 
attended mainly by ‘middle-aged’ men of secondary school education. Most of them were 
‘quite established’. Only four to five participants were female.98 The meeting agreed to 
petition the Telephone Company and start a signature campaign. Another meeting was to be 
scheduled if the petition letter and signature campaign failed to produce any effect. In the 
petition to the Telephone Company, the Association argued that no rental increase should be 
approved and urged the company to publicize its accounts:  
 
It was a shock to the consumers to know that your company is applying for 
permission to increase the telephone charge by about 70 per cent. Although you 
maintained that the financial situation of your company was something confidential 
between your company and the government, we feel that the consumers are entitled to 
know as they will be directly affected if your proposed increase is approved. If you 
believe that your application for increase is not profit motivated, would it be possible 
if you could forward to us for our perusal and discussion a copy of the relevant 
statement of account of your company in support of your application submitted to the 
Telephone Advisory Committee?99 
 
The signature campaign subsequently started on 15 January, when 1,000 forms, each catering 
for ten persons, were issued to commercial organizations, industrial groups, schools and 
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kaifong associations. The campaign was backed by the public; 643 out of the 1,000 forms 
were returned by 31 January. The forms carried 5,250 signatures, presenting forty-three 
organizations and seventy-five schools. 4,777 people, approximately 91 per cent of the 
signatories expressed their objection to charge increase of any degree.100 Compared to the 
Christian Industrial Committee, the Universal Consumers’ Association initially adopted a 
tougher attitude. It ‘unanimously’ refused to give concession to ‘even 1 per cent increase in 
rates’.101 The City District Commissioner argued that the group ‘present(ed) a grave 
stumbling block for any peaceful negotiation’.102 It was unsympathetic to the government and 
believed that if there were any riots, it was ‘entirely the working of the government’.103 
However, by mid-January, their position had shifted, due to its survey of popular attitudes. 
Rather than adhering to the ‘no concession’ position, the organization surveyed the public to 
assess their views on the percentage of rate increase. In the questionnaire, six answers (20 per 
cent, 30 per cent, 40 per cent, 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 70 per cent) were provided. No 
increase was not an option.104 In early February, to put pressure on the government, the 
Association sent the poll result to the UMELCO. The active engagement of the ordinarily 
pro-status quo and politically indifferent middle class in the campaign through the Universal 
Consumers’ Association suggests that they could be mobilized against the colonial state 
when their interests were affected. However, the Universal Consumers’ Association received 
less support when compared to the Christian Industrial Committee as it was ‘obviously bent 
on the issue’ to pull votes for the upcoming election.105  
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A further organization, the well-established Reform Club, also joined the rate increase 
protest. Yeung Li Yin and two other Reform Club candidates started a signature campaign. 
Forms were sent out to banks on behalf of Yeung to appeal for support.106 To campaign 
effectively and exert pressure on the colonial government, in February, the Reform Club set 
up an ad-hoc sub-committee which consisted of members such as Yeung, Messrs Napoleon 
Ng, Poon Tai Leung, Sung Pui. The sub-committee carried out a public opinion survey on the 
proposed rise in telephone charges. It issued 30,000 poll forms and distributed to the public. 
At the end, 21,940 of the respondents were against the increase, with only sixty-nine of them 
supporting the proposed revision.107 The Club submitted the results to the UMELCO. 
Nonetheless, the Reform Club campaign received less publicity than those organized by the 
Christian Industrial Committee and the Universal Consumers’ Association. It was only 
briefly mentioned in Yeung’s speech at the inauguration ceremony of the executive 
committee on 17 January. According to Kowloon City District Commissioner, its signature 
campaign was ‘rather ineffective’, similarly because of its underlying political motive of 
appealing for public support in the forthcoming election.108  
 
A few other civic bodies took an interest in the protest. In early January, the Chinese 
Manufacturers’ Association, which was set up in 1934 representing its member in various 
sectors of industry and trade, sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Deny Roberts and the 
Chairman of the Telephone Advisory Committee, P. C. Woo, warning that any rise in 
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telephone rentals may ‘touch off social discontent and further inflation’.109 It described the 
proposed increase as ‘untimely in the light of the present economic situations’ and argued 
that it was ‘wrong’ to make subscribers finance the company’s expansion programme. It was 
also ‘beyond understanding’ that the company could not operate in spite of the rental increase 
in 1974 and the ‘sizeable net profit’ of $70 million.110 In late January,  after the government 
approved a 30 per cent increase in telephone rates, the Chinese Manufactures’ Association 
formed a new federal pressure group with twenty-two other industrial, commercial and civic 
organizations, including the most influential trade association, the Hong Kong Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce; the Kowloon Chamber of Commerce, the kaifong federal 
bodies and the Kowloon Multi-storey Buildings General Association also were associated 
with this pressure group. This led to a jointly issued press statement 30 January, to protest 
against the ‘unwise’ increase and to demand that the Telephone Company’s accounts to be 
made public.111 
 
By late January, the main lobbies had coalesced. Two distinct categories emerged. These 
three groups were liberal and tended to believe in solving the issue through the adoption of 
‘collaborative strategy’, such as meetings and petitions. Some student organizations, 
however, believed that the matter could only be settled by ‘conflicts’, such as demonstrations, 
sit-ins and other direct actions.112 In mid-January, the City District Commissioner of 
Kowloon had already observed that the young leftists would take advantage of the telephone 
rate issue to discredit the colonial state: ‘New Left and student groups are known to be 
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actively planning protest action. The telephone charges issue is precisely an issue which the 
radical new left groups have been waiting for and there is no doubt that it will be exploited to 
the full.’113 The Hong Kong Youth and Students Association, which was headed by Siu Kai-
chung, probably lined up student radicals such as Daily Combat and 70s Bi-Weekly Groups 
and maintained a close connection with left wing secondary schools, the editors of the student 
publication called Student Go and community groups in Ngau Tau Kok Estate.114 On 16 
January, the Association sent a petition letter to the Governor, in which the student activists 
presented themselves as orderly citizens who often sided with the colonial state but expressed 
concerns over the unjust increase:  
 
The Hong Kong administration has weathered crisis after crisis. On each occasion we 
were the first to voice our support of the government and advised heated and heady 
young people against anti-government demonstrations…. However, this time the 
Hong Kong Telephone Company is applying for a 70 per cent increase in charges less 
than a year since the last increase. The Hong Kong public is shocked. We are of 
opinion that the grounds whereon the Telephone Company rests its application are 
inadequate. If the increase come through, other public utilities would follow suit, 
aggravating inflation and miserable economic situation. 115 
 
Nonetheless, beneath this moderate public image, they warned the government of the 
potential consequence of the rate increase: ‘Civil disturbances, could do neither government 
nor governed any good’.116 To avoid being viewed as ‘trouble-makers’, they claimed that 
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their stance had always been ‘to abstain from unhappy incidents’. They also informed the 
Governor that they had already contacted the police force and Home Affairs Department to 
ensure that their rally was held smoothly.117  
 
Although the government announced that a 30 per cent instead of a 70 per cent increase was 
approved on 22 January, the Hong Kong Youth and Students Association did not cease to 
protest. On 26 January, the Association held a mass rally in Kowloon Park. It started with 
100 members of the Association marching from the main gate of to park to the allocated site. 
During the rally, students expressed their anti-colonial agenda. The Association’s Chairman, 
Sui Kai-chung, accused the colonial government of being ‘capitalists exploiting the common 
people’ and demanded the state to give the public a full explanation as to why 30 per cent 
rate increase was allowed. They also urged the government to abolish the Telephone 
Advisory Committee. Instead, these bodies should be replaced by elected members and 
members from the public. The rally was attended by 2,000 people including Urban 
Councillors Denny Huang and Elsie Elliott. Civic leaders from the three other lobbies, for 
example, Edmund Chow and L. K. Ding from the Christian Industrial Committee, Raymond 
Fung and William Shum from the Universal Consumers’ Association and Cecilia Yeung 
from the Reform Club, also participated in the rally.118  
 
This episode led to a clash between Councillors and the colonial government and thus had the 
potential to open up issues about the relationship between Hong Kong representative 
organizations and the executives. Significantly, Elliott advocated unofficial Legislative 
Councillors resign in protest if the colonial government insisted on granting 30 per cent 
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increase in telephone charges.119 However, according to the assessment carried out by A. K. 
Chui, the Director of Home Affairs, the reaction to the rally was ‘very mild and helpfully 
indifferent’.120 Town Talk also reported that public reaction towards the rally appeared to 
‘lack enthusiasm’.121 Some residents believed that the small number of student participants 
was due to the fact that the rally was held during exam periods.122 It could also be attributed 
to the political indifference of the public, which prevented many from engaging in protests 
that directly confronted the government. By late January, it was evident that the campaign 
had not been effective. As ‘public emotion cooled down significantly’.123 These public 
reactions  disappointed student activists: ‘…the extremist groups were talking loosely about 
organizing another rally because these critics were dissatisfied or disappointed with the lack 
of impact from the first one’.124 Apart from the Youth and Students Association, the more 
‘moderate’ HKFS also launched a signature campaign and a sit-in against the Telephone 
Company in making any increase of the telephone rate, jobbery of officials and merchants, 
and the profiteering of public utilities. The signature campaign was held at Ferry Wharves 
and in San Po Kong in late January.125 On 5 February, the HKFS organized a sit-in jointly 
with the Hong Kong University Students’ Union and Hong Kong Federation of Catholic 
Students outside the Legislative Council chamber, to protest against telephone rate increase 
and against public utility profiteering. The sit-in was a joint action between ultra-leftist and 
moderate student groups. About 150 people were assembled. The signature forms containing 
60,000 signatures were hung up. To express their discontent over the 30 per cent rate 
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increase, students made bonfires out of the signature forms they collected.126 Even such 
symbolic behaviour did not receive support from the public. The demonstration indicated that 
the young generation, which often held an anti-colonial agenda, endorsed political activism 
and believed that it was their right to raise their demands through social movements.  
 
On the whole, student bodies and organizations in the educational sector protested in a 
relatively moderate manner. The College Student Association of Hong Kong, for example, 
issued an open letter to the Chairman of Consumer Council on 23 January, urging the 
government to put an end to the monopoly of the Telephone Company as ‘the company’s 
own claim of insufficient present services clearly indicate an acute ‘‘shortage of supply’’’.127 
Some secondary schools and universities also supported this campaign. On 29 January, for 
example, forty-two representatives from a number of secondary schools and universities 
distributed pamphlets to the public at the Star Ferry concourse. They also submitted an open 
letter to the Administrative Secretary of UMELCO, urging the Councillors to give full 
consideration to the matter and inform the public regarding their stance.128 The Hong Kong 
Teachers Association issued a public statement to urge the government to carry out a 
thorough investigation in the financial condition of the Telephone Company in case of the 
presence of any inappropriate corrupt practices.129 These were moderate protests, in a liberal 
tradition, requesting improved information and state regulation. 
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The campaign against telephone rate increases demonstrates that associations of different 
backgrounds collaborated and formed coalitions. Despite the employment of different 
strategies, all activists and participants expected the colonial government to intervene and 
regulate the telephone rate. One can observe that the upper and middle classes flexibly 
adjusted their attitudes towards informal political activities when their interests were 
threatened. Although the campaign was very much led by middle and upper class opinion 
leaders, residents at the grassroots level also demonstrated a capacity for political 
mobilization. Rather than remaining ‘politically quiescent’, kaifongs on a district level and 
residents in resettlement estates formed groups and joined political lobbies. These groups 
often exerted pressure on the government through informal moderate measures, such as 
sending petitions and organizing signature campaigns. Compared to other social classes and 
age groups, students and the young generation who were critics of the colonial government, 
employed more radical strategies, such as organizing demonstrations and sit-ins, to confront 
the colonial state directly.  
 
The political culture in Hong Kong was not monolithic. Yet, in events like this where public 
interests were vastly affected, even groups with different political attitudes and orientations 
collaborated informally and formally in alliances in the pursuit of a common goal. 
 
Government’s Responses and Public Reception 
 
Since the Telephone Company announced its application to increase the telephone rate, the 
colonial government had been monitoring shifting popular sentiments. The Hong Kong City 
District Commissioner instructed the City District Officers of Western District, Eastern 
District, Central and Wan Chai on 6 January to ‘pay special attention to how the public reacts 
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to the proposed telephone rate increase’ and plan strategies to ease tensions.130 These public 
opinion assessments impacted on the colonial state’s ruling strategies as they were passed to 
the Colonial Secretariat to inform decision making.131 The City District Commissioner of 
both Hong Kong and Kowloon were asked to provide the Secretariat of Home Affairs with 
the latest report on public reactions, including main points that had caused public outcry. The 
Hong Kong Special Branch was also required to put forward comments. These reports were 
discussed during the Governor’s Committee meeting on 10 January.132 There was 
considerable pressure on the administration to address the ‘extremely emotive attitude of the 
public’ and ‘defuse the issue’, and it initially decided to encourage public debate and then to 
depoliticize the issue by setting up a special commission or a sub-committee for the 
Telephone Advisory Committee to investigate the legal status of the company.133 
 
In early January, the colonial government was ‘under fire’ as its passive stance had ‘created 
the impression that it is prepared to side with the company’, and disregard the interests of 
consumers.134 In response, the Kowloon City District Commissioner recommended the state 
to take a public standing on the issue as soon as possible by announcing that a decision had 
not been made and the interest of consumers were considered in the government’s decision 
making process. They also suggested that a public statement should be made to clarify that 
the responsibility to explain the company’s financial accounts lay on the company itself, 
rather than the government.135 During their engagements with the public, City District 
Officers were also instructed to take a similar line. Observations of City District Officers 
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indicated the possibility of bankruptcy had little credibility in the public eyes, especially after 
the company has declared a profit of $70 million in 1974. The fact that the company was a 
monopoly also led the public to expect the government to investigate all other possible ways 
to finance its capital expansion programme before approving the rate increase.136  
 
The telephone rate increase continued to be given ‘top priority’ in the City District Offices in 
early 1975.137 City District Officers observed that suspicion that corruption existed in the 
company prevailed. The public believed that the financial difficulties of the company could 
be attributed to ‘serious errors in forecasting the demand and the need of telephone service’ 
as this Forecast Section was not managed by professional expertise. This led the company to 
invest a substantial amount of capital in purchasing equipment and cables.138 In view of this 
situation, the City District Officers pointed out that the government was in a ‘dilemma’:  
 
If the government does not agree to the proposal of the Telephone Company, then it 
will result in mass unemployment for which the government will be held responsible. 
If the government agrees to the Telephone Company’s proposal and gives the 
company entirely what it wants then there will be tremendous pressures from all 
sectors of society, and the consequences of which can be very frightening.139 
 
To ease tensions and prevent the company from going into bankruptcy, they recommended 
that government to consider the company’s proposal ‘very carefully’. Their source also 
suggested that an increase between 25 per cent to 30 per cent may be set as ‘a tolerable limit’ 
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for the year of 1975.140 If the company could survive the financial difficulties this year, ‘it 
would be much better to increase their rates next year’.141 
 
These high level deliberations were kept secret from the public, but action was becoming 
urgently needed, as noted by lower level bureaucrats. In face of a community ‘united against 
the telephone increases’, the Kowloon City District Commissioner pointed out that ‘too much 
delay would only enable attitudes to firm up and radicals to exploit the situation still 
further’.142 He proposed two strategies. The first was to take a public stand on the issue as 
soon as possible. The government should state clearly that it would ‘weight the consumers 
interest against the case of the company’ and ‘take all possible steps to listen to public 
opinions on the issue’.143 The second was to ensure that the issue had a ‘gestation’ so that 
both the cases of the public and the company could be ‘seen in a rational perspective’.144 The 
City District Officers believed that ‘the best way of taking the heat off the situation’ was to 
enlarge the Advisory Committee with members from civic organizations. They also 
recommended that the public should be invited to share their views on the issue with the 
Committees. Once these consultative processes had been conducted, they advised that the 
Committees’ recommendations to be ‘published and ‘debated’ in the Legislative Council.145 
This would have been a significant reform of policy making. 
 
City District Officers’ recommendations were being taken into consideration by the colonial 
government. On 9 January, the Secretariat of Home Affairs assured the City District Officers 
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that no decision would be made before the receipt of recommendations from the Advisory 
Committee on Telephone Services. The government planned to give ‘a detailed explanation 
and justification to the public on the decision taken’. A press statement was also issued on the 
same day by Denis Bray’s office, which it hoped would have ‘calming effect on public 
feeling’.146 
 
On 13 January, there reforms were discussed between the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, 
the Secretary of Home Affairs, the Director of Information Services, the Director of the 
Special Branch and the political advisors at the Government House. A number of 
departments had been keeping a close eye on the telephone rate issue, and also fed into 
decision making at this point. The Special Branch reported that the issue ‘was not one for 
high-level consideration among local communists’ and the Kuomintang elements in the 
colony followed the ‘policy of avoiding direct confrontation’ although some participated 
individually in the protest.147 Nonetheless, it was reported that ‘the real threat’ was from ‘the 
neutral groups’, notably the ‘New Left’, some Urban Councillors and shop tenants. And the 
shop tenants, who would be seriously affected by the rental increase were ‘potentially the 
most dangerous’. The issue had become an ‘emotive’ issue and thus the public reaction was 
‘potentially strong’.148 Although the Universal Consumers’ Association was not considered to 
be a threat, it had gained ‘a good degree of public support’ and was likely to become ‘the 
focal point of the organized protest’.149 As the government ‘had so far not prepared itself for 
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facing a public outcry’, a remedy was required ‘to prevent the situation from getting out of 
hand’.150 
 
The outcome of these deliberations was government approval of an increase as high as the 
public could bear to ensure the continued operation of the Telephone Company. The 
government expressed its dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong Telephone Company’s 
financial situation and recognized that the approved increase may not be sufficient in the long 
run. It also announced of the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, which consisted of a 
judge, a public accountant, ‘a member of the public’ and a government official.151 To follow 
up the issue, the Governor requested the department heads presented to give any further 
thoughts on the matter ‘urgently’ and reach agreement over an action plan with the Colonial 
Secretary. The Secretary of Home Affairs and the Director of Information Service were also 
instructed to draft plans of a publicity campaign to ease tensions.152 The radical option of 
consulting fully with the public and then orchestrating a debate in the Legislative Council 
was not pursued.  
 
The Home Affairs Department continued to monitor shifting public opinions on the issue 
after the meeting. On 17 January, the Secretary of Home Affairs reported to the Governor 
that that ‘people were very cross’ as they disliked monopolies, the proposed percentage of 
increase and the proximity of this application of the last round. There was ‘potential for 
strong public reaction’.153 Therefore, it was recommended that the government should 
‘cultivate the stabilizing forces that exist’ within the majority of the activists who were 
willing to discuss. To reduce discontent, the colonial government had to be seen to take 
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public opinions into consideration. Kowloon City District Officers were instructed to 
encourage people in their districts to share their views. Nonetheless, it was stressed that ‘one 
cannot maintain credibility for too long’ and the government was urged to take a public stand 
as soon as possible. Suggestion was made that the full examinations should be carried out to 
reassure the political lobbies that their views would be considered and any decision in the 
change in telephone rate would be made public.154 
 
In a final settlement, announced on 22 January, the government set up a Commission of 
Inquiry, that would investigate the company’s management structure, debts, liabilities, 
profitability and plans for future. It was also announced that the government would only 
approve a 30 per cent increase in telephone rentals and waive the company’s royalties for 
1974 and 1975. In return for the government’s help, the company was asked to issue no 
dividends to its shareholders and accept a government appointed director in its board.155 
Some of the proposals made by City District Officers were adopted. 
 
The settlement was criticized. People believed that 30 per cent was ‘still too high’ and 
‘unjustified’.156 The setting up of the Commission of Inquiry did not win popular support. 
People viewed it as ‘a plot to mollify public emotions’ and did not understand the logic of 
settling up the Commission now that a rate had been agreed. A minority supported the 
formation of the Commission, as ‘a good move’.157 There were few comments made 
regarding the appointment of director in the company’s board and the arrangement regarding 
dividends. The public simply did not see the benefits.158 The public ‘at large’ was 
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‘aggrieved’. According to the City District Office staff in Kowloon, ‘much frustration 
abounded’ and their respondents were ‘mostly highly charged with emotions’.159 The 
government’s image suffered ‘another new low’ as the increase ‘served another grave blow’ 
to it. Public confidence in the colonial administration was ‘weakened’.160  
 
To accurately assess public reactions on the increase, a random survey was conducted by City 
District Officers in Hong Kong on 23 January. 1,376 people were interviewed. 92 per cent 
disagreed with the 30 per cent increase. Among those who were against the increase, 23 per 
cent insisted that no increase at all should be made. 34 per cent believed that 5 to 10 per cent 
was appropriate. 7 per cent thought an increase of 11 to 15 per cent was appropriate. And 12 
per cent suggested that an increase of 16 to 20 per cent could be accepted. Only 2 per cent 
supported an increase of 21 to 25 per cent.161 Newspapers were also ‘hostile’.162 Fai Po for 
example, reported that ‘reaction from the public is still strong’ and pointed out that the 
increase was ‘absolutely unreasonable’.163 The headline of Hong Kong Times also described 
the 30 per cent increase as ‘a move against public opinion’.164 Both Sing Tao Yat Pao and 
Kung Sheung Daily News quoted Denny Huang’s words and criticized that the government 
had not taken the potential chain reactions which the increase would have into 
consideration.165 Sing Tao Yat Pao also argued that the increase should not be made before 
the completion of the investigation conducted by the Commission of Inquiry.166 In view of 
the negative comments made by the newspapers, the Governor instructed that ‘more should 
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be done to put down government’s package across the press and to impress upon editors in 
the danger of giving too much weight to irresponsible criticism’.167  
 
By the end of January, despite the unpopularity of the 30 per cent rate increase, the campaign 
lost momentum. According to the City District Commissioner of Hong Kong: ‘there are 
indications that the storm is gradually settling for the time being in the sense that the degree 
of hostility is subsiding.’168 It was believed that if the decision on the percentage of increase 
could be postponed until the findings of the Commission of Inquiry were made available, the 
public would find it ‘more palatable’.169 Similar findings were reported in Town Talk. It was 
true that some were still concerned that the government was ‘playing a game of numbers and 
arrived at his decision by mere haggling’.170 Nonetheless, there was on the whole ‘a very 
grudging acceptance’ in the Chinese communities.171 Kaifong associations in Sham Shui Po 
for example, indicated that they were less inclined to join any protest actions planned in the 
future.172 By early February, the public had ‘by large accepted without query that the 
Telephone Company is in a very difficult financial situation’.173 They were now prepared to 
contribute to enable the continual operation of the company. They were also convinced that 
the government had ‘tried its best in finding the fairest and cheapest way so that burden falls 
in the right places’.174 The issue was now merely ‘one of a challenges to our public relations 
efforts’ rather than ‘a serious threat to our social order’ despite the fact that people were still 
‘in an unhappy mood about these bad times’ and there was still concerns that the issue may 
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turn into civil disorder.175 The Director of Home Affairs noted that ‘the people are very much 
on the government’s side’.176 The government concluded that it must respond to dissent by 
improving the flow of information from itself to the people. It must try ‘hardest to convince 
them that government is very much on their side as well’, presenting data and facts were of 
‘paramount importance’. Government decisions must be communicated, including a refusal 
to make the accounts of the company public.177  
 
The dispute had not led to a reform of modes of political communication. Once tensions had 
eased, the Legislative Council approved unanimously a 30 per cent increase in telephone rate. 
On 8 February, the composition of the Committee of Inquiry was also announced. The 
Committee was consisted of Alastair Blair-Kerr; Gordon MacWhinnie, the Chairman of the 
Hong Kong Society of Accountant; John Soong, the Chairman and Managing Director of 
Mobil Oil in Hong Kong; C. P. Hung, the President of Chinese Manufacturers Association; L 
.K. Ding, the Chairman of the Christian Industrial Committee, the largest lobby in the 
campaign; and Lydia Dunn, the Director of Swire and Maclaine.178 The Committee was 
dominated by business and professional elites. 
 
The colonial government closely monitored shifting public opinions. City District Officers 
were particularly active, making daily observations based on contacts with the ‘man in the 
street’. The Home Affairs Department, the Division of Information Services and the Special 
Branch also checked political activism and popular responses towards the issue constantly. 
Reports and recommendations were passed to the Governor and advisory committees. 
Shifting public sentiments shaped the government responses. Only 30 per cent of increase 
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was approved. Informal consultation with the public, publicity campaigns and the 
appointment of a Commission of Inquiry were devised to respond to and weaken the 
campaign. A reformist colonial administration was increasingly responsive to public opinions 
as it was being reshaped by subtle shifts in political culture. However, these social and 
political process did not create the conditions for more profound institutional reform.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Compared to many other issues, such as increase in public housing rents, the increase in 
telephone rate was regarded by the Governor as ‘potentially explosive’, as people of all social 
classes and age groups were affected.179 And the proposed rate increase generated ‘colony-
wide protest’. At least ninty-three organizations of different sectors and backgrounds took 
part.180 Individuals of different social classes, including kaifongs and residents at grassroots 
level, community leaders, Urban Councillors, clansmen, businessmen, workers, teachers and 
students were motivated by both instrumental and ideological concerns. Many boycotted the 
Telephone Company, the main mechanism of protest which put pressure on the colonial 
government to limit or scrap the rate increase. This reveals how the political culture was 
shifting, with civic organizations mobilizing and actively lobbying the government. Even the 
upper and middle classes, who often disapproved of political activism, joined the campaign 
and used informal political activities to express their grievances. In this instance, their 
material interests were threatened. 
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Different methods were used to put pressure on the Telephone Company and the colonial 
government. Learning from previous campaigns, moderate informal political channels, such 
as sending petitions, organizing signature campaigns and writing to newspaper editors, were 
predominantly used. These forms of political communication were fundamentally liberal but 
underpinning this civil action was a collective memory of ‘civil disturbance’ of the 1960s. In 
addition, but on the margins, radical groups and radicalized individuals organizing rallies and 
sit-ins to confront the colonial state directly. There were different political cultures, with the 
young generation more radical in outlook and in practice. Nonetheless, these student activists 
were also aware that most Hong Kong Chinese were relatively conservative and did not want 
institutions reformed. To appeal for public support, students presented themselves as orderly 
citizens who complied with laws during the rallies. Regardless of differences in methods 
adopted, the anti-telephone rate increase campaign shows that the Hong Kong Chinese were 
willing to voice their opposition and expected the colonial government to intervene and 
regulate whenever their material interests were threatened.  
 
The colonial government monitored social attitudes during the protest movements. Shifting 
popular sentiments were observed by City District Officers, using mechanism such as 
situation reports and Town Talk. Departments, such as City District Offices, the Home 
Affairs Department, the Division of Information Service and the Special Branch were all 
involved monitoring public opinions, checking political activism and comprising special 
reports for the Governor and his Committee. By collecting intelligence on popular attitudes, 
the colonial government improved its decision-making capacity and sought to demonstrate 
that it was responding rationally to the protest. Official responses of the City District Officers 
were tailored and the public was consulted to alleviate general grievances. This weakened the 
campaign. A Commission of Inquiry was also set up.  
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These social and political processes had a moderate effect: the increase was set at 30 per cent, 
lower than 55 per cent that was advised by the Telephone Advisory Committee. This 
outcome was also however symbolically important: it showed that a reformist colonial 
administration was responsive to shifting public opinions, and thus had the potential to 
further encourage the development of civil society, newspapers and social movements 
mobilizing on specific issues. 
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V.       The Campaign to Reopen the Precious Blood  
     Golden Jubilee Secondary School 
 
 
The Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School dispute, which lasted from February 
1977 to July 1978, was ‘one of the most significant political acts’ in the 1970s due to its scale 
and intensity.1 After a decade of political turmoil in China, Hong Kong people increasingly 
identified themselves with the colony.2 The legitimacy of the colonial state had also been 
enhanced by the implementation of reforms responding to popular demands, including 
legalizing Chinese as the official language of Hong Kong and setting up the ICAC, as 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Nonetheless, the colonial government still faced challenges in 
the late 1970s. People engaged in informal and formal activities to press for political and 
social changes. With the establishment of the ICAC, the public began to believe that the 
colonial government was willing to face up to its shortcomings. The young generation, in 
particular, became increasingly critical of the colonial administration. They were intolerant of 
any corruption. To express their grievances, they were willing to take direct actions. The 
Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School dispute was the most commonly known 
example which involved student activism. 
 
In early 1977, teachers found evidence of the financial mismanagement at the Precious Blood 
Golden Jubilee Secondary School. It led to a student campaign that captured the attention of 
the press and the public, and which presented a positive image of the school. Even so, the 
Education Department ordered its closure. The campaign allows historians to evaluate the 
organizational capacity of young people. It involved sit-ins, signature campaigns, 
demonstrations and petitions. Young people were in the ‘political centre’ in the campaign and 
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that ‘society was divided’ over the protest. For example, around 100 priests and sisters 
disapproved of the student activism and stated their support for the Education Department. 
Some newspapers also critiqued the campaign, arguing that students were being manipulated 
by radicalized teachers. As Lam Wai-man highlighted, the campaign raised concerns that 
radical political activism could undermine political stability.3 The event occurred only ten 
years after the riots of 1967. This chapter reinvestigates this activism, exploring the impact of 
class and age.4 It also uses policy files in Hong Kong and London to establish to what extent 
political activism influenced the colonial administration’s ruling strategies.  
 
Shifted Sentiments within the Teachers and Students 
 
The Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School was a Catholic government-aided 
college opened in September 1973. In the 1970s, most schools in Hong Kong were 
academically orientated as success in examinations was the main way that young people 
gained access to well-paid employment, and for a select elite, university education.5 The 
colonial administration controlled the curriculums of schools to counter the spread of 
Communist influence, with the study of contemporary China not in the main included. 
Political topics were confined to ‘a description of the structure and functions of government 
departments’. 6 Contrary to most schools in Hong Kong, which placed an emphasis on 
maintaining disciplines and on examination performance, the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee 
Secondary School experimented using a ‘new’ approach in education.7 The school 
deemphasized examination results. Instead it stressed the importance of ‘discussions, 
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dialogue, mutual assistance, respect’ and adopted a ‘questioning approach’ in learning,8 
Students were exposed to matters of public affairs and debated social justices, and were 
trained to become responsible citizens. The school’s innovative teaching style gained the 
approval from the School of Education of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which 
selected the school for demonstrations for its students, from 1973 to 1976.9 
 
In the beginning of 1977, a number of teachers approached the principal, Sister Leung, about 
financial malpractices of the school and overcharging of student fees. These teachers 
suspected the school administration was corrupt. Leung had recruited a number of teachers 
with ‘Trotskyite views’ and left the running of the school to one of them. She was also 
allegedly engaged in these fraudulent activities.10 Teachers at the school reported Leung to 
the ICAC in February for financial mismanagement. Yet, no action was taken as the teachers 
refused to allow the ICAC to refer their allegations to the Education Department.11 In the 
spring of 1977, a Trotskyite teacher tried to blackmail Leung into letting his group to take 
control of the school. Leung refused and resigned. The management committee was informed 
about her financial malpractices. The incident was then referred to the Education Department, 
which sent an audit team to inspect the school and reform its administration. The allegations 
of financial mismanagement coupled with reforms caused mass demonstrations and a two-
day sit-ins involving both teachers and pupils in June 1977.  
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This initial campaign led the Director of Education to send warning letters to the thirty-five 
teachers involved. Half of these teachers, led by Chan Chung Ling, demanded the withdrawal 
of these letters of complaint. With Sister Leung convicted in February 1978, they erroneously 
claimed that they were held responsible for revealing the financial mismanagement of the 
school and hence were being victimized. They had actually reported these activities to the 
Education Department three days after the audit team was sent to the school and ten days 
after the school’s management committee had informed the Director of Education regarding 
the possibility of financial mismanagement.12 As a result, the warning letters were not 
withdrawn.  
 
A new principal, Hilda Kwan, was appointed in September. Kwan took a firm stand. She 
dissolved the student union and suspended all activities. Many affected students were 
dissatisfied: ‘Since the dissolution of the student union, the activities that were organized by 
it can no longer be held. And since some ordinary activities have been cancelled from the 
school calendar, such as Speech Day, Drama Day, we lack normal activities.’13 Kwan also 
attempted to segregate the new students and teachers from the old ones by holding two 
assemblies daily: one for Form One students and one for students of Form Two and above.14 
The school however gave no public explanation for the financial mismanagement to the 
students. Students came to believe therefore that the school’s administration was ‘on the one 
hand, avoiding its responsibility; on the other hand, persecuting the teachers unreasonably’.15 
Discontentment increased. The school had poorly handled the allegations of institutional 
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maladministration. A student tried to mobilize her peers and expressed her discontent over 
the school’s unjust arrangement in CU Student:  
 
Just people! Don’t fall. Or else the weak people walking in the dark will lose their 
only guiding light. Just people! Don’t leave us. I am afraid I will lose my rationality 
because of this. Just people! We will respect and love you forever…. If you imprison 
the truth, bury it under the ground, it will grow endlessly, and explosive power will 
accumulate. One day it will explode and override all obstacles.16 
 
In April 1978, a new supervisor, Sister Lorraine Turcotte, sent out thirteen warning letters to 
the teachers involved. As this new initiative was interpreted as an attempt to dismiss these 
teachers, protests escalated. This led to four student representatives being suspended for two 
weeks and four others were warned that they had infringed the ‘personal freedom’ of the 
principal. Students also alleged that they had been assaulted by non-academic staff. Student 
discontentment escalated: 
 
On 1 May 1978, a morning with nice weather, students attended lessons like they did 
usually. The parents of three students were called one after another to see the 
principal. After that, their daughters were also being called to see the principal. They 
were being suspended for two weeks! Simply because they once represented the 
students to demand the school to investigate the school bag-searching incident; they 
were also engaged in actions ‘seizing’ the principal, vice-principal and other teachers, 
‘disrupting’ the normal order of the school. Parents found the way the school 
penalized their children unreasonable and demanded the school to explain these 
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ambiguous statements and withdraw the penalty… but they did not receive a 
reasonable reply…. We are angry, we hate that the school penalized the students 
unreasonably! (We hate that the school) ignored the demands of the parents! (We hate 
that the school) neglected the reasonable enquiries of the students!17 
 
On 4 May, parents approached the Chairman of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ 
Union, Szeto Wah, for assistance. Szeto attempted to contact the principal, the Education 
Department, the ICAC and the Catholic Board of Education to ‘ease the situation’. This was 
to no avail. Szeto, nonetheless, received a reprimand from the Education Department for his 
involvement in the incident.18 The chain of events was controversial as students believed they 
were being treated unfairly by a high-handed principal. Teachers were also being viewed as 
victims in the disclosure of the school’s fraudulent financial malpractices. The issuing of 
reprimand, in particular was contested as an infringement of union rights.  
 
Political Activism and Increased Press Coverage 
 
On 5 May, the Education Department issued a statement asserting that it had complete 
confidence in Kwan and sanctioned her to maintain discipline in the school. The 
government’s endorsement led 440 students, eighteen teachers and twenty parents to march 
to Government House to petition the Governor. On 6 May, they marched to the Caritas 
centre, next to the Bishop’s residence, and requested to see the Bishop. About twenty 
students camped outside his residence; several of them and their parents, and sixteen teachers 
stayed outside the residence for two nights. About 300 students participated in the sit-in. 
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They accused Kwan of being a fascist and the school of being corrupt.19 They demanded the 
immediate resignation of Kwan, the resumption of classes of suspended students and the 
withdrawal of warning letters. They also requested that the government investigate the 
complaints from students that they were assaulted and their school bags were searched.20 The 
sit-ins and demonstrations had made it impossible for any normal school work to continue. 
As MacLehose noted, there was ‘a danger of trouble escalating’ and the organization of the 
school might collapse under strain.  
 
On 14 May, the Director of Education therefore ordered the closure of the school.21 It was 
announced that a new secondary school would be set up in September under the same 
principal and supervisor. New terms were included in the teachers’ contracts. They were 
prohibited from engaging in political activities. Permission had to be obtained from the 
principal before anyone could put up posters and assemble after school. The use of school 
premises without permission was prohibited. The school management committee also 
reserved the right to dismiss any employees who failed to observe the new terms.22 As a 
result, the sixteen teachers involved in sit-ins were unable to extend their contracts. The 
teachers complained to the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union. An ad hoc coalition 
formed to engage in activism in support of the teachers: this include the All Hong Kong 
Committee to Strive to Reopen the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School, which 
consisted of a range of representative social groups, including students organizations, 
educational bodies, religious groups and labour organizations.23  
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The incident was widely reported in newspapers. According to ‘Opinions’ in the Chinese 
Press Review, public opinions were divided on the government handling of the issue: ‘at least 
eight papers came out in support of the Education Department’s decision, but an equal 
number of papers disagreed with or had reservations about the move’.24 Wah Kiu Yat Po, for 
instance, described the state’ decision as ‘wise’25. Both Sing Tao Yat Pao and Hong Kong 
Times endorsed the government’s measures, stating that would ‘win public support’.26 The 
Hong Kong Daily News argued that the school’s closure was the only way of ‘ending the 
trouble quickly’.27 Other newspapers were critical. Tin Tin Yat Po captured the discontent of 
some parties involved: ‘Students feel aggrieved. Teachers say it is revenge. And parents 
demand explanation.’28 It condemned the decision made by the Education Department as 
‘undemocratic’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘abrupt’, ‘high-handed’. Closing the school was a typical 
example of ‘colonialism’ and the ‘final judgement rules that the Education Department is 
guilty’.29 The leftist press, Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao, condemned the decision to close 
the school. Wen Wai Pao argued that the state’s move would only aggravate the situation and 
Ta Kung Pao believed that students’ and parents’ interest should be given ‘the greatest 
weight’.30 Community leader, L. K. Ding, accused the colonial government of showing ‘the 
ugly aspects of colonialism’.31 
 
In response to the school’s closure, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ 
Union, Szeto Wah petitioned the Governor on 16 May. He justified the reopening of the 
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school by arguing that the closure was against public interest: ‘And the whole of Hong Kong 
was startled. The consequence that this decision may lead to will make people worry all 
more’.32 He also requested the formation of a special committee, consisted of John Wu, the 
Roman Catholic Bishop, Peter Cheung, the Vice Chairman of Diocesan Justice and Peace 
Commission, Father Thomas Kwan and Father John Tong, to carry out an ‘in-depth fact-
finding survey’ to settle the affairs fully.33 Decisions regarding the alteration of the name and 
sponsoring organization of the school, the retention of the principal and renewal of contracts 
with the teachers, could not be made before the committee had finished its investigations.34 
The representatives of teachers, students and parents also petitioned Colvyn Haye, the Acting 
Director of Education. They claimed that the Education Department had only listened to an 
‘one-sided report’ of the school authorities before issuing the statement, evidence of 
‘prejudice and rashness’. The closure neglected ‘the suggestion made by the public’. They 
protested that the ‘high-handed policy’ was against the wish of parents, students, teachers and 
demanded the reopening of the school.35 To enlist public support, Szeto made use of the press 
and warned the public the arbitrary implication behind the incident. The rhetoric of ‘law and 
order’ was invoked: ‘Closing the school is a rude move and is worrisome; if the policy is to 
continue the community will be a state of disorder.’36 
 
The campaign captured the public’s attention. Newspaper coverage of the dispute expanded. 
According to ‘Opinions’, the incident ‘continued to be a major talking point in the Chinese 
press and attracted no fewer than ten editorials’.37 Although some newspapers were 
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sympathetic, most reports disapproved of the campaign, an indication of political 
conservatism. Hong Kong Daily News for example felt that the ‘major error’ was the boycott 
of classes initiated by teachers and students.38 Sing Tao Yat Pao said that the campaign had 
developed into a social issue, which would ‘adversely affect social stability’: ‘Anyone 
concerned with the security of Hong Kong is worried about the situation because Hong Kong 
is in a delicate position and any small trouble will bring undesirable effects.’39  
 
One of the reasons behind this negative publicity was a perceived association with the leftists. 
In May 1977, a pro-Taiwan newspaper, Wan Ren Jih Pao already implicated that it was the 
left-wing teachers who blackmailed the principal.40 By 1978, many newspapers suggested 
that the teachers were politically motivated. Some teachers were believed to have Trotskyite 
backgrounds. For example, Wai Wing-kwong, one of the teachers involved, was the 
President of Grantham College of Education Student Union from 1972 to 1973, when the 
Union was controlled by the pro-Chinese Communist Fraction. Back in 1972, Wai was 
convicted of unlawful assembly.41 South China Morning Post also pointed out that the 
campaign was backed by leftist organizations, including Marxists Revolutionary League, the 
Progressive Students and October Review.42 The potential connection between the campaign 
and on-going sedition by leftists was also highlighted by a range of mainstream Chinese 
language newspapers. Sing Tao Yat Pao suggested that ‘the issue is soon to blow up into a 
social campaign which smacks of a ‘‘mass struggle’’’. The choice of the term ‘mass struggle’ 
associated the movement with the leftists, as this was a concept referred to Maoist strategies 
of political mobilization. Maoism adhered to a ‘mass line’ agenda, in which populism was 
																																																						
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 2. 
40 Lam, Understanding the Political Culture, p. 172. 
41 FCO 40/1002, ‘Precious Blood Secondary School’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 26 June 1978. 
42 FCO 40/1002, ‘HKU Chief to Lead Inquiry’, South China Morning Post, 17 May 1978. 
	 239	
emphasized. It was believed that the masses, including the rural peasants, embodied ‘great 
social activism’. Revolutions could only be successful by mobilizing the peasant mass.43 
Kung Sheung Evening News condemned the ‘group of subversive elements’ who were with 
‘ulterior motives’ and ‘waiting for the opportunities to disturb our social order to achieve 
their own ends’.44 Some newspapers even compared the campaign with the 1967 leftist riots. 
Oriental Daily reported a home-made bomb was found in the street:  
 
Looking back at 1967 when uncountable genuine and fake ‘home-made bombs’ were 
found, the consequence were casualties, disturbances of people’s daily life and an 
economic recession…. The using of ‘home-made bombs’ is not the right way to solve 
the problem. It will only result in the loss of lives or the problem of one school 
becoming the problem of the society as a whole.45  
 
The Express similarly made this connection:  
 
There are ‘bad elements’ in our midst exploiting innocent children.…This is a terrible 
fact which has appeared more than once in Hong Kong, the most obvious being the 
riots of 1967. These bad elements are in fact demagogues and these school children 
are easily taken by their sweet lies and inflammatory talks and become their tools.46  
 
This coverage linking the dispute with leftist activism deterred people from supporting 
action, a conservative legacy of 1967.  
 
The public’s fear of disorder and political conservatism was also reflected in Sister Lorraine’s 
public announcements. Her rhetoric revealed the society’s emphasis on discipline and order:  
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Discipline is fundamental in the homes, schools and institutions which constitute 
civilized societies. If we sacrifice (it), we lose everything. There are ways and ways of 
complaining about alleged injustices. Sit-ins, marches, intimidation and abuse are not 
the right ways. The methods adopted by some teachers have disrupted one unhappy 
school, but the firm action of the authorities in closing the school rather than tolerate 
continued demonstrations of contempt for law, order and discipline there, must be 
supported by all right thinking people.47 
 
She appealed for public support by suggesting that the Education Department’s decision to 
close the school was the right decision. Her speech reveals that radical political activism was 
not mainstream. 
 
How did newspaper coverage influence public opinions? According to MacLehose, ‘there has 
not been much public sympathy for the sixteen teachers’ and it appeared that most criticisms 
against the school’s closure derived from sympathy for the pupils whose education has been 
disrupted’.48 This view was particularly common among middle-aged and elderly groups, 
who showed ‘strong misgiving and distrust towards the government in China’ and remained 
‘the stronghold of anti-communist sentiments and convictions’.49 Even the petition letter 
drafted by the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union acknowledged that ‘the public at 
large and most sections of the press in Hong Kong we have met only with indifference, 
insult’.50 The Hong Kong Subsidized Secondary Schools Council for example, supported the 
closure of the school and believed that the Education Department had ‘acted responsibly’. 
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The Council asserted that the campaign initiated by teachers and students had ‘badly 
disrupted’ the school’s function and therefore it should not remain open.51 The Hong Kong 
Council of the Church of Christ in China also issued a press release and endorsed the closure. 
It described the government’s decision to close the school as a ‘prompt action’ which was 
‘justifiable’. It disapproved of activism by students and appealed to the public to consider 
‘discipline as a prerequisite’ for the operation of any schools in Hong Kong.52 
 
Nonetheless, the campaign successful solicited substantial support from some post-secondary 
students. About 370 post-secondary students, who were either Catholics or former pupils of 
Catholic schools, signed an open letter, demanding Bishop Wu to request the Education 
Department to reopen the school. These students intended to expand the publicity of the 
campaign by sending a petition to Pope Paul VI.53 The Leimukshui Caritas Centre also 
handed in a petition to the Bishop, urging him to consider the matter seriously. The petition 
was signed by more than 100 of its young members.54 To press for the reopening of the 
school, Golden Jubilee pupils wore red-arm bands inscribing the slogan ‘Return the Golden 
Jubilee to Us’, gathered at the cathedral on the same day. The pupils were soon joined by 
more than 100 parents and 200 post-secondary students. They then issued a joint statement, 
revealing that they had formed an action committee to campaign for the reopening of the 
school. The statement also claimed that they would continue having marathon sit-ins (two 
teachers at a time) and soliciting support from other organizations.55 Some post-secondary 
students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong University and the 
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Hong Kong Polytechnic University also showed support to the movement by offering free 
tutorials to the affected students. About 200 of them volunteered to act as tutors. The Hong 
Kong Federation of Students was involved in coordinating the tutorials. The 400 students 
from the Golden Jubilee School were divided into nineteen groups, each led by a group of 
post-secondary students who had just finished their final exams. The tutorials started on 23 
May.56  
 
The campaign was endorsed by staff in higher education. On 23 May, 205 staff and teachers 
from the University of Hong Kong issued a signed statement, expressing opposition to the 
Education Department’s decision.57 A joint statement urging the Education Department to 
investigate the matter before any interventions was signed by twenty-seven people.58 A group 
of staff from the Chinese University of Hong Kong made use of newspapers to air their 
grievances and obtain popular support. They claimed that they were ‘astounded’ by the 
Education Department’s decision, which demonstrated that ‘the true democracy is still 
beyond the reach of the people in Hong Kong’:  
 
School discipline might have been violated. But a school is not a military organization 
where discipline and order have the highest priority.…Students are taught to 
distinguish between right and wrong, think independently and have a sense of 
justice…If students are ignored, any sensible communication will be broken. Mutual 
suspicion and dislike will dominate.59 
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By suspending the operation of the school, the colonial administration disregarded the 
feelings and grievances of the students, teachers and parents.60 Apart from lecturers, twenty-
four priests in Hong Kong issued a statement to express their ‘deepest regrets’. They publicly 
endorsed the petition made by Szeto Wah and disapproved of the decision made by the 
Education Department, describing it as ‘a judgement without trial for the sixteen teachers’. 
They also argued such ‘injustice’ should not be accepted by the Catholic Church.61 In July, 
the campaign reached its climax. Thirty students from the Polytechnic and Baptist College 
escalated their action by starting a hunger strike outside the Bishop’s Office, protesting 
against the school’s closure.62 The action was condemned by some newspapers. Kung Sheung 
Evening News for instance argued that the hunger strikes ‘make one feel that they have gone 
from reasoning to exerting pressure through threats’.63 On 9 July, a demonstration was held 
and was attended by 4,000 people. Four days later, a signature campaign was organized. 
30,000 signatures were soon collected, indicating the scale of the movement was 
considerable.64 
 
Understanding the ‘weak bargaining position’ and possessing limited resources for mass 
mobilization, as Lui and Chiu pointed out, activists often rallied support of a third party to 
exert pressure on the colonial government.65 The Golden Jubilee dispute was no exception. 
To press for the resumption of the school, activists attempted to obtain support in Britain. A 
pressure group, the Education Action Group, first petitioned MP, Janet Fookes, informing her 
the ‘very shocking and unreasonable event’ and persuading her to intervene in this ‘arbitrary’ 
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and ‘gross injustice’. They portrayed the closure of the Golden Jubilee School as ‘high-hand 
authoritarian attitude and action’ which was widely condemned by community leaders, 
groups and organizations.66 This petition led Fookes to write to David Owen, the Foreign 
Secretary, on 3 June. On behalf of the students, parents and teachers, the Hong Kong 
Professional Teachers’ Union also petitioned Gorowny-Roberts, the Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs and MPs, including Frank Hooley and Tony Benn, pressing for the reopening 
of the school. To enlist support, the organization similarly claimed that the action taken by 
the Education Department was ‘high handed, groundless and unjust’, especially given that the 
sit-ins were ‘peaceful’.67 Although sit-ins and hunger strikes initiated by the students and 
teachers were not endorsed by the public, the rhetoric the Professional Teachers’ Union 
employed strategically portrayed the school’s closure as against interests of the public:  
 
The high-handed measure of the Education Department has shocked the citizens of 
Hong Kong and the reluctance of the government to listen to the public opinions has 
prompted into parents teachers and students to decision to make representation to the 
members of Parliament in England despite the heavy expenses.68  
 
In June, Wai wing-kwong and Fan May-yung, two of the teachers involved in the incident, 
visited London for two weeks to air their grievances to MPs.  
 
The campaign attracted the attention of British MPs, in particular the Labour MP, Robert 
Perry, who asked eight questions regarding the Golden Jubilee incident during parliamentary 
discussion on 28 June 1978. In the meeting of the Labour Party International Executive 
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Committee, Joan Lestor, raised the subject of the Golden Jubilee dispute.69 After some 
discussions, the Committee agreed to express concern and asked the Secretary of State for the 
provision of facts. They pressed David Owen, the Foreign Secretary for the publication of all 
the details of financial irregularities and ensure no teachers and teachers were victimized. 70 
On 20 July, the two teachers met with a group of Labour MPs, including Parry, James 
Johnson, James Lamond, Martin Flannery and Dennis Canavan. The activists seemed to have 
captured the sympathy of these MPs, who ‘were mostly impressed with them and thought 
they had been treated shabbily’.71 The campaign also received support from the Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, which believed the closure of the school and the 
dismissal of the teachers was ‘a blatant injustice’.72 These foreign support put further 
pressure on the colonial government to respond to the campaign. 
 
Apart from students and teachers of the school, a number of educational and religious 
organizations participated in the campaign, and they employed a wide-range of strategies: 
organizing demonstrations and sit-ins, signature campaigns, sending petitions and issuing 
public joint statements. To justify their demands, activists often presented the action taken by 
the colonial administration as unjust and against the public will. The rhetoric of ‘law and 
order’ was repeatedly invoked by activists who emphasized the potential negative 
consequence the arbitrary closure had on the society’s order. To exert pressure on the 
colonial state effectively, activists also solicited support from Labour MPs in London. The 
campaign also captured the attention of the public, and in particular, from people in the 
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educational sector. This shows the increasingly sophisticated organizational and networking 
skills of the young activists. Nonetheless, the campaign still met with opposition. Many 
newspapers disapproved of the student activism and compared the campaign with the 1967 
riots, hinting that the activists were associated with violent leftists. 
 
Government’s Responses  
 
The colonial government assessed the potential public responses before making the decision 
to close the school:  
 
We expect the closure order to lead to some further demonstrations and a considerable 
amount of publicity in the press. The Professional Teachers’ Union may complain that 
the sixteen are being unfairly treated. Some other schools may join in. But we doubt if 
support for the sixteen will be widespread, both because exams are now on and 
because their cause in itself will not be seen by many as worthy to support.73  
 
To avoid similar events from reoccurring, the Executive Council advised the appointment of 
a Committee of Inquiry. Dr. Rayson Huang, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Hong 
Kong, a Legislative Councillor and a member of the Board of Education became the 
Chairman.  
 
After the school’s closure, the colonial administration continued to monitor shifting public 
opinions and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office used MOOD to assess responses to the 
campaign in Hong Kong. Most importantly, the content found in the telegram sent by 
MacLehose to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 31 May 1978 resembled closely to 
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the MOOD report which was published a week ago. On 24 May, MOOD described the mixed 
opinions found in the society:  
 
Overall public reaction was still very mixed, different people taking different sides 
according to their own education background, convictions and basic attitudes. The 
government’s publicity efforts to redress the balance during the next few days were 
successful to some extent in enabling the public to see the situation in better 
perspective…. Unfortunately, this message came rather late and the more critical 
sectors of the public were inclined to be incredulous…. There was still not much 
support for the sixteen teachers. Only radical students, free thinkers and critics of the 
government sympathized with them. However, there was much more sympathy 
towards the displaced students whose schooling had been thus disrupted...Secondary 
and post-secondary students, were inclined to criticize the closure of the school as 
suppressive and Draconian action.74 
 
Similar records were found in the Governor’s telegram:  
 
Vocal opinion is split fairly down the middle between those supporting and those 
opposing the government’s action. Much of the criticism is directed at the closure 
itself and appears to have derived from sympathy for the pupils whose education has 
been disrupted…. There has not been much public sympathy for the sixteen teachers 
who claimed to have been victimized for revealing financial mismanagement of the 
school…. Nevertheless, the revelation of this earlier complaint has understandably 
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caused confusion and some damage to the Education Department and government’s 
credibility. Some people have clearly found it difficult to believe the true situation.75 
 
The assessment by MOOD revealed that the secondary and post-secondary students were 
‘particularly sensitive and resentful to any government measure which appeared to them to be 
high-handed or dictatorial’.76 In encountering the tutorial classes organized by radical post-
secondary students, the non-interventionist approach was deliberately taken by the Education 
Department as it was believed that ‘to do so (intervene) would have brought post-secondary 
students directly into the arena’.77 It instead offered to place Golden Jubilee students in other 
schools.  
 
The major intervention involved setting up of a Committee of Inquiry. This was created to 
ensure that ‘decisions would be taken on an intelligent understanding of community 
aspirations and sensitivities’ and respond to the call for ‘more opportunities for public 
consultation’.78 A ‘public invitation’ was issued to invite citizens to share their views on the 
incident.79 Goronwy Roberts, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, was aware of the public confusion regarding the incident, as 
revealed in MOOD. To reduce ‘prevailing tension and distrust’, he recommended the 
Director of Education to ‘make public his findings of the financial mismanagement’ of the 
school and make clarifications regarding the school’s closure and its change of sponsorship.80  
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The report of the Inquiry was soon published on 14 July. Public opinions influenced how the 
government responded to the incident. 
 
According to MOOD, the incident posed a debate about ‘whether Hong Kong’s education 
system aimed to produce such radical thinking graduates as teachers’.81 There were also 
worries that conflicts and danger would emerge if ‘radical graduates like the Chan group 
were to be employed by institutions whose management and leadership belong to a 
conservative school’.82 These concerns were central to investigations. On 5 October 1978, it 
was announced in the Executive Council that ‘proposals to strengthen the Education 
Department will be put forward shortly’.83 There would be ‘extensive consultation’.84 In the 
final report issued, the Committee of Inquiry urged the Education Department to ‘examine 
whether it has sufficient capabilities in responding to grievances’. As the aided schools were 
not directly responsible for the colonial government, the Education Department was the 
statutory authority which was in charge of the operation of the sector. It was therefore crucial 
for the department to ‘handle grievances at all levels’ appropriately so that officials could 
understand ‘the grassroots level, attitudes and feelings of the community they serve(d)’. By 
reviewing the department’s capabilities, it could ‘maintain the credibility of the government 
and the community’s confidence in it’.85 This strongly suggests that the government’s 
perceptions of public opinions fed into the policy making process.  
 
The colonial administration did not only monitor changing popular sentiments in Hong Kong, 
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but also in Britain. The Hong Kong and General Department closely observed the situation in 
the United Kingdom and ruled that ‘there has been no Parliamentary, press or public interest 
in the disturbances’.86 Despite the lack of interest in Britain, William Quantrill pointed out 
that the financial mismanagement and the fact that the school’s administrators ‘were trying to 
take a more enlightened and progressive approach to education’, ‘could ‘attract attention 
here’, and hence ‘win them more sympathy than they probably deserved’. He therefore 
suggested that they should ‘keep ourselves informed’.87 The publicity of the campaign 
expanded to Britain in mid-1978 when the teachers petitioned the MPs and visited London. 
When the teachers, with the support of the Labour MPs, requested to meet with the Minister 
of State in London, the Hong Kong and General Department assessed potential public 
responses:  
 
A blunt refusal to receive the teachers at all would however appear discourteous, and 
might attract criticism from the MPs and trade unionists who have interested 
themselves in this case. I therefore recommend that the teachers should be offered a 
meeting with officials as an alternative to one with the Minister of State.88  
 
At the end, Robin McLaren met with two teachers.  
 
Although it was observed that the situation was ‘beginning to quieten down’ and ‘press 
coverage is getting less extensive’ in late May, the colonial government continued to monitor 
popular sentiments. With the support of the Labour MPs, the activists pressurized the colonial 
state to make concessions. In July, the Committee of Inquiry recommended establishing an 
additional new school, Ng Yuk School alongside the St. Teresa Secondary School (formerly 
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Golden Jubilee Secondary School) to ‘accommodate those who do not accept the 
arrangements announced by the supervisor’.89 And parents and students were at liberty to 
enroll with either institution. In order to ease discontent among the teachers, the Committee 
of Inquiry advised that invitations of teacher post applications should be sent to those who 
were not offered a contract extension in St. Teresa Secondary School.90 Before the 
Committee of Inquiry published the final report, the Executive Council assessed the public’s 
potential response:  
 
There was considerable interest in Huang Committee’s Interim Report, but the 
opening of classes in the new Ng Yuk School, one of its principal recommendations, 
in the event give rise to little publicity, and there has been little press or public interest 
since then. It is considered that the Final Report is likely to be acceptable to the public 
at large, who would see it as satisfactory end to an issue which might have had more 
serious repercussions on the community had it not been handled judiciously and 
expeditiously.91 
 
This indicates that public opinions were taken into consideration in the policy making 
process. Foreseeing the unlikelihood of public disquiet, the final report was soon translated 
into Chinese on 4 September and published in the public domain on 31 October.  
 
The publication of the Final Report ‘was widely reported by all dailies’.92 All Chinese 
newspapers, except Hong Kong Times, mentioned the report. The report stated that the 
decision to close the school should not be made by Education Department alone, but by the 
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Governor-in Council. The report was widely welcomed by the press. Ming Pao, for example, 
described the investigation as ‘impartial’ and ‘unbiased’ and praised the ‘reasonable 
recommendations’, which could set an example in dealing with other disputes in the future.93 
Sing Tao Yat Pao believed that the recommendations could prevent similar events from 
recurring.94 Kung Sheung Evening News called the report ‘a piece of marvelous work’ and 
said ‘the public was satisfied’ with it.95 Even Urban Councillor Elsie Elliott publicly asserted 
that the proposals in the report were good, given that they were implemented by the colonial 
administration.96 
 
This section reveals how the public opinions influenced colonial government in handling the 
Golden Jubilee disputes. Ever since the emergence of the campaign, the state monitored 
shifting popular attitudes towards the incident. These public opinions, which were collected 
through the covert formal institution MOOD and the supervision of mass media, were 
subsequently fed back to high ranked civil servants, directly influencing the state’s ruling 
strategies. This demonstrates that on the one hand, the government possessed organizational 
means to understand the changing sentiments of the Chinese communities; on the other hand, 
far from being atomistic, the Hong Kong Chinese, in particular the young generation, did not 
hesitate to voice their grievances, expecting the colonial state to respond to their demands.  
 
Political Culture 
 
As Lam has pointed out, ‘as more actions took place, divisions in the society regarding the 
																																																						
93 HKRS 457-3-141, Extract from Chinese Press Review, 2 November 1978, p. 1. 
94 Ibid, p. 2. 
95 HKRS 70-8-1206, ‘Final Report on the Golden Jubilee Affairs’, Chinese Press Review, 1-7 November 1978.  
96 HKRS 457-3-141, Extract from Chinese Press Summary, 2 November 1978, p. 1. 
	 253	
dispute became increasingly explicit’.97 On the one hand, there was political activism 
initiated by the teachers and students, supported by the youth; on the other hand, ‘the culture 
of depoliticization’ prevailed.98 It remains unclear whether social class and age had an 
important effect on the dispute. This section investigates the social composition of the protest 
using newspapers and official opinion polls. 
 
Initially, the public ‘at large did not pay much attention to the dispute’.99 It was when the sit-
ins at Caritas took place, that the public engaged with the incident. The public in general was 
‘confused and bewildered by conflicting reports, accusations and recriminations from both 
sides’.100 Before the closure of the school, the demonstrations and sit-ins already attracted 
‘widespread criticism’, particularly from parents, headmasters, middle class and community 
leaders, against the teachers for organizing the sit-ins, which they described as ‘an 
undesirable and dangerous method of airing grievances by junior students’.101 The adult 
members of the society were politically conservative and inclined to view the teachers as 
‘trouble-makers’ and ‘rabble-rousers’, who exploited the teenage students.102 MOOD 
suggested that there was ‘not much support for the sixteen teachers’, especially after the 
school’s closure and the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry.103 Only ‘radical students’, 
‘free thinkers’ and ‘critics of the government’ were sympathetic to their cause.104  
 
These negative reactions were as reflected in both Chinese and English language newspapers. 
South China Morning Post repeatedly denounced student activism. It labelled the two-day sit-
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in as ‘extreme’ and described it using the term ‘militarism’. It asserted that ‘the last thing 
Hong Kong wants is a wave of student militancy over real or imagined grievances at 
schools’.105 Both Kung Sheung Daily News and The Hong Kong Times similarly condemned 
the ‘trouble-makers’ who had ‘stirred up the students’.106 It claimed that the dissenting 
teachers were ‘politically motivated’ whose aim was to ‘destroy the free society in Hong 
Kong’.107 The Hong Kong Daily News argued that the demonstrations and sit-ins led by the 
teachers ‘run counter to the education system and the basic principles which the community 
cherished’.108 Sing Tao Man Pao also believed that teachers should not offer any 
encouragement to students to participate or organize political activities.109 Teachers’ and 
students’ reluctance to redress the their grievances through formal channels ‘failed to win 
public support’ and showed their case ‘in a bad light’.110 This view was particularly prevalent 
among middle-aged and elderly householders, who mostly supported the decision made by 
the Education Department.111  
 
Most people regardless of age were unwilling to take a side in the campaign. This was 
because they were confused about the chronological development of the event. This was 
partly due to the fact that the event was not fully recovered by media: ‘the further friction and 
confrontation in the school that afternoon was not clearly reported and consequently not 
known by public’.112 Most importantly, the communities in general ‘were anxious to avoid 
‘‘rocking the boat’’’.113 Most people disapproved of any action that might create political or 
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social tensions: ‘Harmony and stability of society were considered to be of paramount 
importance’.114 Direct confrontations, such as sit-ins and hunger strikes, were considered to 
be ‘radical actions’ which ‘could never get the support from the mass’.115 Political 
conservatism continued to prevail among many in the colony, especially when the event did 
not directly affect most people’s lives. 
 
Besides, the campaign itself failed to enlist public sympathy probably because the 
propagation of causes such as ‘injustice’, ‘democracy’ and ‘anti-colonialism’ were not 
particularly appealing to the general public. As MOOD has pointed out earlier, lower income 
groups, especially blue collar workers, were only concerned with their ‘workaday livelihood 
and problems affecting their family’.116 They rarely worried or cared about other issues.117 
These grassroots groups remained ‘largely indifferent’ to how Hong Kong was governed 
provided that they were not affected.118 In 1975, MOOD also had found that there was ‘no 
general public aspiration or pressure for constitutional reform’: ‘Majority attitudes indicate a 
lack of enthusiasm about elections’.119 The middle class either was ‘indifferent’ or advocated 
‘caution’.120 Many also doubted if a limited representative government would ‘really make 
much different’.121 Rhetoric such as ‘democracy’ and ‘anti-colonialism’ therefore did not 
generate substantial support from the local people, who might consider the closure of the 
school as irrelevant to their daily livelihood. 
 
By the late 1970s, the political culture of the young generation and social elites was however 
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changing. As MOOD pointed out, attitudes towards the event ‘varied considerably according 
to age and education background’.122 During the early period, the teachers successfully 
lobbied some support from some post-secondary student. A state opinion poll earlier in 1975 
had pointed out students and youth tended to hold significant different and unfavourable 
views of the colonial government than their elders.123 Their ‘idealistic outlook on life’ led 
many of them being ‘intolerant of a paternalistic type of government’, ‘distrustful of 
compromise’ and ‘impatient in their wait for an egalitarian government’.124 In 1975, it was 
predicted by MOOD that their pursuit of increased social consciousness and political 
participation would only continue to rise.125 Despite the merits of the colonial 
administration’s consultation policy, the young generation still became ‘more aggressive and 
presumptuous’.126 In the Golden Jubilee dispute, these post-secondary student leaders 
suspected Kwan of being ‘reactionary and disciplinarian, and deliberately vindictive and 
suppressive against the Chan group’.127 They urged the Education Department to carry out a 
detailed investigation before declaring its support for the new principal. Apart from 
secondary students, MOOD also suggested that post-secondary students and the younger 
generation tended to criticize the closure of the school as ‘suppressive’.128 They were 
‘sensitive’ and ‘resentful’ to any state responses which appeared to them as ‘high-handed’ 
and ‘dictatorial’.129 Despite their disapproval of political activism, the established middle-
aged bourgeoisie also did not support the government’s measure. They believed that such 
‘strong line’ policy would only threaten social order.130 The Committee of Inquiry’s Final 
Report attributed this political activism, particularly among the young generation, to 
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increased education: ‘In a progressing community like Hong Kong, with steadily rising level 
of education, there is inevitable trend of rising expectations and increasing social 
awareness.’131 This was particularly true as the schooling in Hong Kong was moving towards 
the direction of ‘mass access’ in the 1970s. Universal primary education was achieved in 
1971, followed by the implementation of three-year compulsory government funded 
education in secondary schools in 1978.132 The emergence of an educated ‘large middle 
class’ parents in the 1970s also made schools increasingly difficult to meet their high 
expectations.133 
 
This section has demonstrated that the political culture in Hong Kong was far from 
monolithic. Different attitudes were held by people in different social classes and age groups. 
The educated young generation and social elites, including students, post-secondary students 
and young teachers, were at the ‘political centre’. They were motivated by ideological 
concerns, such as social justice, democracy and anti-colonialism, and mostly held an 
intolerant attitude towards the colonial government. Most middle-aged and elderly people 
were politically conservative, worried about political stability. Some grassroots groups were 
indifferent, considering the campaign as irrelevant to their lives. Middle aged and elderly 
householders also accused dissenting teachers and students of being trouble-makers. In this 
case however conservatism aroused from a perception reinforced by the press that the 
campaign was due to leftist activism.  
 
Conclusion 
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The Golden Jubilee incident was ‘an eye-opener’ for the public, in particular those with a 
conservative mindset.134 In order to obtain attention from senior civil servants, the teachers 
and students exposed an example of ‘corruption’ to the public by the organization of sits-in 
and hunger strikes, and by attracting media coverage. During the campaign, the activists 
displayed remarkable capacity for organization. The networking capacity of activists gave 
them an effective way of communicating with post-secondary students, educational and 
religious organizations, and even MPs in London. They were able therefore to organize large-
scale sit-ins. Their campaigning pressurized the colonial government to set up a Committee 
of Inquiry, and to monitor public opinions closely. 
 
The campaign shows how the political culture of the educated young generation was 
changing. These students engaged in different forms of political acts and gained support from 
their peers and the politicians. Despite considerable support from the post-secondary students 
and educational sector, the campaign failed to enlist support from the general public. Middle 
aged and elderly householders, particularly those within the middle classes, disapproved of 
political activism and considered students and teachers involved to be ‘rabble rousers’, who 
posed a threat to the political stability of Hong Kong. Grassroots groups were largely 
indifferent. Political conservatism was still prevalent, in part because with respect to this 
particular issue the 1967 riots cast a shadow on the society. Moreover, concepts such as 
‘injustice’, ‘democracy’ and ‘anti-colonialism’ propagated by the activists were probably 
unappealing to many people concerned primarily with their livelihood, lacking enthusiasm to 
engage in debates about how the state was governing a colonial society.  
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VI.      The Changing Immigration Discourse and Policy 
 
 
A small integrated community with resources appropriate to its size surely has a right 
to protection against an inundation of strangers. This is an internationally accepted 
principle, and Hong Kong's own pre-war and more recent history has shown that it 
can and must be applied when the situation becomes threatening — or when the 
government wakes up to its responsibilities to its established citizens. Why was the 
situation ever allowed to develop into the vast problem that now faces the 
government? Was it assumed that up to one million immigrants could be assimilated 
to an acceptable degree and in reasonable time?1 
 
The piece was written in 1956 by Chief Secretary, Claude Burgess. In June 1979, it was re-
quoted by David Ford, the Secretary for Information, in a speech, ‘The Price of Freedom’. By 
then, the statement possessed a new meaning. To justify the new immigration policy, Ford 
employed Burgess’s statement but deliberately omitted the answer provided by Burgess to 
the questions in 1956: 
 
The answer to these questions may fall oddly on modern ears. The immigrants were 
admitted on humanitarian grounds alone and the problems to which they would give 
rise if they did not return or emigrate elsewhere were deliberately accepted. The first 
influx fled from the shattered economy and threat of famine which followed the 
Pacific War. The people who followed in the second influx voted with their feet 
against the new régime which was established when the Nationalists withdrew to 
Formosa. In either case the immigrants sought in Hong Kong something sufficiently 
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important to themselves to necessitate the abandonment of their homes, the severance 
of family ties and the renunciation of traditional allegiances. No one will ever know 
what it cost them to abandon the land on which their ancestors had made their living. 
They were not denied what they sought, and Hong Kong accepted the burden which 
they brought with them in the name of humanity rather than because it had any special 
standing in the matter other than the accident of contiguity.2 
 
Ford argued that Burgess’s statement was ‘as relevant today as it was twenty-three years 
ago’. The situation was different however in the 1970s because illegal immigration was 
‘unacceptably high’ and the present rate of immigration would yield at least one and a half 
million people in three years. The central problem for Ford was that the increase would 
hinder the government’s Ten-Year Housing Programme planned in 1972. Ford noted that this 
plan was ‘ambitious’. It aimed to rehouse 1.8 million people.3 Ford’s statement highlighted 
that immigration from China was a major problem for the colonial government and one that 
affected its relationship with Hong Kong people. This chapter examines the relationship 
between the changing public discourse on immigration and the colonial state’s immigration 
policy. Illegal immigration became a serious issue in Hong Kong from the late 1960s because 
it strained the colony’s housing stock, and welfare and education systems.  
 
Agnes Ku has argued that the colonial government’s shift from ‘a policy of tolerant 
acceptance’ to exclusionary immigration practices– such as the introduction of ‘Hong Kong 
belonger’ as an immigration category, the deprivation of illegals’ rights to apply for identity 
cards and the ending of the ‘Touch Base’ policy– had ‘unintentionally’ invoked ‘a set of 
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inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms’, which transformed the refugee mentality of 
Hong Kong Chinese and gave rise to new political culture in the 1970s.4 This aligns with the 
consensus that Hong Kong’s political, cultural and economic separation from the mainland 
Chinese gave rise to the Hong Kong identity, a new political culture in the 1970s.5 
  
The public’s attitude towards migrants had shifted since the 1940s and 1950s, the first wave 
of post-war migration. Nonetheless, historical work on the 1970s is highly limited so this link 
between immigration public policy and identity formation had not been proven. The political 
culture of Hong Kong was certainly changing during the 1970s, as previous chapters have 
demonstrated, but how did a reformist polity set a new policy towards immigration from 
China, and how did this relate to shifting public opinions? The chapter explores these 
dynamic effects by reconstructing unofficial discourse regarding immigration and linking this 
cultural analysis with policy changes. It argues that the relationship between popular 
discourse and policy was dynamic in the sense that new policy measures affected popular 
attitudes in the early 1970s and after the mid-1970s, the relationship changed. These shifting 
relationships were further complicated by the changing state of international relations: new 
Hong Kong immigration policies were controversial in Taiwan and the PRC. They were used 
by the Nationalists to undermine Communist China.  
 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first outlines changes of immigration policy, 
details the scale of immigration and explains its impact on the development of housing 
programme and social services, a technocratic issue but one with political consequences in an 
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era when public policy was debated more fully by the public. The second section explores 
mass immigration from China from a diplomatic perspective, how China and Hong Kong 
reached an agreement on a ‘Touch Base’ policy, which repatriated all illegal immigrants who 
were apprehended in the frontier area. The third section examines the immigration discourse, 
focusing on press sentiment and traces along with policy shifts, how it changed over time and 
affected people’s political orientations and attitudes towards Chinese immigrants. The fourth 
section investigates how popular attitudes towards immigration changed and affected 
interactions between ordinary people and the colonial administration. The last section 
analyses the abandonment of the ‘Touch Base’ policy, and the negotiations between China 
and Britain regarding a new policy governing how illegal immigrants were repatriated. 
 
Managing ‘the Problem of People’  
 
In the early 1950s, as Chi-kwan Mark has pointed out, a ‘lenient approach’ was adopted by 
the colonial government in handling immigrants. From May 1950, there was a quota system 
which restricted the number of entry from China to be equal to that of leaving Hong Kong, 
but this policy was ‘not strictly enforced’.6 The colonial administration had limited internal 
funds for resettlement programmes, and piecemeal funding from the Nationalists, the United 
States and the United Nations were insufficient for a comprehensive set of measures to 
support refugees. Seeking more financial support from Taiwan and the United States also 
risked entangling Hong Kong into the Cold War politics.7  
 
																																																						
6 Chi-kwan Mark, ‘The ‘‘Problem of People’’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees 
in Hong Kong, 1949-62’, Modern Asian Studies, 41:6 (2007), p. 1148. 
7 Ibid., pp. 1151, 1153-8. 
	 263	
Colonial policy changed from 1956. Realizing the ‘permanent nature’ of inward immigration, 
the colonial government labelled mainland immigrants as ‘illegal immigrants’ instead of 
‘refugees’ and identified their influx as a ‘problem of people’ of serious economic, social and 
political implications.8 The colonial government believed the ultimate solution to ‘the 
problem of people’ was to turn ‘potential trouble-makers into responsible residents’ by ‘local 
integration’.9 This would restore people’s confidence after the 1956 riots. Rapid 
industrialization, which relied on low cost labour, provided abundant job opportunities for 
immigrants. It also generated higher revenues for the government and allowed it to expand 
social services in line with population growth.  
 
In 1962, Hong Kong experienced another influx of Chinese immigrants due to the Great Leap 
Forward which caused famine across China. In response to the ‘exodus’, the Hong Kong 
government applied a ‘turning back doctrine’: illegal immigrants were to be returned once 
they crossed the border.10 From 1962 to 1967, the government allowed, under a quota system, 
fifty legal immigrants to enter Hong Kong per day. It repatriated the rest. This policy was 
abandoned in 1967 ‘as a consequence of the trouble caused by the Cultural Revolution’, 
when clashes and violence broke out repeatedly on the border.11  
 
By the 1970s, the ‘local integration’ policy became impracticable due to the scale of 
immigration from China. The number of illegal immigrants increased at an unprecedented 
rate, as shown in Table 11 below. The annual figure of illegal immigrants increased from less 
than 8,000 during the period from 1968 to 1970 to 18,000 in 1973. These figures did not 
include illegal immigrants that had successfully reached the urban area. It was estimated that 
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‘for every one caught, two entered undetected’ and ‘the actual number of illegal immigrants 
from China might be anything from two times to three times the number detected by the 
police’.12 The number of legal immigrants increased from under 2,000 to nearly 74,000, as 
shown in Table 12.13 And it was estimated that about 56,000, 75 per cent of the total, would 
‘settle permanently’ in the colony.14  
 
Table 11: Annual Figure of Illegal Immigrants Entering Hong Kong from China, 1968-1973 
Year Annual figure of illegal immigrants 
entering Hong Kong from China 
1968-1970 <8,000 
1971 10,500 
1972 17,000 
1973 18,000 
 
Source: FCO 21/1273, ‘Illegal immigration from China’, telegram from A. E. Donald, 
Colonial Secretariat to W. G. Ehrman, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 14 August 1974. 
 
 
Table 12: Annual Figure of Legal Immigrants Entering Hong Kong from China, 1967-1973 
 
Year Annual figure of legal immigrants 
entering Hong Kong from China 
1967-1970 <1800 
1971 3,000 
1972 20,000 
1973 74,000 
 
Source: FCO 21/1273, ‘Immigration from China into Hong Kong’, by the Far Eastern 
Department, 30 April 1974, pp. 1-2. 
 
Immigration compounded already critical problems with overcrowding and congestion. In 
1974, the population density in some parts of Kowloon was ‘ten times that of Tokyo’. Hong 
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Kong only had limited resources and 404 square miles, most of which were ‘steep, rugged 
mountain areas unsuitable both for agriculture and building’. The welfare system and housing 
were both under extreme pressure.15 Job opportunities and relative high level of economic 
development were the primary pull factors for migrants. As James Callaghan, the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, pointed out, ‘in many cases the motive has been as much one of 
economic self-interest as a well-founded fear of political persecution’.16 Many came to what 
they perceived as a ‘paradise’,  ‘with the hope of enjoying better living’.17 The chaotic 
political situation and harsh lives in China also served as push factors, pushing people to 
escape to Hong Kong. The Cultural Revolution and difficult lives in communes in particular 
pushed many youngsters to the colony. The anti-Lin and anti-Confucius campaigns after the 
failure of Lin Piao, the former Chinese Defence Minister, to overthrow Mao in 1971 caused 
even more upheavals in mainland, escalating the problem of illegal immigration. Communist 
government may even have deliberately granted permits to Lin’s former supporters who were 
reluctant to stay in China and wished to emigrate to join their overseas relatives.18 The 
relative low quality of life in China, such as ‘the day-to-day life of the commune’, which was 
‘physically demanding and materially unrewarding’, continued to push many to escape to 
Hong Kong illegally.19 
 
As Ford acknowledged, the scale of new immigration created a real problem for the colonial 
government, at a time when it was trying to increase per capita spending on social 
infrastructure, on housing in particular. It was estimated that an additional $300 million 
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would have to be spent on housing, medical facilities and education due to the influx of 
population from China.20 It was difficult for the colonial government to house all these 
migrants under the existing housing programmes. As Table 13 shows, the government 
increased access to social housing but at a rate only marginally higher than the rate of 
immigration. 
 
Table 13: Number of People Being Housed by the Colonial Government in Public Housing, 
1970-1974 
 
Year Number of people 
1970 30,000 
1971 89,000 
1972 104,000 
1973 91,000 
1974 53,000 
Total 367,000 
 
Source: FCO 21/1418, Telegram from MacLehose to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
18 March 1975. 
 
The ‘Touch Base’ policy reduced the number of illegal immigrants from 7,105 in 1974 to 
only 583 in the first half of 1975.21 In a long run, however, it failed to stop the influx of 
immigrants from China. The number of both legal and illegal immigrants continued to rise. 
The daily average figure of legal immigration remained high. As Table 14 shows, in 1978, 
the average number of legal immigrants entered Hong Kong from China per day increased 
from 92 in January to 149 in April. The number of illegals was also showing a sharp increase, 
as shown in Table 15 which sets out statistics for the first quarter of 1978. The number of 
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illegals arrested in April 1978 was the ‘highest arrest figure since repatriation commenced on 
30 November 1974’.22   
 
Table 14: Legal Immigration from China to Hong Kong in 1978 
Month/1978 Average per day 
January 92 
February 97 
March 114 
April 149 
 
Source: FCO 40/1005, ‘Entrants from China and Macao’, memo by A. J. Carter, Director of 
Immigration, 3 February and 8 April 1978. 
 
 
Table 15: Number of Illegal Immigrants Being Arrested in 1978 
 
Month/1978 Number of illegals being arrested 
January 197 
February  199 
March 165 
April 308 
 
Source: FCO 40/1005, ‘Entrants from China and Macao’, memo by A. J. Carter, the Director 
of Immigration, 4 March and May, 1978. 
 
 
Throughout the late 1970s, additional measures were introduced to cope with the high level 
of immigration from China, such as the setting up of a Ship Searching Unit, the amendment 
of legislation to grant police the authority to arrest illegals who had stayed in Hong Kong for 
two years, the implementation of a new immigration bill to prosecute people aiding illegals 
and increased fines and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the number of illegals did not drop. 
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During the ‘peak time’ in June 1979, the figure of illegals reached an average of 625 a day.23 
Up until October 1979, 57,000 illegals were arrested.24 The level of immigration was 
unacceptably high. Press coverage on immigration increased and popular sentiments shifted, 
which forced Hong Kong to negotiate with China, ending the ‘Touch Base’ policy in October 
1980. 
 
Negotiating the ‘Touch Base’ Policy  
 
With the end of the economic embargo imposed by the United States and the admission into 
the United Nations in 1971, China’s relation with the West improved. Britain and the colonial 
government had to deal with immigration into Hong Kong carefully through negotiations 
with the PRC. A number of factors created obstacles to reaching a mutual agreement on 
Hong Kong’s immigration control. Firstly, immigration from China to Hong Kong had 
always been loosely regulated due to the tradition of free movement of people. To effectively 
reduce immigration, China first had to agree to cooperate and reduce the number of legal 
permits issued to its people. Besides, Hong Kong had to ensure China would accept any 
illegal immigrants being sent back.  Secondly, the differences in two legislative and judiciary 
systems also hindered the repatriation process. Hong Kong could not just send back a 
particular group of illegal immigrants requested by China. It had to develop a standard 
measure that complied with colonial laws. Thirdly, immigration policies enacted and 
implemented by the colonial government had to have the backing of the British government, 
which might put the interests of improved Sino-British relations before those of Hong Kong. 
Fourthly, to reduce the risk of international criticism, it was essential for Britain to adopt a 
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consistent liberal humanitarian policy on immigrants, especially political refugees, and check 
if the returnees would face harsh punishment. The complexities made swift resolution 
unfeasible. 
 
Before the early 1970s, there were no formal modalities on how illegal immigrants from 
China should be returned. The difficulties of handling these Chinese illegal immigrants can 
be summarized by a passage written by the Governor, MacLehose to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in 1974:  
 
Poon of NCNA (New China News Agency) called on the Assistant Political Adviser 
on 15 February to seek, on instructions from the ‘Kwangtung (Guangdong) 
Authorities’, the return to China of fifty-eight persons who entered Hong Kong 
illegally on 20 September last year by Stooolen (Stolen) Junk…. In reply George said 
that this approach came very long after the event. Even if, as Poon has alleged, they 
had been detained at the time of their arrival, the people would long since been 
released and perhaps admitted for residence here. The matter would have to be dealt 
with according to the law which, as Poon would know, was complicated.25   
 
 
In short, there was neither agreement nor coordination between China and Hong Kong. The 
Guangdong Authorities often requested the return of a particular groups of illegal immigrants 
after they entered Hong Kong for a long period of time. It was extremely difficult to arrest 
them when many of them already gained residence and settled in the colony. Also, rather than 
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acting upon all illegal movements, Guangdong only pursued cases that were related to groups 
of criminals who had offended Chinese laws and endangered the safety of Chinese waters, 
often without a formal request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing and specifying 
the charges against these people. Uncertainty regarding legal process compounded returning 
illegal immigrants to China. There were three categories of illegal immigrants which the 
colonial government had to handle differently. The first was refugees who were alleged to 
have committed crimes within China. In these cases, the Chinese Extradition Ordinance 
applied. The second category was refugees that were alleged to have committed crimes in the 
act of escaping, such as hi-jacking a junk to enter the colony. There were different 
considerations in this category. If the escapes were justified, the means of escape would as 
well be justifiable. However, it was also possible that extradition was involved. The last 
category was refugees who committed no crimes but entered Hong Kong using their own 
means.26 It was therefore essential for the colonial administration to distinguish between 
these illegal immigrants and lay down modalities of returns before any appropriate measures 
were taken. 
 
The increase in the scale of immigration combined with critical press coverage of the issue 
drove the colonial government to consider tightening immigration controls. The 
normalization of Sino-British relations allowed negotiations with China to take place in 
November 1973. On 27 November, it was agreed that legal immigrants should be kept to 
seventy-five a day. Nevertheless, the daily flow of immigrants seemed to have exceeded this 
level.27 Regular meetings between Political Advisers of Hong Kong and representatives of 
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the New China News Agency were set up in February 1974. The strategy was simple: first to 
reach an agreement with China on legal immigration before any discussions of the return of 
illegal immigrants. The aim was to keep the number of legal immigration down to about fifty 
a day, which was viewed at the time as the maximum which Hong Kong could absorb.28 In a 
telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Foreign Secretary, Alec 
Douglas-Home stated that he would be ‘grateful’ if Political Advisers ‘would confine 
yourself to probing the latest Chinese position on legal immigration’ and ‘would not 
volunteer anything about illegal immigration’.29 MacLehose, who preferred ‘not to mention 
this intention to return illegals until Hong Kong introduced a control on legal immigration’, 
agreed.30 This decision was made because of the legal complexity involved in returning 
illegal immigrants and the scale of the problem. By making arbitrary decisions, the Governor 
was concerned that it ‘would expose ourselves (the colonial government) to charges of 
corruption’.31 The colonial government entered the talk wanting to reduce both legal and 
illegal immigrants without compromising the improved relations with China and the British 
government’s sovereignty, and arousing negative opinions in both the colony and Britain.32 
 
From the viewpoint of China, there were a number of reasons that a tighter control on illegal 
emigration was desirable. Illegal immigrants were ‘very seldom refugees’. Instead, they were 
mostly ‘young people from town who dislike having been sent to work on farms or others 
who prefer the comparative ease of Hong Kong’.33 Therefore, the absence of effective 
																																																						
Legal Immigrant Influx Doubled’, Hong Kong Standard, 27 January 1974; ‘China Intake Remains 100’, China 
Mail, 1 April 1974. 
28 FCO 21/1273, Telegraph from E. Youde to R. M. Evans, 21 February 1974; ‘Immigration into Hong Kong’, 
telegram from R. M. Evans to E. Youde, 30 April 1974. 
29 FCO 21/1273, Telegram from Alec Douglas-Home to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 March 1974. 
30 ‘Immigrants from China to Hong Kong’, telegram from Stuart to Kelly, 4 March 1974, p. 1.  
31 FCO 21/1273, ‘Immigration into Hong Kong’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1 April 1974. 
32 FCO 21/1273, ‘Immigration from China’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 8 March 1974. 
33 Ibid. 
	 272	
controls over illegal emigration would adversely affect the ‘Up to the Mountains and Down 
to the Countryside Movement’ initiated by the Chinese Communist regime and cause an 
impact on the order the communes. It would also reduce the size of the labour workforce and 
subsequently the country’s productivity. There were inflationary conditions in China in 1974, 
and this led to a ‘great increase in Chinese prices – notably foodstuff’ and ‘contributed to the 
savage increase in the local cost of living’.34 This was push factor which motivated mainland 
Chinese to escape to Hong Kong, causing a rise in illegal emigration from China. Through 
taking control over illegal emigrations, China could also discourage Hong Kong’s 
representations. 
 
From the perspective of the colonial government, it was essential to ‘separate the questions of 
immigration control and the extradition of wanted criminals’. Yet, the Chinese government 
often refused to comply with the requirements of the Extradition Ordinance and sent 
witnesses to Hong Kong when requesting the return of some criminals back to China.35   
During a meeting in Shenzhen, for example, NCNA representatives expressed that there were 
no difficulties for the Hong Kong authorities to return illegal immigrants caught at the 
frontier back in 1961 and 1962. The Political Advisor of Hong Kong believed that what the 
Chinese government wanted was to ‘return to the pre-67 situation’ in which there was a quota 
of fifty legal immigrants a day and the colonial government returned all illegals detected at 
the borders.36 However, since 1968, the regular control at the border had been lifted and the 
colonial government had also taken a line that illegals who were alleged to have engaged in 
criminal activities should be viewed as ‘a matter of extradition to face trial rather than of 
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illegal entry’.37 Despite the desire to return to the pre-67 situation, Chinese officials ‘made 
(it) clear that they would object to the reinstitution of controls by Hong Kong on legal 
immigration on the pre-1967 pattern’, as ‘this would interfere with the ‘‘traditional rights of 
access of Chinese to Hong Kong’’’.38 In this context, the decision on the repatriation of 
illegals became the bargaining chip for Hong Kong at the Sino-Hong Kong negotiations. 
MacLehose even suggested that Hong Kong ‘could progressively ignore illegals if the 
Chinese did not respond over legals’.39 In other words, Hong Kong would not be prepared to 
return illegals unless China agreed to lower the number of legal immigrants. 
 
On 3 May 1974, Goronwy-Roberts granted approval to the Governor to start discussion with 
the NCNA ‘the practical arrangement’ of returning illegal immigrants.40 Alan Donald, Hong 
Kong’s Political Adviser, stressed the importance of establishing some general rules before 
taking action in individual cases.41 On 27 August, the Political Adviser met the Director of 
Shenzhen Foreign Affairs Bureau to discuss modalities of returning illegal immigrants. 
Donald questioned if China would receive all illegals sent by Hong Kong and emphasized the 
need for ‘speed, smoothness and good judgement’ when discussing practical methods for 
return.42 During the meeting, the ‘Chinese attitude was generally one of reasonableness’.43  
Representatives of NCNA welcomed an effective approach of returning illegals. When it 
came to the discussions of returning criminals, there were ‘however some disposition’.44 In 
response, Donald pointed out that the legal systems of Britain and China were ‘historically 
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different’.45 
 
During the negotiations, there were multiples concerns within the colonial government. The 
Executive Council had given its approval to the idea of sending back illegals who were 
arrested before reaching the urban area according to the pre-1967 practice in November 1973. 
Nonetheless, the Acting Governor wished to consult the Council again in mid-1974, to obtain 
their views, particularly on the potential undesirable responses which may be created by 
revising the immigration policy.46 There were also concerns over possible international 
repercussions stirred up by international amnesty organizations. To avoid undesirable 
responses, MacLehose believed it was essential to distinguish Chinese immigrants from other 
illegals from third world countries, particularly Vietnam.47 Britain’s political development 
was another ‘complicating factor’.48 If an agreement was not reached and implemented 
before a new British government was elected (there was a General Election due in 1974), the 
new government have had to review the revision of Hong Kong’s immigration policy. If the 
negotiations were postponed and changes were made by the new British government, the 
colonial government may have faced ‘accusations of bad faith’ from China.49 The fact that 
the subject was already an agenda in the Executive Council, it was difficult for the Governor 
to further postpone the discussion.  
 
The colonial government had assessed the potential public responses before the introduction 
of the ‘Touch Base’ policy. In the early 1970s, although the society was still sympathetic 
towards illegal immigrants, there were increased concerns over how population growth was 
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straining social services. As MacLehose had pointed out, ‘though people here would dislike a 
return to pre-67 practice, they are sufficiently disturbed by recent numbers (to) accept it’.50 
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs also believed that the majority of the public would acknowledge the need to take the 
pressure off from housing and social services. It was expected that only immediate relatives 
of immigrants would be ‘more vocal’. It was predicted that the majority would be ‘silent’.51 
The Executive Council also anticipated that although the repatriation policy would not be 
popular, people would understand it was necessary and accept it.52 Nevertheless, due the 
prevalence of the sympathetic attitude, it was expected sometimes ‘publicity given to a case 
would prevent us (the colonial government) from sending an illegal back’. The 
implementation of the ‘Touch Base’ policy would also be sharply criticized by Nationalist 
organizations, Christian groups and some expatriate newspapers in Hong Kong.53 
 
On 22 October, Gorowny-Roberts agreed that a final agreement should be sought with the 
Chinese over the return of illegals on the basis of the meeting in Shenzhen on 27 August.54  
On 12 November, a final agreement was reached between Hong Kong and the NCNA: the 
colonial government ‘in principle’ would not allow illegal immigrants from China to either 
enter or stay in Hong Kong. The word ‘in principle’ was deliberately added in order to allow 
more flexibility for the colonial government, especially over cases of genuine hardship and 
people that were already absorbed into the community.55 Hong Kong would start to return 
illegal immigrants from 30 November. The Guangdong provincial government would receive 
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them according to the agreed procedures.56 Under the ‘Touch Base’ policy, all illegal 
immigrants who were apprehended in the frontier area would be repatriated. However, to 
avoid public disturbance and unpleasant repercussions, those who had ‘touched base’ 
(reached the urban area) were allowed to stay. To minimize possible negative responses, 
officials were given instructions to repeatedly state that the arrangements were only a revival 
of policies before 1967, and merely aimed to put a halt to the enormous increase in illegal 
entries. It was also emphasized that every single case was examined individually and people 
suffering from ‘genuine hardship’ were exempted from repatriation.57  
 
Government officials played an important role in shaping the view that illegal Chinese 
immigrants were external threats to Hong Kong. The colonial administration continued the 
policy adopted since 1956, labelling them as ‘illegal immigrants’ instead of ‘refugees’. In 
June 1974, Bill Collard, the Director of Immigration publicly described Chinese immigrants 
as unwanted elements who imposed strain on the colony’s welfare system:  
 
We don’t want and we don’t need these people (Chinese immigrants); they’re no good 
to us and they can’t go anywhere else because the country from which they originated 
many years ago simply don’t want them back…. It’s very expensive business because 
all these people have to get accommodated and this means we’ve got to build more 
schools, hospitals and houses…. Obviously, very few of these people are going to 
bring any benefit to us because a lot of them are old people and a lot of them are kids 
who are uneducated.58  
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After the implementation of the ‘Touch Base’ policy, police reports were issued regularly to 
further strengthen the negative image of Chinese immigrants. K. K. Pui, the Assistant 
Immigration Officer, for example, explicitly expressed in a speech to the Lion Club that there 
were ‘undesirables’, such as ‘swindlers, drug traffickers, racketeers, subversive elements and 
criminals’ among those who entered Hong Kong: ‘the illicit activities of these people 
constitute an immediate threat to law and order, and it is critical importance they should be 
chased out of our city as soon as possible’.59 The association between criminals and Chinese 
young illegals was still reinforced by officials in the 1980s. The Deputy Director of Criminal 
Investigation, Li Kwan-ha, for example stated that ‘illegal immigrants are responsible for 
some 10 per cent of crime in Hong Kong’ in April 1981. According to Li’s statistics, ‘they 
have been found responsible for 35 to 45 per cent of major crimes such as bank robberies, 
goldsmith shop attacks and cases involving firearms’.60  
 
The capacity for Chinese immigrants to be identified as refugees in Hong Kong had been 
greatly reduced by the introduction of the ‘Touch Base’ policy and the associated rhetoric 
employed by the colonial state. Rather than being considered to be ‘refugees’, Chinese 
immigrants fell into two categories: legal or illegal. The latter was now being portrayed as 
unruly criminals who bypassed legal procedures to enter the colony and therefore should face 
repatriation. Along with shifting newspaper reporting, the public’s perceptions of Chinese 
immigrants changed in the mid-1970s, paving the way for increased demands for a tighter 
immigration policy in the late 1970s. The following section examines how the immigration 
discourse within newspapers shifted. 
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Increased Press Coverage  
 
In the early 1970s, newspapers were increasingly concerned about the ‘exodus’ from China. 
South China Morning Post made the following observation and comment:  
 
A feeling of widespread concern verging on serious disquiet has been aroused by 
reports of the disturbingly large influx of people from the Chinese mainland…. There 
is no hope of many, if any, of them leaving. Hong Kong, in other words, is the end of 
the line….Cooperation is needed by both sides in settling this, and it is to be hoped 
that this human flow is stopped as soon as possible.61   
 
Similar sentiment was captured by the Star: ‘the mystery surrounding the sudden upsurge in 
the number of immigrants from China deepened today’.62 Ma Man-fei, the Secretary of the 
United Nations Association in Hong Kong even accused China of ‘using Hong Kong as a 
litter bin’: ‘Hong Kong has always been a litter bin, right on China’s doorstep. Anyone they 
don’t want they just dump here’.63  
 
The press typically portrayed the influx of illegal immigrants from China as a problem which 
had serious economic, social and cultural implications. South China Morning Post held that 
Chinese illegal immigrants were ‘illiterate, unskilled, unemployed, elderly or a combination 
of all four’, who threw a heavy burden on the social welfare resources of the colony.64 It also 
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described mainland illegal immigrants as ‘unassimilable and useless mouths’ and stressed 
that they could hardly integrate due to cultural differences.65 Sing Tao Yat Pao similarly 
argued that legal immigrants from China were mainly people with a ‘lack of labouring 
ability’ and who were ‘viewed by the Communist Party as unfit’ that ‘may not be able to 
make any contribution’ to China. It argued that illegal immigrants were mainly young people, 
who lacked ‘suitable survival skills’ and ‘left because they could not tolerate the torture and 
difficulties’.66 Less frequently, newspapers implied that Chinese immigrants were criminals. 
For example, the Hong Kong Standard claimed that ‘a number of well-planned holdups in 
recent years were carried out from China’ and ‘the problem of refugees-turned-bandits has 
already aroused the attention of the government’.67  
 
The newspapers brought the absence of immigration control by the colonial government to 
the public’s attention. For example, the China Mail labelled the current influx of Chinese 
immigrants as an ‘immigration crisis’ and denounced the colonial state for installing ‘an 
effective wall of silence’.68 When the ‘Touch Base’ policy was introduced in 1974, the 
subject was ‘given prominence in most local papers’. According to a survey of local press, 
apart from the right-wing pro-Nationalist papers, ‘all editorial comment has been 
understanding and favourable to the Hong Kong government’s case’. A press report in early 
December 1974 suggested that newspapers had ‘unanimously approved of the repatriation 
move’.69 Wah Kiu Yat Po agreed that the repatriation policy was ‘the only way to maintain 
the stability of the public of Hong Kong’ and ‘the local government is left with no choice’.70 
Tin Tin Yat Po expressed sympathy for the illegal immigrants but ‘saw no point in objecting 
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the move’.71 Fai Po also supported the ‘new’ policy: ‘In face of the present economic 
recession, price inflation and rise of unemployment, we can no longer accept non-ceasing 
flow of illegal immigrants’.72  
 
Nevertheless, the immigration discourse was not wholly anti-immigrant. From the early 
1970s to the mid-1970s, some editorials and reports were sympathetic towards illegal 
immigrants. For instance, Wah Kiu Yat Po regarded the move as ‘inhumane’.73 Kung Sheung 
Daily News held that ‘the refugees had provided considerable capital, technical skills and 
manpower for the industrial development of Hong Kong’ and stressed that ‘they would not 
have risked their lives to flee’ if they ‘had not been desperate’.74  Far Eastern Economic 
Review even denounced the repatriation policy: 
 
Something rather nasty is happening to Hong Kong…. I refer of course to the 
despicable decision to begin sending illegal refugees back to China. The process of 
betrayal began with the familiar smoke-screen of official leaks to the local press…. 
But the argument that the ‘illegals’ impose a strain on Hong Kong’s resources does 
not bear a moment’s examination. They are mostly young and fit, in their late teens or 
their twenties, and many have proved their fitness by crossing the border area or 
swimming across the bays between Hong Kong and China. Further, under Hong Kong 
regulations, they do not qualify for either public housing or public assistance until 
they have been in Hong Kong for a minimum of five years.75   
 
																																																						
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., p. 4. 
75 FCO 21/1274, D. Davies, ‘Traveller’s Tales’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 December 1974. 
	 281	
These opinions were not mainstream but reveal that some newspapers held sympathetic 
stance to illegal Chinese immigrants by the end of 1974. 
 
As the scale of illegal immigration became public knowledge, the calls for a tighter 
immigration policy dominated the news discourse. The Express argued that only by 
strengthening the repatriation policy, could Hong Kong’s order be maintained.76 In 1978,  
according to ‘Opinions’, most Chinese language newspapers ‘expressed concern over the 
problem of illegal immigration to Hong Kong’. For example, in November 1978, Tin Tin Yat 
Po argued that, although ‘Hong Kong should in principle not turn back those seek political 
asylum here’, it was ‘common knowledge that Hong Kong is a small place and it would fall 
apart if it was forced to accept a large number of political refugees’. Kung Sheung Evening 
News also pointed out that ‘Hong Kong has already been placed in a difficult position by the 
influx of Vietnamese refugees from all directions’. Therefore, ‘it will not be able to cope with 
the situation if China continues to let refugees it has already accepted come here in large 
numbers’.77 In 1979, there were increased criticisms against the colonial government’s lack 
of determination to put an end to the influx on both Chinese and English newspapers. 
According to South China Morning Post, there was ‘increasing dismay and growing concern’ 
over the influx of people from both China and Vietnam, both ‘legal and ‘illegal’ and ‘a 
growing sense of helplessness in official reactions as the daily figures mount’.78 Ming Pao, 
during the week from 23 to 29 May 1979, devoted four editorials to the subject. It argued that 
the government’s attitude was ‘one of submission and resignation, lacking in both courage 
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and determination’.79 Similar views were expressed by the Express: ‘We think now is the 
decisive moment to act and stop the influx of all types of immigrants. We can no longer 
afford to be soft-hearted’.80 The illegal immigrants also proved to be burdens of the colony. 
Hong Kong Times pointed out that cost of repatriating illegal immigrants back to mainland 
was high: ‘the total sum of expenses reached $36,080.2’ from January to April 1979. 
‘Generous taxpayers’ ironically became ‘hosts’ of these illegals.81 According to the Star, ‘the 
call is growing for the government to change its policy on illegal immigrant problem’ as ‘the 
current policy obviously is not working’.82 In February 1980, the South China Morning Post 
urged the colonial government to review its policy on illegal immigrants:  
 
How could we strengthen our policy? Well, from now on, we could refuse to issue 
identity cards and set the police the task of catching them in the urban jungle and 
sending for trials those found harbouring them. But a pre-condition to that would be a 
law compelling everybody to carry his or her identity card everywhere he or she 
goes.83  
 
The Sun even called the influx ‘an invasion’ and said ‘it must stop’.84  
 
 
From the mid-1970s, newspapers stereotyped Chinese illegal immigrants as criminals. This 
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relationship between Chinese illegal immigrants and bad elements was established in Hong 
Kong Standard in 1976: 
 
Criminals responsible for many Hong Kong’s big payroll holdups and expertly 
planned robberies are believed to be illegal immigrants from mainland China. Police 
sources reported that the illegals have banded together in a loose association called 
the Big Circle. Detectives described the Big Circle members having expertise, 
organization and professionalism. They said that the illegal immigrants are tougher 
than ordinary street criminals….Two of the Hong Kong’s most wanted criminals who 
were involved in the $7.2 million Great Tunnel Robbery on 5 August last year are 
believed to be ‘Dai Luk Chais (mainlanders)’ or members of the circle.85 
 
 In 1978, an editor of Kung Sheung Daily News suggested that many young Chinese illegal 
immigrants ‘still inherited the bad traditions of communism, which shaped their cruel 
personality’. He claimed that many of these illegal immigrants ‘would use measures, such as 
struggles, revenges and looting’ to achieve their goals, especially those that were ‘laid back’ 
and ‘do(did) not want to find a decent job’. These former Red Guards ‘would be happy to see 
destruction of the social order, history, culture and ethnics under the name of 
‘‘revolutions’’’.86 Kung Sheung Evening News similarly pointed out that teenage illegal 
immigrants from China did not always have the ability to adapt and integrate into the society 
of Hong Kong. False expectation ‘may stimulate them and provoke them to walk towards the 
‘‘evil path’’’. These ‘black-market residents’, the editor believed, were ‘a major hidden 
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trouble in Hong Kong’.87 Sing Tao Yat Pao and Hong Kong Standard also portrayed young 
Chinese illegals as criminals who ‘wanted returns without efforts’ and committed crimes with 
‘no remorse’.88 Apart from the ‘Big Circle Gang’, other degradative discriminatory terms, 
such as ‘Green Card Holders’ and ‘Ar Chan’ were commonly inflicted by newspapers to 
describe Chinese illegal immigrants, differentiating them from the Hong Kong Chinese.89  
 
While the society was gradually turning anti-immigrant, the pro-Taiwan press and rightists 
continued to portrayed illegals as victims and denounced the Chinese Communist regime:  
 
Under the tyranny of Mao’s gang, people who risked their life to come to Hong Kong 
have never stopped, especially the Mao’s gang again used ‘investigating anti-
revolutionaries’ as an excuse to carry out a massacre on its people lately. People 
cannot tolerate it and therefore risk their life to escape.90   
 
Both Kung Sheung Daily News and Hong Kong Times repeatedly used the term ‘compatriots’ 
to label these Chinese illegal immigrants.91 An editor, Yu Tin advocated acceptance and 
tolerance in Hong Kong Times. In one article, he denounced the repatriation policy as 
inhumane: ‘In a civilised society, there is natural differentiation between human and other 
creatures’. He then questioned ‘whether human or other animals are under protection’. in this 
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‘highly civilized’ society. Illegal immigrants sometimes faced arbitrations that even animals 
would not need to face under the existing practice in Hong Kong.92 This propaganda, 
however only represented the opinion of small minority. Since the 1970s, the increased press 
coverage triggered public discussions on the existing immigration policy. The negative image 
of Chinese illegal immigrants constructed by newspapers since mid-1970s also influenced 
public sentiments towards Chinese immigrants, as discussed in the following section.  
 
Shifted Public Sentiments and Political Culture 
 
By the mid-1970s, many community leaders advocated a tighter immigration policy. The 
Chairman of Kowloon City Kaifong Association, Lui Fook-hong, for example, believed that 
‘both governments should be taking steps to stop them from coming in’. Chan Ling-fong, the 
Chairman of Kennedy Town Kaifong Association also urged the colonial government to do 
‘something about this and give the situation top priority because it will upset our social 
plans’. As an Urban Councillor, Henry Hu believed the current policy should be revised: ‘I 
would favour a move to stop these immigrants coming in, we cannot absorb many people in 
such a short time’.93 In the mid-1970s, public attitude shifted as a result of hostile comments 
made by public figures due to the negative image of Chinese illegal immigrants constructed 
by the press and an increasingly crowded living environment. According to MOOD, during 
the 1950s, the general public in Hong Kong was sympathetic towards the Chinese immigrants 
and considered the immigration policy ‘good’ and ‘humane’. Immigrants from China were 
often being viewed as ‘refugees seeking political asylum’, whose attempt to move to Hong 
Kong would risk being ‘harshly punished by the C.P.G’.94  
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The mid-1970s was a turning point. Attitude towards Chinese immigrants changed. Although 
the large scale immigration from China had ‘not aroused widespread of anxiety or strong 
feelings’, there was hostility towards Chinese immigrants among people of different classes 
and age groups.95 It was mainly due to the perception that the influx of mainland population 
to Hong Kong could be ‘an impediment to the fulfilment of long-term social service 
projects’.96 The perceived increasing difference between the locals and mainland Chinese in 
culture and experience further aggravated the anti-Chinese immigration problem. In the 
1950s, locals believed that Chinese immigrants were able to adapt easily as they all had 
similar background and were brought up in China before the Chinese Communists seized 
power. Contrastingly, the young generation who grew up in China under the Chinese 
Communist regime encountered enormous difficulties in adapting. Not only were ‘their 
upbringing in present day China in many ways incompatible with the ways of life in Hong 
Kong’, many young Chinese immigrants’ work ethic was questioned. According to MOOD, 
in 1975, many young Chinese immigrants were convinced that they could enjoy an easy life 
after they moved to Hong Kong. Many employers found these young immigrants 
‘unsatisfactory’ and complained that they were ‘lazy, unwilling to work too hard, difficult to 
manage or discipline, and quite ready to cause trouble’. Many Hong Kong Chinese held 
contemptuous attitudes towards Chinese immigrants. They believed that growing up in an 
environment which had a different set of legal system and hoping to seek instant benefit, 
these Chinese illegal immigrants were ‘prone to commit crime’.97 The public’s perceptions of 
Chinese illegal immigrants assembled their negative characteristics found in official rhetoric 
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and newspapers in the early and mid-1970s, demonstrating the influence of the latter on the 
former. 
 
As the majority of the society expressed their hope to protect the local interests, the ‘Touch 
Base’ policy had ‘on the whole been tacitly accepted by the community’.98 Although a 
number of posters appeared in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island on 1 December 1974, 
protesting against the introduction of ‘Touch Base’ policy,  they were ‘the work of right-wing 
elements’ and soon ‘removed by the police’.99 According to the Governor’s reassessment on 
3 December, ‘so far the public reaction has been calm’ and accepted the revised immigration 
policy.100 The ‘new’ immigration policy also received support from a number community 
leaders and politicians, including Urban Councillors and representatives of kaifong 
associations. For example, Denny Huang endorsed the ‘Touch Base’ policy: ‘We must face 
the fact that we are experiencing a population explosion. If the influx of refugees from China 
was allowed to continue, local residents would suffer, particularly in housing and jobs.’ Elsie 
Elliott agreed it was a difficult decision which should be implemented: ‘So many of our 
people are unemployed. We can’t let the refugees accept jobs with less wages, leaving our 
own people unemployed.’101 Another Urban Councillor, Peter C. K. Chan also showed 
support to the reversion of the immigration policy:  
 
Hong Kong’s resources are limited, and as an elected Urban Councillor, my first 
responsibility is towards the people of Hong Kong. In view of the present economic 
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situation, we have already reached saturation point as regards population and cannot 
accept the burdens of illegal immigrants from other countries. I therefore support the 
government’s decision as a temporary measure. When our economy begins to get 
going again, perhaps the situation can be reviewed.102  
 
The President of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Joint Kaifong Research Council, Yan Chi Kit 
also believed that ‘the government had no other choice’ as it had ‘carried the burden long 
enough’.103 
 
Press sentiments and comments made by officials and community leaders further influenced 
public opinions. A government’s survey in 1979 revealed that the public was increasingly 
anti-immigrant when compared to 1975. In this period, the scale of immigration to Hong 
Kong grew as migrations from China were coupled by the influx of Vietnamese refugees in 
1975. According to MOOD, there was considerably anxiety:  
 
Respondents were spontaneous and frank. They were worried about the vast numbers 
arriving daily and the correspondingly few refugees/immigrants leaving for 
resettlement elsewhere. Everyone was concerned about the social and economic 
consequences; working class people in particular strongly held the view that Hong 
Kong people should come first and that government should ensure that ‘outsiders’, be 
they ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam or immigrants from China, did not disrupt 
their livelihood, and the housing, medical and educational programme.104   
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Despite their sympathy for immigrants and refugees who only fled to Hong Kong due to 
political persecution, most Hong Kong Chinese believed that ‘Hong Kong had no 
responsibility, let alone the resources, to accommodate the refugees even most of them were 
ethnic Chinese’.105  
 
By 1980, majority in Hong Kong believed that no identity cards should be issued to illegals 
and called for putting an end to the ‘Touch Base’ policy. Express carried out a random poll 
interviewing 1,000 people. Eight out of ten ‘felt that the government should deport illegal 
immigrants who had successfully made into the urban areas’. When being asked why they 
favoured an end to the ‘Touch Base’ policy, 67 per cent of respondents believed that ‘the 
influx had strained social and transportation services’, 31 per cent felt that the exodus from 
mainland ‘would cause greater overcrowding’ and 30 per cent believed they had worsened 
the problem of employment.106 In a poll conducted in an open forum in Victoria Peak on 22 
September 1980, 185 people supported a deportation policy. Only eight people opposed it.107 
This suggests a shifted attitude towards Chinese immigrants in the late 1970s, influenced by 
the press and official rhetoric. In October 1980, MacLehose reported that ‘pressure from 
public opinion for the government to deal with the problem is growing’.108 
 
Hong Kong residents did not treat all immigrants indiscriminately. MOOD captured locals’ 
different attitudes towards immigrants from China, Vietnam and Southeast Asia. They 
perceived illegal immigrants from Southeast Asia as ‘resourceful people who were able to 
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buy their way here’.109 They were therefore unlikely to rely on Hong Kong’s public social 
services. In contrast to their antagonism towards the Chinese immigrants, a proportion of 
Hong Kong Chinese welcomed these Southeast Asian immigrants to settle in Hong Kong, 
believing that they could invest in the colony and boost the local economy. Coming from 
‘free (non-communist) societies’, many locals believed that when compared to the mainland 
immigrants, the Southeast Asians ‘should have few problems in adapting themselves to life in 
Hong Kong’.110 In the MOOD survey conducted in 1979, most respondents believed that the 
Chinese immigration ‘had even more serious implications’ than that the influx of Vietnamese 
refugees as ‘the (Chinese) immigrants were here to stay’.111 There was a ‘strong resentment 
against others (mainland immigrants), especially the young men and women who supposedly 
came here for a more leisurely life or material gains’. Many mainland Chinese could enjoy 
overseas remittances from their relatives in Hong Kong since a more open market was 
developed in China in the early 1970s. Subsequently, many families in China had lost their 
incentive to work as wages were low.  
 
The conventional view was that illegal Chinese immigrants were responsible for crimes, such 
as the Hang Seng Bank robbery.112 This impression coincided with the negative image of 
Chinese illegal immigrants constructed by the press. As the bitterness towards the Chinese 
immigrants intensified, there was increased criticism of the colonial government. Many 
condemned the inconsistent policies of the government and expected a firmer stand to be 
taken. Stricter and harsher anti-immigration measures should be implemented. For instance, 
some MOOD respondents recommended that Chinese visitors who entered with travel 
documents should not be given extension to stay and given permanent resident statuses. 
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There should also be more actions against immigrants who had arrived Hong Kong illegally. 
Some even suggested that ‘boats arriving in the future should be towed away’.113 
 
Despite the tighter immigration control advocated by the general public, ‘anti-immigrant’ 
attitudes were constantly shifting. Under some special circumstances, people believed it was 
acceptable to grant illegal immigrants permission to stay. Mass media often played an 
important role in shaping this humanitarian sentiment. The case of Chan Kwan-fong in early 
1977 was one of the exceptional cases that received publicity and triggered attitude shifts. 
Chan’s husband was a citizen of Hong Kong. They had been separated for years as Chan’s 
two attempts to enter the colony both failed and she was subsequently repatriated to China. In 
March 1977, Chan tried to enter Hong Kong again but was apprehended for the third time. 
Being uncertain about what punishment Chan would face upon her return, her husband, Lee 
Man-hung, started a campaign to obtain public support for Chan’s permanent stay in Hong 
Kong. Their story was widely reported. At the end, Chan was allowed to stay. ‘Opinions’ 
captured the shifted public sentiments: 
 
The non-Communist press welcomed the decision to allow a woman illegal 
immigrant, Chan Kwan-fong to stay here and be reunited with her husband. The 
general consensus was that while there was a need to stop illegal immigrants from 
entering Hong Kong, humanitarian grounds must be given due consideration in 
individual cases.114   
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For example, an editorial in Oriental Daily believed that ‘the government should refuse 
illegal immigrants permission to stay here’ in order ‘to prevent a population explosion’ but it 
‘should examine every case very carefully and make an appropriate decision based on its 
merits’.115 Express also praised the colonial government for dealing with Chan’s case 
‘sensibly and reasonably’: ‘We believe humanitarian grounds should be taken into 
consideration when drafting and enforcing laws. If we adhere strictly to the law when dealing 
with Chan’s case and similar cases in the future, we will be making big mistake.’116 The 
editor of Hong Kong Daily News similarly claimed that ‘the government has made a correct 
decision in allowing Chan Kwan-fong to stay here’.117 The case of Chan Kwan-fong 
demonstrated that the anti-immigrant attitudes of Hong Kong Chinese were not static. In 
special context, humanitarian grounds were invoked and Hong Kong Chinese could be 
mobilized, supporting Chinese illegal immigrants to stay. 
 
This period witnessed a shift of attitude towards mainland Chinese immigrants. A call for a 
tighter immigration policy emerged in the mid-1970s. Despite the absence of political 
mobilization and direct confrontation, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, there was a new 
critical discourse about immigrants and this intensified the pressure for policy changes. Since 
the mid-1970s, Chinese immigrants were being increasingly considered by the public to be 
inferior, not only when compared to local Hong Kong Chinese, but also newcomers from 
Southeast Asia, primarily due to their perceived lack of language proficiency and economic 
skills, cultural differences and their association with illicit activities. Nevertheless, the 
flexible nature of attitudes towards immigrants should be acknowledged. As Chan’s case has 
showed, Hong Kong Chinese were able to adjust their positions on immigration issue 
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strategically, in response to context. The escalating anti-immigrant sentiments should be 
attributed not only to the increasingly overcrowded living environment and strained social 
services in Hong Kong, but also to the construction of negative images of mainland Chinese 
immigrants by the press and due to the rhetoric employed by the government officials. The 
prejudicial rhetoric adopted by the officials to justify the increasingly exclusionist 
immigration policy and the shifting press sentiments in the early 1970s influenced the 
perception of Chinese illegal immigrants among Hong Kong Chinese. Holding a negative 
view towards illegal immigration, Hong Kong Chinese of different social classes and age 
groups increasingly engaged in a critical immigration discourse after the mid-1970s. Even the 
working class, which often distanced themselves from the political discourse, expressed their 
discontent towards the colonial state’s immigration policy. This changing public opinion 
influenced policy changes, ending the ‘Touch Base’ policy in 1980.  
 
Government’s Responses 
 
Initially, the ‘Touch Base’ policy reduced the number of illegal immigrants.118 There were 
increased warnings against illegal emigration in China. According to intelligence sources, in 
mid-December 1974, ‘leading cadres of all production teams in Pao-an County received via 
production brigades a commune directive that in all mass meetings, regardless of the main 
topic, verbal warnings against attempting to escape to Hong Kong should be issued’.119 
People were warned that the Hong Kong government had sought an agreement with China to 
the immediate repatriation of all illegal immigrants and they would all be returned. 
Nonetheless, in a long run, this Chinese policy failed to solve illegal immigration.  
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Due to the increased anti-immigrant sentiment, more measures were introduced to detect 
illegal entries both in China and Hong Kong in 1976. For example, a Ship Searching Unit 
was set up within the Immigration Department in early 1976 which inspected more than 250 
vessels entering Hong Kong a month.120 On the Chinese side, smugglers were given life 
sentences by the Chinese authorities.121 In June 1976, new legislative amendment was 
proposed to allow the police to prosecute illegal immigrants who had stayed in Hong Kong 
for two years. Most newspapers supported the change. South China Morning Post for 
example, described the bill as ‘designed to plug a loophole in the Immigration Ordinance’.122  
In July 1976, the bill became law. It empowered the Immigration Department to arrest and 
remove illegals within a period of three years from the time they have overstayed or entered 
Hong Kong. In June 1977, a new immigration bill was introduced to prosecute people aiding 
illegals. Before 1977, to fine and imprison aiders, evidence had to be provided at court to 
demonstrate the person they assisted was of illegal status, which hindered the process. This 
act solved the problem by allowing certificates issued by the Director of Immigration to be 
used as an evidence in court proceedings.123 
 
Yet, these new measures failed to put a halt to the influx. In May 1978, MacLehose was 
aware of the public’s increasingly hostile attitudes towards Chinese illegals. He expressed to 
London that the colonial administration was ‘becoming increasingly concerned about the 
number of legal immigrants arriving from China’. The Governor instructed Political Advisers 
to raise concerns to the Director of the NCNA again. MacLehose, however, believed that the 
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Chinese could only help solving part of the problem by issuing exit permits to those who had 
valid documentations for onward travel. MacLehose’s main concern was with the ‘overall 
numbers’, which should be brought down to fifty a day at maximum. Therefore, he proposed 
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the re-imposition of unilateral immigration control 
at the border. However, that was only regarded as the ‘ultimate weapon’ which should be 
used if China refused to act on the immigration problem. 124 Nevertheless, the Far Eastern 
Department and the Hong Kong and General Department both believed that ‘the possibility 
of controls should not be mentioned’ at this stage. Given ‘the present state of our relations 
with the Chinese over Hong Kong’, it was unnecessary to ‘resort to threats of counter-
measures in order to induce them to be cooperative’.125 In the meeting between Political 
Adviser and the NCNA in May 1978, Chui Yi, the Deputy Director of NCNA agreed to 
report the views expressed by D. C. Wilson to the relevant departments in China.126   
 
By the end of 1978, the ‘problem of people’ had escalated. The cumulative figure of legal 
arrivals from 1 January 1978 to 12 December 1978 totalled 64,770. What worsened the 
situation from the perspective of those perceived higher immigration as a ‘problem’ was that 
among these legal immigrants, 61,916 did not have onwards visas, which meant that the 
majority of them were unable to travel further and would therefore stay in Hong Kong 
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permanently.127 The imposition of unilateral border control on the Hong Kong side was once 
again brought to the agenda. However, D. T. Owen, the Director of Immigration, pointed out 
that imposing border control on the Hong Kong side ‘would present major political 
difficulties and could only be considered as a last resort’. He believed that it should be made 
clear that Hong Kong would prefer China to control the flow, and stated that the colonial 
government would be forced to introduce unilateral control if the number did not reduce to an 
acceptable level.128 China’s opposition to the re-imposition of border control was principled: 
Hong Kong was ‘a Chinese territory temporarily under British administration’, and not a 
‘British territory’. Any quota system and border control, therefore, was viewed as a violation 
of ‘traditional right for Chinese nationals to enter Hong Kong’. And China, of course, ‘have 
never officially recognized the legality of any systems of quota for entry of Chinese nationals 
into ‘‘Chinese territory’’’.129 
 
On 15 December 1978, Percy Cradock, the British Ambassador to China, met the Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Wenjin in Beijing. Cradock expressed concerns and hoped that 
the Chinese government would not issue any exit permits before valid visas for onward travel 
were acquired. Chang recognized immigration as ‘an important and serious matter’ and 
agreed that ‘something would have to be done to solve the immediate problem’.130 The 
Ambassador also suggested that Hong Kong should return people who overstayed the period 
stated in their Chinese short-term exit or re-entry documents. This approach however was 
‘not practical’, according to MacLehose:  
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If we attempted to return the thousands who overstay, they would simply destroy their 
Chinese travel documents and either go underground or claim to be treated as illegal 
immigrants who had ‘reached based’. We would then face the same dilemma as in 
dealing with illegal immigrants who ‘reached based’ in the urban areas, i.e. arresting 
them from the midst of their relatives and in crowded areas is virtually impossible; 
and the alternative of denying them legal documents to say is equally unpalatable 
since it would create a substratum of people outside the law who would be vulnerable 
to all sort of pressure.131   
 
The NCNA agreed. Alternative measures had to be sought. In January 1979, three changes 
were proposed and approved in the Executive Council: the distinction between immigrants 
from Guangdong and elsewhere in China should be abolished; the initial stay of all legal 
arrivals from China should be limited to twelve months; the initial stay of all illegals should 
be restricted to three months.132 It was expected that these new practices would be ‘welcomed 
by the public’, especially by those who considered the previous colonial immigration policy 
illogic.133 Although these changes would not completely solve the ‘problem of people’, they 
would at least cause those who stay some inconvenience and expenses’.134 
 
While being received positively by the general public in Hong Kong, the new policy attracted 
criticisms from China. Wen Wei Pao denounced the Immigration Department for changing its 
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policy for two times within three months and argued that the new measures ‘resulted in the 
disappointment or anxiety of so many people’.135 Ta Kung Pao argued that ‘compatriots in 
China and people of Hong Kong are related in flesh and blood’. The new policy ‘would 
naturally bring about problems and difficulties to people concerned’.136 These ‘unpopular’ 
measures however, did not put an end to the immigration problem.  
 
From the viewpoint of the Governor, the situation was extremely alarming: ‘We cannot allow 
this situation to continue. The present rate would be the equivalent of over 100,000 a year for 
legal immigrants alone. With illegal immigration also running at a high level we could face a 
yearly total of 140-150,000’.137 The rapid increase in illegal immigrants entering Hong Kong 
from China could be attributed to the relaxation in internal Chinese security. People were 
now being able to move more freely than previously inside the country. In addition, the 
collapse of the back-to-the countryside movement also led hundreds of thousands of exiled 
young people returning to cities where unemployment was running as high as 50 per cent. 
Natural disasters, such as floods in Huizhou also played an important role in the rise of illegal 
immigrants in 1979. MacLehose pressed the British government for policy changes, arguing 
it was ‘inevitable’ to impose unilateral control.138 Cradock agreed that warning should be 
given to China.139 In March 1979, the situation became so serious that MacLehose requested 
naval reinforcement.140 The Political Advisor then met the representatives of NCNA to 
follow up the discussions. As expected, the NCNA suggested that ‘the Chinese government 
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would find it very difficult to accept an imposed quota in view of the traditional free 
movement between China and Hong Kong’.  The meeting ended in a ‘friendly’ atmosphere 
but ‘the NCNA gave no signs of a favourable response to the various ideas put to them’.141 
 
Public opinions in Hong Kong shaped negotiations between MacLehose and the Foreign 
Office in London. In May 1979, as public discontent escalated, the Governor wrote to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, proposing to inform the Chinese that an unilateral quota 
system would be re-imposed on legal immigrants: 
 
We are now facing a potentially explosive mixture of immigration problems which I 
think requires early actions...and NCNA say the numbers will continue to drop. But 
they are still more than treble our target of 1,550 a month. NCNA persistently defer 
the discussions we have asked for because they have not yet authority for ‘concrete 
measures’…. The public are becoming profoundly disturbed by these mounting 
Chinese and Vietnamese figures. They feel that they are being shot with both 
barrels…. The fact that H.M.G. should even hesitate (and I have some personal 
sympathy) emphasized to the public here the hard fact that Hong Kong cannot expect 
much from others in solving her immigration problem in the short term. There is 
therefore strong demand that the Hong Kong government should act in some way, and 
this demand will grow fast. 142   
 
However, the proposition put forward by MacLehose was opposed by both Cradock and 
Carrington, who believed that emphasis should be placed on illegal problem instead as 
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‘unilateral measures by Hong Kong to stem the legal flow would increase rather decrease 
pressure of illegals’.143 In response to Hong Kong’s request to lower the number of illegals, 
Shenzhen started an anti-illegal emigration campaign in June 1979. Banners were put up and 
new policies against illegals were also broadcasted by radio in Guangzhou.144 
 
Yet, illegals increased again in the second half of 1979. Numerous potential emigrants ‘were 
waiting for the dust (new anti-illegal emigration campaign) to settle before making an attempt 
to get away’.145 The lack of universal measure and central coordination of the anti-illegal 
emigration campaign, which was first initiated by China in October 1977, also contributed to 
the increased number. For example, Zhongshan and Panyu Counties installed ‘stringent anti-
escape measures’. The militia in Zhongshan in particular, was ‘exercising a high level of 
vigilance’ and had set up a number of sentry posts.146 However, in some areas, border 
controls were loosely regulated. An illegal from Shekou Commune suggested that the militia 
near Shekou was ‘not active in arresting escapees but merely patrol the roads’.147 The 
People’s Liberation Army soldiers patrolled counties in different ways. Some were patrolling 
with dogs, but some, such as soldiers in Shatou and Baishizhou were without dogs, which 
made them easier to elude.148 Severe weather conditions also hindered border checks. An 
illegal immigrant from Longgang Commune pointed out that ‘many Commune members 
succeeded in reaching Hong Kong whenever storm condition prevailed’.149 Gathering 
intelligence from both successful and unsuccessful escapees, illegal emigrants would avoid 
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routes that were heavily patrolled. Fines and punishments also varied in different counties. 
For example, the Sai Heung Commune had taken no special anti-escape measures. Before 
July 1980, illegal emigrants who were arrested would face detention for fifteen days in the 
Reception Station. Even after July, they were only asked to pay a fine of RMB 35 and 
surrender a rice coupon. Penalties were not strictly enforced in a busy farming period when 
communes needed more manpower.150 However, in Chashan Commune, escapees had to face 
both detention and fines. Their heads would also be shaved and they had to labour without 
pay for fifteen to twenty days.151 Due to the lack of universal measure and the absence of 
close supervision of the implementation of anti-emigration measures, the problem of illegal 
immigration from China to Hong Kong persisted. 
 
In September 1979, the lack of effectiveness of China’s measures drove MacLehose to press 
London to reconsider the re-imposition of unilateral controls on legal immigration. He also 
proposed to separate immigrants without onward travel documents from other travellers at 
the border. 152 The plan, however, was put on hold because of the visit of Hua Guofeng to 
London in October 1979. The Foreign Office wanted to see ‘what Hua and his party say in 
London’ before taking any further steps.153  
 
Alongside negotiations with China, a series of legislative amendments were passed in 1979 in 
hope of solving ‘the problem of people’. For example, fines and penalty against smugglers 
were increased in both the Merchant Shipping (Amendment) Ordinance and the Shipping and 
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Port Control Ordinance, which passed in January 1979.154 The Immigration Ordinance was 
amended in May 1979 , removing restrictions on both the detention period of illegals and the 
size of vessels in offences, empowering the Royal Hong Kong Regiment and the Royal Hong 
Kong Auxiliary Air Force in arresting illegals, and altering definitions of ‘Immigration 
Assistant’ to include other newly created ranks in the Immigration Department’.155  
 
Despite all these new measures, the spread of rumours encouraged emigration to Hong Kong 
illegally, leading to fluctuations of influx rate in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The rumour 
that the People’s Liberation Army would replace the People’s Policeman after Shenzhen 
became a Special Economic Zone led numerous people to attempt to enter Hong Kong in late 
1980.156 Throughout the early 1980s, the rumours of amnesty stemmed from the Royal 
Wedding in 1981 and the agreement of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 motivated 
many to attempt escaping and believe they would be granted permission to stay.157 Rumours 
of the spread of natural disasters also occasionally led to influx of illegals from a few 
particular counties. Believing there would be an earthquake, a large number of people from 
Haifeng and Lufeng Counties fled to Hong Kong by vessels to seek shelter in March 1981.158 
The influx of illegals could as well be attributed to the increased number of smugglers who 
sought profit by offering boats to assist escapees. 
 
In response to the rising public pressure, on 16 April 1980, Lewis Davies, the Secretary for 
																																																						
154 FCO 40/1118, Hong Kong Government Printer, Legal Supplement No.1 to the Hong Kong Government 
Gazette Extraordinary, (Hong Kong, January 1979). 
155 FCO 40/1118, ‘Memorandum for Executive Council, Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 1979’, 31 May 
1979, p. 1. 
156 ‘Implementation of Illegal Emigration Controls in China’, memo from J. M. Shannon, Director of Special 
Branch for Commissioner of Police to Secretary for Security, 21 November 1980, p. 1. 
157 HKRS 70-8-2106, ‘II Amnesty Rumours Denied’, in ‘Opinions’, Chinese Press Review, 22-28 July 1981; 
HKRS 70-9-588, ‘Illegals Keep Pouring In’, South China Morning Post, 28 March 1984; HKRS 70-9-588, A. 
Chan, ‘More Illegals Floating in on Amnesty Rumours’, South China Morning Post, 20 September 1984. 
158 HKRS 70-8-2094 ‘Attention NWS Editors: Tuesday 31 March 1981’, Daily Information Bulletin, 31 March 
1981. 
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Security announced that the repatriation policy was ‘under review’. In June, the 
representatives of the NCNA expressed their ‘concern about this problem’ and accepted that 
‘in Hong Kong the concern was even greater’.159 In July, the public sentiments further 
escalated, forcing MacLehose to contact the Hong Kong and General Department again to 
press for policy changes. According to R. D. Clift,   
 
Sir Murray MacLehose told me on the telephone that he is thinking of recommending 
that the contingency plans for the return to China of illegal immigrants who have ‘got 
to base’ should be activated in the second half of August. He is concerned that the 
figures remained high; that Hong Kong will be affected by recession this autumn and 
that there may be some unemployment; and that public pressure for action is growing. 
He does not see any prospects of an improvement on the Chinese side until the new 
steps are taken.160 
 
The number of illegal immigrants had been rising since early 1980. The total number of 
illegal immigrants being returned reached 31,380 during the period from 1 January to late 
June. The daily average number of illegals repatriated also increased from 248 in mid-June to 
282 in late June. (See Table 16.) The Foreign and Commonwealth Office believed that time 
should be given for representations to take effect in Beijing on this ‘delicate political 
issue’.161 Nonetheless, in July, driven by increased public criticism and public expenditure, 
MacLehose continued to press for London’s approval in revising Hong Kong’s immigration 
policies: 
																																																						
159 FCO 40/1202, ‘Illegal Immigration from China’, extract from the record of meeting with NCNA, 10 June 
1980. 
160 FCO 40/1202, ‘Governor of Hong Kong: Illegal Immigration from China’, telegram from R. D. Clift to 
Blaker, 2 July 1980. 
161 FCO 40/1202, ‘Governor of Hong Kong: Illegal Immigration from China’, telegram from E. Youde to R. D. 
Clift, 4 July 1980. 
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There are a number of factors which led me to modify this view…. (4) This means we 
could face a population increase this year from immigration alone, of at least 125,000 
(excluding Vietnamese). This is on top of an increase of at least 180,000 last year. We 
cannot go absorbing population at this rate without very serious consequences for our 
wages, social services, and, ultimately, political stability. A new factor is that this is 
now realized by the public, because the steady accumulation of numbers has passed 
the point at which immigrants can be invisibly absorbed. Squatter areas are growing. 
The illegal immigrants are a noticeable and unruly element, and fellow feeling for 
them has evaporated. (5) The certainty of international recession, which inevitably 
will hit Hong Kong is also a major new factor which worsens this prospect. Because 
of (4) and (5) above, public opinion has noticeably happened months, and there is 
increasing criticism in and outside the media of government’s failure to act to change 
the ‘reached base’ policy. This criticism will grow as recession abroad affects the 
working population here.162 
 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office recognized ‘the increased pressures over the last two 
months’ but proposed that the policy should not be implemented before the Secretary of State 
visited Beijing in early October.163 To persuade the British government to accept the proposal 
as soon as possible, MacLehose stressed that ‘opinion in Hong Kong was strongly in favour 
of the measures’ in July.164  
 
																																																						
162 FCO 40/1202, ‘Illegal Immigration’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the Foreign and the 
Commonwealth Office, 8 July 1980. 
163 FCO 40/1202, ‘Illegal Immigration’, from Carrington to Hong Kong, 16 July 1980. 
164 FCO 40/1202, ‘illegal Immigration from China to Hong Kong’, discussion between Mr Blaker and the 
Governor of Hong Kong, 14 July 1980. 
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Table 16: Statistics of Illegal Immigrants Repatriated in 1980 
 17-23 June 10-16 June Cumulative since 1 
Jan 1980 
Illegal repatriated 1,977 1,739 31,360 
Daily average 282 248 187 
 
 
Source: FCO 40/1202, ‘Immigration from China’, telegram from MacLehose to the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 24 June 1980. 
 
In September 1980, a new policy which set that an identity card must be carried when 
travelling to the New Territories. However, the calls for ending the ‘Touch Base’ policy were 
not muted by the introduction of the new law. In late September, MacLehose put pressure on 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office again, arguing the immigration issue ‘cannot wait’.165 
On 1 October 1980, a meeting was held between Peter Carrington, the Secretary of State of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Chinese Foreign Minister. Carrington 
pointed out to Huang Hua that ‘the situation was so serious that Hong Kong was planning to 
send back to China those who were successful in reaching the urban areas and had previously 
allowed to stay’ and China’s cooperate would be needed.166 When MacLehose met Huang 
two days later, he explained to him that changes in border control were necessary. To deal 
with illegal immigration effectively, Hong Kong would soon declare that it was illegal for 
illegal immigrants to take up jobs in the colony and they would send back all illegals even 
																																																						
165 FCO 40/1202, ‘Cancellation of Secretary of State’s Visit to China’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 September 1980. 
166 FCO 40/1203, ‘Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister at 
1 Carlton Gardens on Tuesday 1 October 1980 at 2.30 pm’, by the Far Eastern Department, 6 October 1980, p. 
1. 
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they ‘reached base’.167 The Chinese side was in general cooperative. As Guo Jie, the Deputy 
Director of Western European Department, had pointed out, the Chinese authorities had 
attempted to but could not solve the illegal immigration problem. Therefore, they 
‘appreciated the efforts on the British side and all necessary measures would have Chinese 
support’. To avoid another wave of influx of illegals, the new measure was deliberately kept 
in secret.168 On 8 October, the Hong Kong and General Department and Far Eastern 
Department both agreed that London should authorize MacLehose to enact new laws to end 
the ‘Touch Base’ policy and should be ‘given discretion to implement the scheme without 
further reference to Ministers’.169 Two days later, the Governor visited Canton. It was finally 
announced on 21 October that the ‘Touch Base’ policy would end on 27 October after a 
three-day grace period was given to illegals to register. Identity cards were no longer given to 
immigrants, causing them unable to seek employment and public welfare. During the grace 
period, 6,952 illegals came forward for registration. And 4,068, which was about 59 per cent 
of them were allowed to remain in Hong Kong.170  
 
This section demonstrates that shifting sentiments towards Chinese illegal immigrants since 
the mid-1970s played an important role in ending the ‘Touch Base’ policy in October 1980. 
The Governor was aware of the intensified immigration discourse in the colony, and this 
encouraged him to repeatedly put pressure on the British government. Britain however 
prioritized relationships with China which led to difficult negotiations that shaped changes to 
immigration policy.  
																																																						
167 FCO 40/1203, ‘Immigration’, telegram from Murray MacLehose to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
3 October 1980. 
168 FCO 40/1203, ‘Immigration’, telegram from P. Cradock to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 16 
October 1980. 
169 FCO 40/1203, ‘Hong Kong: Illegal immigration from China’, telegram from R. D. Clift to Mr Donald, 8 
October 1980. 
170 HKRS 70-8-2094, ‘Reply by Secretary for Security to a Question by Dr. Rayson Huang in Legislative 
Council’, Daily Information Bulletin, 13 May 1981. 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, the influx of immigrants from China resulted in 
public discussions regarding the colonial government’s immigration policy. Far from being 
apathetic, Hong Kong Chinese of all social classes and age groups were engaged in an issue 
that indirectly affected their daily lives. The mid-1970s was a turning point, when attitudes 
towards mainland Chinese immigrants shifted. Mainland Chinese immigrants were 
stereotyped. They were refered as ‘inferior’ due to the perceived cultural differences, lack of 
language proficiency and skills, and absence of working ethics. Nevertheless, public attitudes 
varied, with some invoking humanitarian concerns to pressurize the colonial government to 
grant residence to a particular group of illegal immigrants.  
 
Shifting public opinions encouraged the colonial administration to change its immigration 
policy. The colonial government departed from ‘local integration’, the approach adopted in 
the 1950s when immigration was controlled at the border. The ‘Touch Base’ policy was 
introduced. Public opinions influenced the attempts by MacLehose to negotiate with the 
British government. The problem was that the Foreign Office prioritized its relationship with 
China. Policy changes had long term effects. The end of the ‘Touch Base’ policy and new 
immigration measures strengthened the boundary between Hong Kong Chinese and mainland 
Chinese. This reinforced the emergent ‘Hong Kong political identity’, influencing the 
colony’s political culture in the 1980s. The new policy separated Hong Kong Chinese from 
mainland immigrants politically and highlighted cultural differences. It laid the foundation 
for the emergence of political definition of ‘Hong Kong permanent resident’ in the Sino-
British Joint Declaration in 1984 and Basic Law in 1990. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Using under-explored evidence derived from archives in Hong Kong and the United 
Kingdom, this thesis constructs political culture and policy making in British Hong Kong in 
the long 1970s, bringing the hitherto disjointed research on ‘state’ and ‘society’ together. It 
uncovers changes to state-society relations: how the colonial government improved political 
communications with the Chinese society and how political activism and shifting public 
opinions influenced the policy making process. After the Star Ferry riots in 1966 and the 
leftist-inspired riots in 1967, the colonial government sought to enhance its legitimacy to 
prevent further political turmoil. Political stability in the colony was crucial for future Sino-
British negotiations regarding the future of Hong Kong which eventually commenced in the 
late 1970s. Democratic reform was perceived to be unfeasible as it would jeopardize Sino-
British relations. In order to instil a sense of belonging among the Hong Kong Chinese, the 
colonial government changed its ruling strategies. It became increasingly responsive to public 
opinions. As revisionists, such as Ma Ngok and Lam Wai-man, have rightly pointed out, the 
colony was far from a ‘minimally-integrated social-political system’. The colonial 
government and the Chinese society interacted frequently. The thesis similarly dismisses 
Lau’s concept and contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating that the colonial 
bureaucracy had both the desire and administrative capacity to reach into the Chinese society; 
and the Hong Kong Chinese demonstrated increased readiness and organizational capacity to 
engage in informal political activities that sought to influence policy making.  
 
The five case studies have proved that Town Talk and MOOD were important mechanisms 
for the colonial state to understand shifting popular sentiments. This thesis argues that since 
the riots, the colonial government invested substantial resources to improve political 
communications between itself and the Chinese population. It reveals that instead of gauging 
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public opinions indirectly through Chinese elites and advisory bodies, a reformist colonial 
administration developed a polling exercise. This began in 1968, covertly embedded in the 
City District Officer Scheme. During the period from 1968 to 1975, Town Talk was adopted 
as the main official device to assess shifting sentiments of different age groups, social classes 
and occupations. When it first started, the weekly exercise involved more than 100 staff, who 
were responsible for carrying out qualitative surveys. To enhance the diversity of the data 
collected, the Home Affairs Department expanded the contact list. Officers were also 
instructed to follow specific indirect interviewing techniques to ensure that opinions solicited 
were free from excessive bias. In the second half of the 1970s, the colonial administration 
invested increased manpower and experimented with new methodologies adopted in the 
polling exercise. This highlights its urge to develop a reliable and effective institutional 
mechanism to obtain better understandings of popular sentiments. This investment in 
collecting intelligence centred on the movement of opinion direction. 
  
In 1975, MOOD was introduced to replace Town Talk. The MOOD unit was large: its staff 
tripled that of Town Talk. The theme of each report became more focused. It also employed 
more scientific and sophisticated surveying methodologies. While the qualitative nature of 
the exercise was preserved, the Home Affairs Department continued to expand its contact list 
and started regulating the sample size. Incidental contacts were increased. The area covered 
expanded from urban areas to rural areas, including not only Kowloon and Hong Kong 
Island, but also the New Territories. By the late 1970s, quota sampling method and random 
sampling method were adopted. This thesis argues that the Town Talk and MOOD 
mechanisms were crucial in colonial statecraft in Hong Kong in the 1970s. These constructed 
‘public opinions’ were analysed and written up as a report circulated restrictively among high 
ranked civil servants, including the Governor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as 
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highlighted in Table A in the appendix. In short, the colonial government became 
increasingly responsive to popular opinions.  
 
The thesis points out that whenever political activism emerged, City District Officers in 
different districts were required to monitor activities of the activists and changing public 
opinions closely. These situation reports provided further intelligence for colonial 
bureaucrats, aiding policy making. The presence of an institutionalized covert polling 
exercise affirms the colonial government’s desire and organizational capacity to comprehend 
shifting sentiments of the Chinese society, dismissing the concepts of ‘laissez-faire’ and a 
‘minimally-integrated social-political system’.  
 
During the long 1970s, the general political culture of the Chinese society experienced 
changes, observed as increased political activism. In the early 1970s, the general political 
culture in Hong Kong was relatively conservative. This thesis asserts that most people were 
reluctant to disclose their identities in discursive debates via newspapers and petitions. They 
avoided engaging in social movements. This thesis argues that nonetheless, by the mid-
1970s, the political attitudes of many Hong Kong Chinese had changed. As MOOD noted, 
‘the statutory proclamation of Chinese as official language and the establishment of the ICAC 
have gradually built up public confidence in the government’s open minded attitude and 
sincere interest in public reactions’.1 The legalization of Chinese as the official language in 
1974 improved political communications and enhanced the stake of Hong Kong Chinese in 
politics by introducing simultaneous interpretation in the Councils and amending the 
language requirement for working in the government. The setting of the ICAC in 1974 
																																																						
1 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘Changes in Public Attitude towards the Hong Kong Government’, MOOD, 18 September 
1975, p. 2. 
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showed that the public was determined to work with the colonial government in eliminating 
corruption. With increased political transparency, supported by colonial propaganda and 
mass education, hostility and apprehensiveness towards officialdom reduced. People were 
more willing to report crimes and corruption, showing a rising readiness to raise their 
concerns and engage in public affairs. Hong Kong people were now ‘believing that the 
incompetent, corrupt, or unfair officer should not, and will not get away with his wrong 
doings, in the face of public exposures’.2 They increasingly stood up for their own rights and 
were willing to express their grievances publicly.3 In 1975, MOOD observed that this general 
shift: 
 
The government greatly intensified its efforts in publicizing and explaining its 
policies, achievements and difficulties, through increasingly powerful mass media and 
widely extended personal contact. It encouraged public discussion on major policies 
and current issues.... More frequent appearances on the ground by the Governor, top-
level civil servants and prominent unofficials to study problems in the field and 
discuss them with ordinary people all helped to bridge the proverbial gap between the 
government and the people. As a result, public knowledge, interest and involvement 
in current affairs increased considerably at all levels of society. Many more people 
now feel confident to approach the government not only for help and advice, but also 
to offer suggestion and criticisms. The traditional fear of authority or officialdom 
reflected in the adage that one should ‘keep away from officialdom when alive and 
from hell after death’ has been greatly reduced. Today, the humblest labour or hawker 
has no inhibitions about going to the City District Officers, or even to Government 
House if and when his interest is at stake.4 
																																																						
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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Social classes and age groups mobilized to participate in social movements and public 
discourse across a range of issues, and were especially active if their material wellbeing was 
perceived to under threat (as in the case of immigration) and actually under threat (as with the 
case of telephone rate increases). The diversity of participants strongly suggests that a new 
form of political activism was pervasive and thus significant. It had longer term repercussions 
on colonial governance and social change as the case studies have indicated. In no way was 
the Chinese society in Hong Kong politically aloof.  
 
Due to changing political cultures, collaborative and overt strategies used in a range of social 
movements were gradually accepted as appropriate means to express grievances. The five 
case studies reveal common mass mobilization strategies. To pull resources together, activists 
set up ad hoc coalitions. This thesis argues that most groups did not confront the colonial 
state directly. Instead, they expressed their grievances through informal channels, such as 
petitions, signature campaigns, open letters and surveys. Activists employed ideological and 
instrumental rhetoric, such as ‘people’s livelihood’, ‘public interest’, ‘political stability’ and 
‘law and order’. It also reveals that the use of abstract ideas, such as democracy, nationalism 
and anti-colonialism, were relatively less appealing; except amongst students. Activists 
requested concessions and warned that administrative intransigence would cause political 
disturbances and lead to economic decline. There were extremists, who, for example, made 
death threats to politicians through letters and posters. Nevertheless, they were on the 
margins of society, and had limited political impact. As the collaborative strategies were 
considered rational and widely endorsed by the public, the use of them were more likely to 
put pressure on the colonial government successfully.  
 
This thesis also shows that a degree of political conservatism persisted. This could be 
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observed from the fact that direct confrontation, such as sit-ins and demonstrations, was still 
not widely endorsed by Chinese people. These informal political activities were only 
organized and joined mostly by social elites, especially by the young generation at the higher 
education. This may have been a legacy of the leftist riots of 1967. Many contemporaries 
considered direct confrontation radical and expressed their worries of ‘rocking the boat’. The 
rhetoric of ‘law and order’ was repeatedly coined, emphasizing that these direct actions 
would undermine the colony’s political stability and lead to the outbreak of chaos. Activists 
who confronted the colonial government were deemed as ‘trouble-makers’ and ‘rabble-
rousers’. This could be observed in the relatively poor attendance of the anti-corruption 
demonstrations in the anti-corruption campaign. The Precious Blood Golden Jubilee 
Secondary School dispute was another notable example where teachers and students lost the 
support of the public due to their ‘radical’ sit-ins and hunger strikes. Some newspapers even 
associated the teachers and students involved in this disputes with leftists who attempted to 
subvert the colony’s law and order in 1967.  
 
The diverse attitudes towards political activism suggest the political culture in Hong Kong 
society was far from monolithic. Political culture varied in accordance with class and age. 
MOOD reports in 1975 and 1977 closely summarized the political attitudes and orientations 
of different social classes, which attune to their responses and involvement in the five case 
studies. In general, both the upper and middle classes opposed political activism:  
 
Our successful upper and middle classes are staunch supporters of the status quo. 
They have identified themselves with the establishment. Many even have become 
British subjects by naturalization and taken out Hong Kong passports.5  
																																																						
5 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘Public Attitude towards Living in Hong Kong’, MOOD, 25 September 1975, p. 1. 
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The upper class considered participating in informal political activities incompatible with 
their status: 
 
Influential and wealthy social groups view such (informal political) activities with 
dislike and concern. They are well capable of looking after their own interests in some 
way or other and consider a march to the Government House undignified and 
unbecoming of their status. They are also apprehensive that should this style of 
agitation continue to gain momentum, social order and discipline will be undermined. 
They hope that the government will stand firm and not give concessions in the face of 
such pressure because of the danger of encouraging more groups to follow suit.6 
 
The middle class also tended to be pro-status quo: 
 
Another group in support of the status quo and social order and becoming more 
important ‘politically’ in the broad sense are those with established careers and 
sufficiently substantial vested interests in Hong Kong. They are by no means as 
wealthy or influential as the magnate entrepreneurs mentioned above, but they have 
by and large succeeded in going some way up the social ladder, often through hard 
work and persevering effort, and do not wish to lost that position.7 
 
They were politically informed but some were still conservative: 
 
 
The Hong Kong middle class are intelligent, articulate, resourceful and much 
informed than the low-income group…. Being aware of the government’s liberal and 
enlightened policies of ‘open government’, they are encouraged to take much more 
																																																						
6 HKRS 394-26-12, ‘1975 in retrospect: Part II’, MOOD, 8 January 1976, p. 2. 
7 ‘Public Attitudes towards Living in Hong Kong’, p. 5.	
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critical and aggressive stance against the authorities, particularly over decisions they 
dislike…. The more traditional types among them, especially those without the 
benefit of a modern education, are still less forceful than their younger generation…. 
It would be misleading to suggest that all the agitation was due entirely to 
disenchantment or dissatisfaction. Part of it, at least must have been inspired by the 
belief that the current government welcomes constructive criticisms…. Despite these 
occasional feelings of disaffection, uneasiness and anxiety described above, the Hong 
Kong middle class are still, by and large, the strongest supporters of the status quo. 
Their attachment and support vary to some extent in direct proportion to their own 
success here. 8 
 
This thesis demonstrates that diversity shaped activism across the five case studies. In the 
Chinese as the official language movement many middle and upper classes showed concern 
regarding the colonial government’s language policy but despised ‘radical’ political actions, 
such as class boycotts and petitions. Similarly, while supporting the cause of the anti-
corruption campaign, they were critical of students’ organization of rallies, particularly the 
demonstration at Morse Park, which was not included in the list of approved sites. In 
contrast, the working class was on the whole less politically informed, and primarily driven 
by instrumentalism: 
 
What matters most to blue-collar workers is good take-home pay, which gives them a 
better standard of living and more material comforts. They are less enthusiastic about 
long-term benefits…. Families at the lower end of the scale are not very well-
																																																						
8 HKRS 925-1-1, ‘An Assessment of the Government’s Current Image and a Student of Community 
Aspirations, Part II’, MOOD, 13 April 1977, p. 3. 
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informed, often silent. Sometimes families eligible to receive various forms of aid are 
still not aware of the allowances and service available. 
 
Nonetheless, the working class showed no hesitation to engage in political activism when 
their interests were threatened. As the campaign against telephone rate increases 
demonstrated, grassroots groups in public housing and resettlement estates were capable of 
forming their own lobbies when their livelihood was affected directly. This affirms the 
heterogeneity of political culture in Hong Kong.  
 
Political culture also differed in accordance with age. While middle-aged and elderly 
members of the society were politically conservative, the young generation, particularly those 
at the higher education, had a completely different political outlook: 
 
Even discounting radical elements and those with political affiliations, students and 
youths generally hold significantly different, and largely less favourable view of the 
government than their elders…. Their idealistic outlook on life results in their 
distrustful of compromise and impatient in their wait for an egalitarian society. 
Although on the whole, the younger generation in Hong Kong is much less 
revolutionist than their counterparts in many other countries, their move towards 
greater social consciousness and their demand for greater participation in the 
evolution of society will certainly continue to increase.9 
 
Direct confrontation, the more ‘radical’ approach, was often only adopted by the young 
generation to exert pressure on the colonial government. Nevertheless, the young generation 
																																																						
9 ‘Changes in Public Attitude towards the Hong Kong Government’, p. 7.	
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was also divided, notably between those in secondary and tertiary education. As the Chinese 
as the official language movement has shown, students in secondary schools sometimes were 
more reluctant to engage in political activism. This suggests that political culture was 
heterogeneous, varying in accordance with age group.   
 
Lastly, this thesis reveals administrative, legislative and institutional changes were influenced 
by political activism and government perceptions of how public opinions were shifting. 
Unlike in the 1960s, the colonial government did not only solicit public opinions indirectly 
through Chinese leaders and elites, they consulted the public directly. In the 1970s, when 
discursive debate of an issue intensified or a social movement emerged, various 
administrative agencies, such as the City District Offices and the Hong Kong Special Branch, 
were instructed to monitor shifting press sentiments, activists’ activities and changing public 
opinions. The City District Officers, in particular, attempted to capture attitudes of different 
social classes and age groups in various districts. They also offered strategies and provided 
practical advice, helping to resolve social tensions. The intelligence solicited were analysed 
into situation reports, circulated and discussed among senior civil servants who were 
involved in the policy making process. To demonstrate that the colonial administration was 
responsive to public opinions, in all case studies that involved political activism, either a 
Special Committee or a Commission of Inquiry was set up, investigating the issue and 
consulting the public. In the Chinese as the official language movement, the colonial 
government set up a Chinese Language Committee swiftly in September 1970. To encounter 
widespread discontent over the escape of Peter Godber, a Commission of Inquiry was set up 
in June 1973. Similarly, a Commission of Inquiry was set up in January 1975, enquiring into 
the financial situation of the Hong Kong Telephone Company. A Committee of Inquiry was 
also set up in the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee dispute in 1978. Members were carefully 
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chosen. In most cases, the Committee consisted of people of diverse backgrounds, included 
politicians, social elites, businessmen and community leaders. Alastair Blair-Kerr’s selection 
to head the Commission of Inquiry investigating corruption was a response to the public’s 
distrust of the police force. Findings from these committees and commissions were 
published. Based upon the situation reports from City District Officers and the Special 
Branch, and using information uncovered by the ad hoc bodies, the colonial administration 
altered policy, via, in most cases, close liaison with the British government.  
 
This thesis also demonstrates the circumstances under which activists and the Chinese society 
were more likely to succeed in exerting pressure on the colonial government. The case 
studies suggest that the following three conditions often enhanced the likelihood of the public 
to press for administrative, legislation and institutional changes successfully. First, if the 
movement involved people of different age groups and social classes, and was on a large 
scale, the colonial government would normally set up a Commission of Inquiry and respond 
to public opinions to avoid undesirable repercussions. Second, the colonial state was more 
likely to get the permission from London to introduce changes if those changes were only 
confined to Hong Kong, instead of affecting other dependent territories. Third, interventions 
by British and colonial governments were shaped by perceptions of how the reputation of the 
British government internationally was being influenced by events and social processes in 
Hong Kong. To put it another way, if the requested changes had impacts beyond the colony, 
such as affecting legislation in other dependent territories, and if diplomatic relations between 
the British government and other countries might be adversely affected by the reform of 
colonial governance in Hong Kong, political activism did not necessarily lead to changes to 
colonial policy.  
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To reiterate, the wider interest of the British government and the state of Sino-British 
relations outweighed the importance of shifting popular sentiments in the policy making 
process. With respect to the anti-corruption campaign, for instance, the Home Office was 
opposed to retrospective legislative changes and believed any precedent would affect other 
dependent territories in the British Empire. There was no attempt therefore to amend the 
Fugitive Offenders Act. The British government’s concerns over Sino-British relations 
delayed the implementation of immigration control in 1980. Similarly, if the situation 
involved practical issues which could not be solved by the colonial government, popular 
demands were not followed. For example, in the case of the campaign against the telephone 
rate increases, the Legislative Council did not introduce a bill to cap rate increases; the 
colonial administration was concerned that the company would go bankrupt if rates did not 
increase. Nevertheless, the colonial administration’s new appreciation of the attitudes and 
wants of Hong Kong people did alter Hong Kong-London relations. 
 
The thesis also asserts that official perceptions of popular opinion influenced how the 
Governor engaged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarding institutional 
changes. Hong Kong and London did not always agree. While the colonial administration 
paid close attention to the needs of the Chinese communities, the British government was 
concerned primarily with domestic interests and the Sino-British relations. Interests rarely 
aligned. In such instances, the Governor used new evidence of political activism and 
changing public opinions to justify reform. As Chapter 3 has shown, although the creation of 
an independent Anti-Corruption Branch separating from the police force was debated as early 
as in the 1960s, both the colonial and British governments did not endorse the notion of an 
institutional change until a number of anti-corruption campaigns emerged and press coverage 
reporting corruption increased. When London was reluctant to introduce unilateral border 
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control, the colonial government drew on evidence regarding popular discourse of 
immigration. MacLehose’s repeatedly informed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of 
widespread of public discontent over the existing immigration policy, which had failed to 
stop influx of illegal Chinese immigrants. In late 1980, he finally persuaded the London 
government to approve the new immigration legislation, ending the ‘Touch Base’ policy. In 
these cases, changing political culture altered policy.
	 321	
Appendix 
 
 
Table A: MOOD Distribution List in 1980 
 
Department and officer Number of copies 
Agriculture and Fisheries Department  
–Director of Agriculture and Fisheries 
 
1 
British Forces 
–Commander British Forces 
–Gurkha Field Force 
–Joint Service Intelligence Section 
–Captain in-charge, Her Majesty’s Ship 
Tamar  
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Civil Aid Services 
–Chief Staff Officer 
 
1 
Census and Statistics Department  
–Commissioner for Census and Statistics 
 
1 
Consumer Council 
–Executive Director, Consumer Council  
 
1 
Education Department 
–Director of Education 
–Music Administrator, Education 
Department  
 
1 
1 
Fire Service Department 
–Director of Fire Services 
 
1 
Government House 
–His Excellency the Governor  
–Private Secretary, Government House 
 
1 
1 
Government Secretariat 
–Chief Secretary 
–Financial Secretary 
–Secretary for Civil Services 
–Secretary for Economic Services 
–Secretary for the Environment 
–Secretary for Home Affairs  
–Secretary for Housing 
–Secretary for Information 
–Secretary for Monetary Affairs 
–Secretary for Security 
–Secretary for Social Services 
–Deputy Financial Secretary  
–Director of Administration and 
Management Service 
–Assistant Director (Councils), Councils 
Branch  
–Deputy Clerk of Councils, Councils 
Branch 
–Political Adviser 
–Assistant Political Adviser 
 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
 
3 
 
30 (for Unofficial Members of Executive 
and Legislative Councils) 
1 
1 
	 322	
–Secretary, Local Intelligence Committee 
–Commander Royal Air Force 
–Commander Officer, Royal Hong Kong 
Regiment (The Volunteers) 
–Officer Commanding 10 Intelligence and 
Security Company  
–G. Operations Division, Headquarters 
British Force 
–Joint Services, Public Relations Section, 
Victoria Barracks 
–Security Liaison Officer, Headquarters 
British Force 
–Commissioner for Narcotics, Narcotics 
Division, Security Branch  
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Housing Department 
–Director of Housing 
 
1 
Immigration Department 
–Director of Immigration 
 
1 
Independent Commission Against 
Corruption 
–Commissioner Against Corruption 
 
 
1 
Information Services Department 
–Director of Information Services 
 
1 
Inland Revenue Department  
–Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
 
1 
Judiciary  
–Chief Justice 
 
1 
Labour Department 
–Commissioner of Labour 
 
2 
Legal Aid Department 
—Director of Legal Aid 
 
1 
Legal Department 
–Attorney General  
 
1 
Marine Department 
–Director of Marine 
 
1 
Medical and Health Department 
–Director of Medical and Health Service 
 
1 
New Territories Administration 
–Secretary for New Territories 
 
12 
Post Office 
–Postmaster General  
 
1 
Public Services Commissions 
–Chairman, Public Services Commission  
 
1 
Public Works Department 
–Director of Public Works 
 
1 
Radio Television Hong Kong 
–Director of Broadcasting 
 
1 
Rating and Valuation Department 
–Commissioner of Rating and Valuation 
 
1 
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Royal Hong Kong Police Force 
–Commissioner of Police (Personal) 
–Deputy Commissioner of Police 
Administration 
–Deputy Commissioner of Police 
Operations 
–Director of Operations 
–Director of Special Branch  
–Director of Criminal Investigation 
–Chief Staff Officer (Traffic) 
–Director of Public Relations 
–Chief Staff Officer (Staff Relations) 
–Exercise Director 
District Police Commander 
–Divisional Superintendent (Eastern) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Wan Chai) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Central) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Western) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Traffic) Hong 
Kong Island  
–Divisional Superintendent (Yau Ma Tei) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Mong Kok) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Sham Shui Po) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Kowloon City) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Wong Tai Sin) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Kwun Tong) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Airport) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Traffic) 
Kowloon 
–Divisional Superintendent (Yuen Long) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Tsuen Wan) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Sha Tin) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Kwai Chung) 
–Divisional Superintendent (Traffic) New 
Territories 
–Divisional Superintendent, Marine 
(Harbour) 
–Divisional Superintendent, Marine 
(Sectors) 
–Divisional Superintendent, Marine 
(Islands) 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Royal Observatory  
–Director of Royal Observatory 
 
1 
Social Welfare Department  
–Director of Social Welfare 
 
1 
Television and Entertainment Licensing 
Authority  
–Commissioner for Television and 
Entertainment Licensing  
 
 
1 
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Trade Industry and Customs Department  
–Director of Trade Industry and Customs 
 
1 
Transport Department 
–Commissioner for Transport 
 
1 
Treasury  
–Director of Accounting Services 
 
1 
Unofficial Members of the executive and 
Legislative Councils Office  
–Administrative Secretary  
 
 
1 
Urban Services Department 
–Director of Urban Services 
 
1 
Overseas 
–Hong Kong Commissioner, Hong Kong 
Government Office, London  
–Hong Kong and General Department, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
 
1 
 
1 
Departmental Distribution 
–Director of Home Affairs  
–Deputy Director of Home Affairs 
–Assistant Directors 
–Administrative Officers 
–City District Commissioner (Hong Kong) 
–City District Commissioner (Kowloon 
East) 
–City District Commissioner (Kowloon 
West) 
–City District Officer (Central) 
–City District Officer (Western) 
–City District Officer (Wan Chai) 
–City District Officer (Eastern) 
–City District Officer (Sham Shui Po) 
–City District Officer (Mong Kok) 
–City District Officer (Kowloon City) 
–City District Officer (Kwun Tong) 
–City District Officer (Wong Tai Sin) 
–City District Officer (Yau Ma Tei) 
 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
TOTAL  167 copies 
 
Source from HKRS 394-26-13, ‘MOOD Distribution List’, (date not specified) 1980, pp. 1-9. 
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